From: skunk-works-digest-owner@mail.orst.edu To: skunk-works-digest@mail.orst.edu Subject: Skunk Works Digest V5 #701 Reply-To: skunk-works-digest@mail.orst.edu Errors-To: skunk-works-digest-owner@mail.orst.edu Precedence: Skunk Works Digest Sunday, 1 September 1996 Volume 05 : Number 701 In this issue: re: RAM in JSF?? re: JSF Award FW: NASA Dryden: 50 Years of Discovery through NASA Flight Research Re: Skunk Works Digest V5 #700 RE: Building 90 RE: Building 90 RE: Building 90 Compartmented Information Is the Defense Budget Really being cut? (Long, again) See the end of the digest for information on subscribing to the skunk-works or skunk-works-digest mailing lists and on how to retrieve back issues. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: ahanley@usace.mil Date: Thu, 29 Aug 96 16:49:22  Subject: re: RAM in JSF?? Su Wei-Jen: Remember that JSF is not going to be available for export for about 15 years yet. The stuff probably won't be classified by then. As far as Commanche goes, so far there hasn't been a lot of interest in it from other countires. By the time it finally arrives, most other nations that are in the market for that kind of vehicle will have already bought what they're going to buy. Art Hanley Despite what you might want to Believe, none of any of the above Even remotely has anything to do With my employer. ------------------------------ From: "Earl Needham, KD5XB, in Clovis, NM" Date: Thu, 29 Aug 1996 17:17:20 -0700 Subject: re: JSF Award > From: Charles_E._Smith.wbst200@xerox.com, on 8/29/96 4:48 AM: > > Unless you`ve been involved with the day to day upkeep of aircraft, > you probably can`t imagine whats involved. > Compare the maintainence time to the flight time for a military A/C. > (Especially the C5!!!!!!) Maybe the F-4 would be a more visible (and expensive!) example. Twelve hour shifts were common, no, NORMAL. 7 3 Earl Needham, KD5XB, in Clovis, NM (DM84) Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia, Pi Chi '76 Have you really jumped ROUND PARACHUTES? (Overheard at the Clovis Parachute Center) ------------------------------ From: "Mark E. Schmidt" Date: Fri, 30 Aug 96 00:53:01 UT Subject: FW: NASA Dryden: 50 Years of Discovery through NASA Flight Research Hope not too many folk here mind this repost. *Nomex suit on*, Mark Schmidt, IS Director Heritage Broadcasting Voice: 616.775.3478 x3316 Fax: 616.775.9665 Email: marks@michweb.net or cfii@msn.com - ---------- From: owner-press-release@venus.hq.nasa.gov on behalf of NASA HQ Public Affairs Office Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 1996 3:44 PM To: press-release-com2@venus.hq.nasa.gov Subject: NASA Dryden: 50 Years of Discovery through NASA Flight Research Don Nolan-Proxmire Headquarters, Washington, DC August 28, 1996 (Phone: 202/358-1983) Kirsten Williams Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA (Phone: 805/258-2662) RELEASE: 96-174 NASA DRYDEN: 50 YEARS OF DISCOVERY THROUGH NASA FLIGHT RESEARCH This September, NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA, will celebrate a half century of exploration, discovery, and contributions to the nation's aerospace industry. The occasion marks the 50th anniversary of Dryden's founding as a support unit for the X-1 rocket plane supersonic research flights. A place of unique resources and capabilities, Dryden has evolved over the years from a small desert outpost into the nation's premier flight research facility. This year also marks the 50th anniversary of the "X-planes," specifically designed as flight research tools to provide data not available from wind tunnels or simulators. The X-plane tradition continues today with the X-36 Tailless Fighter Agility Research Aircraft, scheduled to fly this fall. Dryden History and Contributions The Center's origins date back to September 30, 1946, when a small group of engineers from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics' (NACA) Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton, VA, arrived in Muroc, CA, to research the so-called "sound barrier" with the X-1, a joint effort with Bell Aircraft and the U.S. Army Air Forces. The remote desert location was picked for several reasons. First, the Mojave Desert offered clear skies and almost unlimited visibility all but a few days a year. The desert landscape and sparse population in the surrounding area also made it an excellent choice for high-speed and classified operations. Moreover, the Army Airfield at Muroc had both a 10,000 foot runway and access to Rogers Dry Lake -- a 44- square mile natural landing site that General Albert Boyd called "God's gift to the Air Force." Those resources became even more important as the nation moved rapidly into the supersonic age. These were the heady days of jet and rocket power, where speed and altitude records often stood only until the next flight. However, in an era where aircraft designers were moving so rapidly into new and unknown territory, the NACA station at Muroc provided an essential resource for designers trying to build aircraft to operate beyond the speed of sound. In an effort to better understand the dynamics of transonic (approaching and immediately surpassing the speed of sound) and supersonic flight, the X-1 was followed by other "X-series" research aircraft. Beyond simply expanding understanding of high speed flight, the early X- plane