From: skunk-works-digest-owner@harbor.ecn.purdue.edu To: skunk-works-digest@harbor.ecn.purdue.edu Subject: Skunk Works Digest V3 #45 Reply-To: skunk-works-digest@harbor.ecn.purdue.edu Errors-To: skunk-works-digest-owner@harbor.ecn.purdue.edu Precedence: bulk Skunk Works Digest Wednesday, 19 May 1993 Volume 03 : Number 045 In this issue: Clipper Chips vs Skunk Watchers Re: Clipper Chips vs Skunk Watchers RE: New Intercepts Re: RE: New Intercepts clipper F-4 Phantom list in operation - FYI See the end of the digest for information on subscribing to the skunk-works or skunk-works-digest mailing lists and on how to retrieve back issues. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Rick Pavek Date: Tue, 18 May 1993 10:51:01 -0700 Subject: Clipper Chips vs Skunk Watchers One realization that I made was that the Clipper Chip, soon to be used in cellular phones, telephones, radios, and modems is that the biggest customer will be (at first) the US Government. We, the people, might find it untasteful to knowingly use a device that has less-than-adequate security for our own communications (supposed appropriate uses will allow chip-tapping), but the one thing that it will do is make our communications safe from the prying eyes of others who have scanners (other normal folk, like us). You and I won't be able to monitor conversations that use these chips, right? We're going to see the government purchase a whole slew of new equipment that uses this technology. And people that make a hobby of monitoring the activities of the government via open radio are soon going to find those avenues closed. I'll wager that the government doesn't even care if we buy new Clippered phones... Pity they didn't write something about open government and access by the people into the Bill of Rights... Now don't get me wrong. I don't think that the current government is an evil force waiting to take advantage of the people. But I don't know anything about future administrations, do you? Personally, I think that the government's right to privacy is, and should be, automatically overrided by the people's right to know what its government is doing. Soon, they'll be able to hide previously open communications... (oh, you didn't know that with a scanner and the proper frequency you could listen in to the communications from Air Force 1? Well, you can, for now.) As for the suitability of this message on this list? Well, I figured it would be marginally appropriate since virtually all of the Skunk Works info relates to secure programs and that a suprising amount of information comes from people who monitor the airwaves... Thanks for the ear... Rick kuryakin@halcyon.com ------------------------------ From: "Philip R. Moyer" Date: Tue, 18 May 1993 13:47:37 EST Subject: Re: Clipper Chips vs Skunk Watchers There won't be any significant loss of information if all government communications are suddenly switched over to Clipper, IMNSHO. Critical telecommunications systems are already encrypted. The only things sent in the clear are non-critical, though interesting, "administrative" communications. The only way skunkers can extract useful information from encrypted radio communications is through traffic analysis. To my knowledge, no skunkers are currently involved in this sort of monitoring. I don't even know if AW&ST is doing it. I do know that nobody has asked for *my* help, if they are. Essentially, any information that is now being sent in the clear can be extracted through other means, even if that cleartext is switched over to ciphertext, given the proper knowledge and motivation. As for the security of Clipper (as opposed to Capstone or Skipjack), I don't trust it for anything more than keeping the neighborhood teenagers from listening in when I order pizza on the cordless, which is exactly what I plan to use it for. If I need strong crypto for something, I'll use an alternative cryptosystem. I'm willing to bet that the government won't use Clipper. They'll use a non-escrowed Capstone chip (the MYK-80). And then you're back to using traffic analysis, which is where you are now (or should be). Cheers, Phil ------------------------------ From: George Allegrezza 18-May-1993 1508 Date: Tue, 18 May 93 15:11:16 EDT Subject: RE: New Intercepts Rick P. writes: >Boy, this latest Intercepts (May '93) is _hot_. > . . .and on a trip to Alamagordo/White Sands has seen a new, previously >unknown (?) aircraft that uses a heat shield (tail number 399). So Rick, make with the details. :-) :-) Like, is this new aircraft large or small? Small enough to be an RPV? Shape? Apparent function? And, what about the "heat shield"? How did Steve determine it was a heat shield? Is it an RV-type heat shield, or a shield for some onboard heat source, or maybe a defensive shield against pulsed/DEW weapon effects? Non-"Intercept" subscribers want to know! (Many thanks.) George George Allegrezza | "I don't deserve to be treated like this. I'm Digital Equipment Corporation | human, ain't I?" -- Hope Littleton MA USA | "Well, there've been some complaints." allegrezza@tnpubs.enet.dec.com | -- Crosby ------------------------------ From: larry@ichips.intel.com Date: Tue, 18 May 1993 13:59:59 -0700 Subject: Re: RE: New