research offered manufacturers important insights into problems they were encountering with their production aircraft. The adjustable stabilizer on the X-1, for example, was incorporated in the F-86's all-moving horizontal tail, giving it great advantages over MIG fighters during the Korean conflict. And a potentially deadly problem with inertial coupling (a tendency to diverge from the flight path) on North American's F-100 Super Sabre fighter was solved with the help of NACA's X-3 research plane. The open skies, land and resources at Dryden soon proved their usefulness to the space effort, as well. The Mach-6 X-15, whose pilots were labeled the first "space men" by the popular press of the day, researched and developed various technologies that were implemented in the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo spacecraft. The X-15 also provided the pioneering work on a craft designed to go into space and then return to a horizontal landing on Earth -- a concept that would develop over the next two decades into the Space Shuttle. The Space Shuttle design also was influenced significantly by lifting body research conducted at Dryden in the 1960s. Lifting bodies were small, tubby, wingless vehicles that proved a craft designed for space flight could be landed safely without power. In addition, the Lunar Landing Research/Training Vehicles (LLRV/LLTV), or "flying bedsteads," designed and researched at Dryden, became the trainers that taught the Apollo astronauts how to land on the Moon. The payoff came on the very first mission, when Neil Armstrong, who was a research pilot at Dryden before joining the space program, had to land the lunar module manually. The confidence to do that, Armstrong said later, came from his experience flying the Dryden-designed LLTVs. Yet even as the nation was reaching into space and to the Moon, aerospace manufacturers were trying to get improved performance out of conventional aircraft designs, especially as rising fuel prices in the early 1970s made fuel efficiency a much greater industry concern. Dryden provided invaluable assistance in this area by flight researching concepts such as the supercritical wing and winglets -- designs to improve a wing's aerodynamic efficiency that are now used by most airliners and corporate jet aircraft. Dryden also researched military applications of a supercritical wing with the Transonic Aircraft Technology (TACT) program and a variable camber wing concept called the Mission-Adaptive Wing (MAW), both flown on the F-111 aircraft. At the same time, the dawning computer age was opening a new horizon of possibilities in aircraft and engine design that were explored at Dryden. The Center flew the world's first purely digital fly-by-wire aircraft in 1972, for example, transferring both important technology components and a critical level of confidence in the concept to industry. That research contributed to the creation of McDonnell Douglas' F-18 Hornet, General Dynamics' F-16 C/D Falcon fighters, and even aircraft such as Boeing's new 777 digital fly-by-wire airliner. Computerized flight control systems and new composite materials made more maneuverable aircraft designs possible as well. To provide engineers and designers with more information about this new realm, Dryden conducted extensive flight research with advanced aircraft technology demonstrators, including the remotely controlled Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology vehicle, the forward-swept- wing X-29, and the thrust-vectored X-31. Dryden researchers also helped manufacturers explore new engine designs and integrated engine and flight control systems made possible by computer technology. The Digital Electronic Engine Control flight research project at Dryden led Pratt & Whitney to commit to a digitally controlled production engine, which since then has been integrated into aircraft ranging from the McDonnell Douglas F-15 to the MD-11 and the Boeing 757. A more advanced concept, integrating digital flight and engine controls, showed the potential of a fighter aircraft having a "self-repairing" control system, in which the aircraft would automatically use engine power to compensate for damage to an engine or flight control surface. After reading about one of several crashes resulting from the loss of flight controls because of hydraulic failures, a Dryden researcher then adapted that integrated flight control and engine concept into a potential Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA) system. A PCA system would provide a pilot with a computerized system to land an aircraft with only engine controls in the event of a catastrophic hydraulic system failure. Although the feat was considered impossible by many engineers, Dryden nevertheless completed successful automatic PCA landings with both a McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter in 1993 and an MD-11 airliner in 1995. Along the way, Dryden also has proved a valuable support and trouble-shooting resource for a wide variety of commercial and government aerospace efforts. In addition to providing a testing and landing site for the Space Shuttle, for example, Dryden researchers discovered the cause and a cost-effective fix for a potentially dangerous Pilot Induced oscillation problem discovered on the Shuttle orbiter's final test flight before its