Intercepts George writes: >So Rick, make with the details. :-) :-) Like, is this new aircraft large or >small? Small enough to be an RPV? Shape? Apparent function? And, what about >the "heat shield"? How did Steve determine it was a heat shield? Is it an >RV-type heat shield, or a shield for some onboard heat source, or maybe a >defensive shield against pulsed/DEW weapon effects? > >Non-"Intercept" subscribers want to know! Steve heard the pilot say his heat shield had a problem, or some such. that's how the term 'heat shield' came up. The pilot also mentioned his tail number when talking with the tower, that's how that was 'known'. I also doubt that a secret aircraft would be spouting too much reality on unencoded channels but, ... who knows. Keep in mind a secret aircraft would of course be talking to the appropriate ATC centers when necessary using normal call signs and a bogus aircraft type, if asked. We know this from the crash report on Ross Mullhare's unfortunate F-117A crash in 1986, when the F-117A was still quite secret (the crash report was published in AW&ST after the F-117A was declassified). Larry ------------------------------ From: rh@craycos.com (Robert Herndon) Date: Tue, 18 May 93 16:16:22 MDT Subject: clipper Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't suddenly see all government radio communications becoming encrypted: 1) Clipper, unless I misunderstand, encrypts/decrypts one two-way communications stream with one other party. Does it have some sort of party-line or conferencing capability as well? Without this, it would be impossible or at least very inappropriate to encrypt most air-to-ATC and ATC-to-air communications. 2) The ability of pilots to hear ATC's directives to other craft in their area is a significant boon to air traffic safety. Hearing that ATC has just cleared someone to land will make me suspicious of any directive to taxi and hold on that runway (to use a famous example, as well as one that's happened to me). If ATC was to encrypt each pilot's directives separately, this would (IMO) seriously compromise safety. 2) ATC's most pressing need is not security, but authentication. Rude persons with aviation transceivers are a major nuisance in a number of major metropolitan areas, giving bogus "ATC" directives to aircraft. Of course, this does not apply to air-to-ground communications between one aircraft and one or more ground stations, such as might be the case with classified military operations of various sorts. While I'm less sanguine than Rick about our government's intentions (I largely believe that government is a large organism that thinks it has control of its food supply (money) and cares a great deal primarily about making its own operations convenient to it) I believe that the government's secrecy apparatus is largely out of control. I also see encryption as a way for it to hide mundane things that should be readily observable, and in so doing, make government even less accountable than it already is. Add to this the government's express desire to be able to eavesdrop on citizens (e.g., the FBI wiretap bill, Clipper) when wiretaps weren't even legal until 30 years ago (and still aren't in California and Illinois), yet now it often doesn't even require a court order.... Sorry, I'll get off my soapbox now. Robert "call me a paranoid pessimist" Herndon ------------------------------ From: justin@tasman.cc.utas.edu.au (Justin Ridge) Date: Wed, 19 May 1993 15:21:31 +1000 Subject: F-4 Phantom list in operation - FYI [This message has been posted a few places so don't be surprised if you see it again] Mid-April a mailing list was formed for Phantom Phanatics, admirers of the greatest aircraft the world will ever see. The purpose of this message is to let people know of the lists existence. You may join the list by sending Email to Roland Hamblin (rolandh@eos.co.uk) stating this. It is important to note that the Phantom list is NOT a listserv. Thus: * Listserv commands such as SET NOMAIL will not work. * Additions to the list are done by hand - please allow Roland a day or two to process your request before re-sending it! * Include a relevant subject line in your request, e.g. "F-4 Subscription". Mail sent to phantom@eos.co.uk will then be forwarded to all members of the Phantom list. Phantoms forever, Justin R. - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Justin Ridge, | Phone: +61 02 202811 Information Technology Services | Fax : +61 02 231772 University of Tasmania | Email: Justin.Ridge@cc.utas.edu.au - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Skunk Works Digest V3 #45 ******************************** To subscribe to skunk-works-digest, send the command: subscribe skunk-works-digest in the body of a message to "listserv@harbor.ecn.purdue.edu". If you want to subscribe something other than the account the mail is coming from, such as a local redistribution list, then append that address to the "subscribe" command; for example, to subscribe "local-skunk-works": subscribe skunk-works-digest local-skunk-works@your.domain.net To unsubscribe, send mail to the same address, with the command: unsubscribe skunk-works-digest in the body. 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