first space mission. Dryden's high- speed research aircraft have proven capable testbeds for a variety of technologies, ranging from side-control sticks for the F-16 fighter to shuttle thermal protection tiles. Its B- 52 "mothership" has provided the launch platform to test everything from scale models and F-111 escape pod parachute systems to the commercially developed Pegasus rocket booster, designed to launch small payloads into orbit more cost- effectively than traditional rocket systems. Dryden's Convair 990 researched ways to improve the safety and performance of the Space Shuttle's landing gear, and the center's B-52 tested the drag chute now employed regularly on Shuttle landings. The center also has conducted a variety of research projects to improve safety in civil aviation, ranging from a general assessment of the handling qualities of small aircraft to a study of wake vortices to determine safe separation distances between airline and other traffic at commercial airports. In addition, the center has helped numerous aircraft manufacturers trouble-shoot design problems with production airplanes. The F-89, F-100, F-111, F-14, and F-15, among others, have benefited from Dryden's targeted research efforts. Dryden Today Much has changed since the initial NACA cadre of 13 engineers and support personnel arrived at Muroc in 1946. Yet in many ways, Dryden researchers today stand in the exact same place as their predecessors of 50 years ago -- still at the leading edge of what NASA understands, working to expand the boundaries into the abyss of the unknown. Technology has made great advances in the past half century. However, the problems have become more complex. Now, instead of simply trying to break through the speed of sound, America needs aircraft that can do that while still being highly maneuverable, "stealthy," or environmentally sensitive. Computers have made aircraft more capable, but they also have created new possibilities for problems. Software is now as critical to aircraft as the spars in their wings. Today, as Dryden faces the start of its second half century, it is continuing the tradition of diversified flight research in support of national goals and efforts. Its F-16XL supersonic laminar flow project aims to develop technology to help make a High Speed Civil Transport more aerodynamically, and therefore cost, efficient. Other projects, such as the F-15 Advanced Control Technology for Integrated Vehicles are looking to further improve the performance and maneuverability of aircraft and help industry capitalize on thrust-vectoring engine technology. The Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology program is attempting to develop remotely controlled aircraft capable of sustained, slow flight at high altitudes to gather currently unavailable information about our atmosphere. And a Reusable Launch Vehicle research effort using the Lockheed Martin X-33 is exploring technologies designed to make access to space more efficient and economical. People, Partnerships, and "Technical Agility" Over its 50 year history, there have been several factors that have enabled Dryden to successfully accommodate a wide variety of challenges and changes while continuing to play a significant role in advancing the nation's state of the art in aeronautics and aerospace design. Since its inception, Dryden has been a specialty shop, concentrating on the unique discipline of flight research. It is a practical discipline, where researchers from a variety of fields must work as a team, focused on the very real problems posed by an operational aircraft. This daily experience in operating and trouble-shooting research aircraft contributed greatly to Dryden's ability to help manufacturers and other NASA centers solve problems with production aircraft and spacecraft designs. It also has helped create an organizational philosophy and management approach that was very pragmatic, flexible, and result- oriented. Dryden has always been an independently-minded place where individual innovation and creative problem- solving were rewarded and formal procedures and paperwork were kept to a minimum. Dryden's project-focused team approach and pragmatic, flexible operational style have translated into a capability best described as "technical agility" -- an ability to adjust resources and focus to meet constantly changing priorities and needs. This "technical agility" is, unquestionably, one of Dryden's greatest strengths. It is also the primary reason the Center has been able to accommodate so many different projects and make such a wide variety of contributions to the aeronautics and space communities over the years. The requirements of flight research also have given Dryden a tradition of partnerships that date back to the first Army Air Force/Bell Aircraft/NACA team organized to conduct the X-1 research. The Center's very location on the grounds of Edwards Air Force Base means that it shares resources with the Air Force on a daily basis. In addition, many of the ideas and concepts researched in flight at Dryden originated elsewhere, and partnerships have involved other NASA centers, the military, and numerous commercial manufacturers. These teams not only provide a broad spectrum of expertise and perspective, they also help immensely in transferring the results of the research to organizations that can apply the technology to an operational design. Dryden's Mission -- Today and Tomorrow Much has changed since 1946. NASA has learned a great deal about high speed and high altitude flight. America has gone to the moon, and now NASA flies back and forth from space on a regular basis. Computers have revolutionized aircraft design and made much more capable ground test and simulation possible. Yet for all that, the role of flight research is as critical as it ever was. Computers and simulators can only model what is known. The unknown is always inherently unpredictable. To push the boundaries beyond what is known, to see what lies beyond the current frontier, further exploration is necessary. For the past half century, the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center has been a unique place where flight research could occur; a place where people have been encouraged to question and look for the unexpected; to push, discovery by discovery, the limits of our knowledge and understanding about aeronautics. In the process, Dryden has contributed significantly to the strength and success of the nation's aerospace community. As the United States faces the 21st century with an increasingly global economy and rising foreign competition, the role Dryden plays during its second 50 years will become even more important. -end- EDITOR'S NOTE: Still photography, video and a press kit are available to support this release. Photos are also available on the Internet under URL: http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/PhotoServer/photoServer.html Photos available in support of this release: EC60 6204 X-1 rocket research aircraft EC96 43434-7 X-1E on a pedestal in front of Dryden Headquarters building EC95 43073-6 Williams Phillips' painting, "Mach 2 Dawn," portraying first Mach 2 flight, which NACA pilot Scott Crossfield achieved in the D-558-2 E 17348 X-3 "Flying Stiletto" EC94 42909-1 Artist Stan Stokes' concept of the rocket-powered X-15 EC66 1461 NASA Hangar 4802 in 1966 with lifting bodies (HL 10, M2 F2, M2 F1) F-4, F-5D, F 104, C-47, and X-15s ECN 506 Lunar Landing Research Vehicle EC73 3468 F-8 Supercritical Wing research aircraft EC73 3478 F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire research aircraft EC 18899 F-15 equipped with digital electronic engine control ECN 14281 Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology research vehicle EC90 224 F-104 engaged in shuttle tile tests EC91 623-7 Perseus remotely piloted research aircraft EC94 42478-4 X-31 performing the Herbst maneuver EC94 42690-7 Orbital Sciences Corp.'s Pegasus launch vehicle under wing of B-52 EC94 42805-1 Propulsion Controlled Aircraft diagram on napkin EC95 43247-4 Milestone landing of propulsion-controlled MD-11, performing the first transport aircraft landing using only engine power EC95 43273-4 F-15 (ACTIVE) Advanced Control Technology for Integrated Vehicles EC96 43493-1 Moonrise over the orbiter Atlantis EC96 43503-9 F/A 18 vertical tails ------------------------------ From: erebenti@MIT.EDU (Eric Rebentisch) Date: Fri, 30 Aug 96 09:44:20 EDT Subject: Re: Skunk Works Digest V5 #700 Bryon said: >On another note not directly related to the Skunk Works, can someone >please explain to me what Im missing? Comments in the JAST thread >and previous threads on a variety of defense and aerospace topics >reference the commonly stated belief that there have been massive >defense budget cuts. This belief taints design and application >considerations for future projects and prompts endless speculation >on future contract acquisitions based on cost. Dole even used the >issue in his nomination acceptance speech. I did a little >research and frankly, I dont understand. While the DoD "top line" budget has come down substantially in recent years, specific accounts (such as modernization, readiness, force size, etc.) within that budget have taken different trajectories of their own. DoD planners usually absorb budget cuts first in the readiness accounts (ammo, consumables, etc.), then the modernization (R&D and Procurement), and then last in force structure (number of divisions or wings). As Art mentioned, there's not a lot you can do about "entitlements" like retirement accounts since you can't just downsize the number of retirees you have to support. The idea is that you can always buy more bullets in a pinch, but raising new divisions that are combat-ready takes a while (there are also basing issues, both domestically and internationally that constrain large changes in force structure). There are also contingency operations to pay for. To give you an idea how this works, I've heard a number of program managers complain that their acquisition program budgets are being raided (not literally, of course, but the money has to come from the service's budget from somewhere) to pay for Bosnian operations. So, while the top line budget has dropped by 15-20% since the late 1980s, the procurement budget has dropped more like 50% Since not a lot of programs have been cancelled (especially the big ones like F-22 that burn a lot of money) during that time period, that puts the sqeeze on those that remain and those that would like to get started (like JSF). Most acquisition program managers nowadays are under tremendous pressure to cut costs, and in fact, most of the DoD acquisition community (at least at the top levels) is frenetic with acquisition reform proposals and initiatives looking for ways to cut costs. JSF is putting a lot of effort into affordability initiatives even now, because the JPO understands that it won't be building a new fighter if it can't get the price down (hint: the Air Force would have just 40 C-17s today instead of the projected 120 if MDA hadn't been able to reduce the cost by about $100M per copy). Cost is very much a driver these days in new aircraft development and acquisition decisions. Hope this helps. Eric, speaking for myself ------------------------------ From: "Fowler, Robert A." Date: Fri, 30 Aug 1996 08:55:00 -0700 Subject: RE: Building 90 Note that base closures COST MONEY, they don't save money until the out years (> 5 years in the future). In business these get labeled as "restructuring costs" and if you have noticed every time a large corporation announces a significant downsizing they also announce a significant "one time restructuring charge". These include but are not limited to: For general down-sizing: * Buy-outs (early retirement or severance pay). * Paying up pension plans (I don't know if this applies to the military but in business the pension plans are often under funded and like social security are run as a pyramid scheme. Then when you down size you have to readjust the payments. This is particularly ugly for the employees if the company goes out of business before making the last balloon payment to the pension fund.) * Retraining programs (paying for all those ship workers to go to Novell CNE training :-) For base closures: * Soil Remediation. Military bases were exempt, or at least acted like they were, from environmental regulations. They have lots of industrial solvents, motor oil, fuel oil, JP6, etc. spilled into the soil that have to be cleaned up before the bases can be transferred to commercial use. * Refurbishing base buildings and infrastructure (the bases aren't being abandoned/bulldozed, they are being refurbished into low income housing and industrial parks to try to minimize the negative impacts on the local economies. * Sweet-heart deals with business to create jobs at the now closed/clossing bases to minimize job losses. In short it is a LOT cheaper to keep a base open in a reduced capacity (like just the gate guards) than it is to close it. Since this is harder on the local economy and this is politics not business we will be paying for it. >---------- >From: chosa@chosa.win.net[SMTP:chosa@chosa.win.net] >Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 1996 12:01 >To: skunk-works@mail.orst.edu >Subject: Building 90 > >Historical Note: The NY Times reported today Building 90, the former >sight of Lockheed's Skunk Works, has been leased by Walt Disney >Company. > >On another note not directly related to the Skunk Works, can someone >please explain to me what Im missing? Comments in the JAST thread >and previous threads on a variety of defense and aerospace topics >reference the commonly stated belief that there have been massive >defense budget cuts. This belief taints design and application >considerations for future projects and prompts endless speculation >on future contract acquisitions based on cost. Dole even used the >issue in his nomination acceptance speech. I did a little >research and frankly, I dont understand. > >From the US Office of Managment and Budget and the US Department of >Defense the Federal Budget outlays fo National Defense Functions >have averaged 284 billion for the past 7 years, that is, since 1990. >Considering the current and 1997 budgets, in the 270 billion range >and increasing, the cuts just dont appear "massive?" Add to this >active military personnel in 1990 was just over two million people >and by 1995 it had been reduced 25 percent to one and one half >million with the closure of many bases. It seems to me that leaves >more dollars for procurement, even if one uses "real dollars" >(factoring inflation). > >Quite seriously, I dont get it. Anyone? > >Byron > > ------------------------------ From: Salvatore Denaro Date: Fri, 30 Aug 1996 14:22:55 -0400 Subject: RE: Building 90 On Wednesday, August 28, 1996 03:01 PM, Byron Weber[SMTP:chosa@chosa.win.net] wrote: >Historical Note: The NY Times reported today Building 90, the former >sight of Lockheed's Skunk Works, has been leased by Walt Disney >Company. Hmmmm... From one magic kingdom to another. Anyone here anything about a FZX-3,000,000 "Super Goofy" program. - -- Salvatore Denaro "The only difference between me and a madman sal@panix.com is that I am not mad." -- Salvador Dali ------------------------------ From: tcrobi@most.fw.hac.com (Tom Robison) Date: Fri, 30 Aug 1996 15:07:30 +0000 Subject: RE: Building 90 >>Building 90, the former site of Lockheed's Skunk Works, has been leased >>by >>Walt Disney Company. > >Hmmmm... From one magic kingdom to another. >Salvatore Denaro Sounds like a Mickey Mouse operation to me... Tom Robison Hughes Defense Communications, Fort Wayne, IN tcrobi@most.fw.hac.com (work) tcrobi@fortwayne.infi.net (home) ------------------------------ From: James Easton <100626.2242@Compuserve.com> Date: 01 Sep 96 13:45:15 EDT Subject: Compartmented Information A brief note just to say thanks to everyone who provided such helpful information and suggestions. It seems there's no clear indication that the actual terminology did indeed originate from the U-2 program. I will gratefully follow up the references mentioned. James. ------------------------------ From: betnal@ns.net Date: Sun, 01 Sep 96 21:31:25 GMT Subject: Is the Defense Budget Really being cut? (Long, again) Another long one from "Motorfinger", again... I know there has been quite a discussion here about cuts in DoD. I stayed out of it because I'm not sure how credible I'd be given who I work for. I decided to jump in this one time because of Byron's question about the annual "defense outlays". The first part of this electronic missive (up to the ****) may prove useful for people trying to make sense of some of the numbers they see in the news. By the way, if you do make sense of them, would you mind explaining them to me? The second part is just one guy's perspective on whether or not cuts are truly taking place. Keep some terms in mind when you hear numbers bandied about: "Appropriated", "Authorized" and "Outlays". All of these are thought of as being interchangeable, but they're not. "Appropriated" refers to how much money Congress sets aside for a particular thing. "Authorized" means how much money Congress gives permission to spend on it. It's not at all uncommon for these two figures to be used for political or other purposes. For example, Democrats used to say that President Reagan would make dramatic cuts in some pet social program, while Republicans would absolutely deny it. They were both in a sense telling the truth. What was happening was that traditionally Jimmy Carter would ask for authorization to spend umpty-gazillion dollars on some program. Congress, being of the same party, would approve it and both branches of Government would then trumpet what a marvelous thing they had done. The thing was, the money that was actually appropriated would be less than what was authorized. It's sort of like Congress was saying, "We give you permission to the money we put into this account up to $1,000", but really only put $700 into it. When the Presidency changed hands, Congress continued the practice, authorizing more expenditures than were appropriated. They would then beat up the Republicans by saying that they authorized X dollars, but the administration was only delivering X-Y. So what Reagan started doing was figuring out what about what Congress was actually wiling to really appropriate for these programs and would only actually ask for authorization for that amount. Republicans would say they increased funding for the programs because the appropriations did go up each year. Democrats said that the funding had been cut because the amount of authority requested was smaller than had traditionally been authorized previously. The converse also happens. Money may be appropriated, but the authorization to spend it may be less than what was appropriated or even zero. Kind of like saying, "I'm giving a checkbook for an account with $10,000 in it, but you aren't authorized to sign any checks". This is the dodge the opponents of the SR-71 used to sabotage the return to service. They claimed that although Congress fully appropriated more than enough money to restore and operate the Blackbird, they didn't Specifically authorize the money to be spent for operational use. This was a selectively applied technicality (they didn't ground U-2s, JSTARs, UAVs, etc.), but was literally correct. "Outlays" refer to the amount of money physically spent in any given year. It is not restricted to the year money was appropriated or authorized, just when it was actually spent. Here's an example: In an unusual flash of common sense, Congress a few years back realized that if you put up all the money at once for an aircraft carrier, it'll get built faster and for hundreds of millions of dollars less than if you do it incrementally. So, they twice appropriated and authorized in one fell swoop the money for a couple of aircraft carriers to be built in the upcoming years. Now, you can't build a carrier in one year and the Government normally doesn't pay until the actual portion of any given work is done. If you assume that it takes five years and the money gets spent equally (not real world), then there will be "outlays" of 20% of the total each year. However, that doesn't mean that each year Congress is coming up with more money for carriers. In fact, for the last four years of this example, Congress spent nothing on carriers. "Outlays" can come from plans from previous years, or money carried forward or even money advanced in some cases. It's kind of dangerous to use outlays because it doesn't really give you the true picture. The same money can show up twice (once when its appropriated, and again when it's actually expended) if you aren't watching real close. Also, "defense-related outlays" do not necessarily mean that DoD gets the money. *********************************************************************** Regarding cuts, there's no question that they are happening and have accelerated dramatically since 1993, although they would have happened to a lesser extent no matter who won in 1992. Unlike most programs (I'm talking in the aggregate), where a "cut" means the amount of increase is less than first planned, or where the programs and resources are shifted to a new name and the original program is listed as being "cut", DoD is really being dramatically cut (i.e. less money is being provided). There are some who say that virtually all the real spending reductions of the past few years are coming almost entirely from DoD and NASA, because they aren't popular right now. For example, the Administration announced earlier this year that it wouldn't be prudent to cut Defense further. When the budget was actually submitted, it included a further 6% cut. The Director Goldin of NASA was told his budget was to be cut, and he actually was to reduce expenses below that level by a significant amount. He was publicly honored and set forth as an example of what other agencies should be doing. After the hoopla died down he was told that he would not even be funded at the lower level he was able to achieve. In the Army, for the first time since the 1930s, there are no tanks in production. Military construction (base repairs, etc.) is way down, and of course bases are being closed left and right. For example, come next year, there will be no longer any Naval Air Stations (Pt. Mugu is a test center) on the West cost of CONUS between San Diego and Whidbey Island USAF and USN squadrons are being disestablished at a rate not seen since the end of WWII. Low time aircraft are being mothballed or sold. After spending hundreds of millions to convert the FORESTAL to a training carrier, she was taken out of service after one tour because there was no longer going to be any money to run her. Other carriers that were due to have their lives extended to avoid new construction are going to be taken out of service sooner because the money isn't there for the overhauls. This means more money in the long run, but it won't show up until after the 2000 elections. In fact most of the remaining devlopment and production progrmas are being restructured so that the big bills won't show up until just after 2000. Nuclear submarines are being mothballed or scrapped with more than half their service lives remaining because the money isn't there to refuel them. The SSN fleet is being cut in half. Training time is down. Weapons are being cancelled. We're developing tactics for using the "smart" weapons that we aren't buying. Lengths of deployments are increasing because there aren't enough assets anymore to permit the normal amount of downtime. There has been talk of "cross-decking" aircraft. That means that when a squadron returns from deployment its aircraft, instead of going into the normal maintenance cycle, would be turned over to another squadron who would take them right back out again. In the short term it would make readiness look like it's up, but it wears out aircraft real fast (same thing for ships). There has even been talk of "cross-decking" some personnel (in fact for some ground troops it's already happening). The various UN adventures were not budgeted for, and only part of what is being expended in them is being replaced through supplemental appropriations. Keep in mind that money spent on those things will show up as a "Defense Related Outlay". Many of the other non-Dod type tasks take personnel, time and money away from training, maintenance and other missions that are assigned to DoD. For example, there were lots of troops and airmen and resources used to supplement security for the recent Olympic Games. This may have been a good thing, maybe not, I'm in no position to say. However, guarding the Olympics does not provide any meaningful military training and ths costs take quite a chunk out of the Operations and Maintenance budget. I haven't seen anything that says that money's going to be replaced... Ground some more airplanes, cut some F-22 R&D, reduce some flying hours--it's all related. The much-vaunted "bottoms-up" review may be done again, because it was apparent even while it was going on that, even though it was targeting a lower level of operations than the Bush Administration planned, the Administration wasn't planning to ask for enough money to even fund what its own study group came up with. The much vaunted $60 billion annual procurement (that's all stuff bought, not just weapons) budget is what the Joint Chiefs came up with that would be needed starting in Fiscal Year 1998 in order to support the taskings it was expected to have to fulfill. The Administration originally responded by adopting that figure as a goal for Fiscal Year 2001 (after the next election). DoD Comptroller John Hamre has since been quoted as admitting that he wasn't 100% sure that it would happen even by then. Don't take this as whining or as gospel. There's been questions about this from the group. I'm just trying to give you a Unofficial Personal Opinion perspective from this side of the meadow. There are still some things we're spending money on that we might be better off without (clever how I worked the F/A-18E/F in here), but there are lots of things that we need that aren't getting done anymore. Some may feel this is the right way to go, some may be very worried by it, but in either case it really Is happening. Art "Keyboard Capers" Hanley ------------------------------ End of Skunk Works Digest V5 #701 ********************************* To subscribe to skunk-works-digest, send the command: subscribe skunk-works-digest in the body of a message to "majordomo@mail.orst.edu". 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