From: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com (skunk-works-digest) To: skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Subject: skunk-works-digest V1 #1 Reply-To: skunk-works Sender: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Errors-To: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk skunk-works-digest Thursday, May 28 1998 Volume 07 : Number 030 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 22:01:22 -0500 From: "Bob Rush" Subject: test test - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Now Marketing Servers Nationwide as Webmaster's Choice http://webmasterschoice.com 800-954-HOST (4678) - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Member of: The Association of Internet Professionals http://www.association.org/ The National Association of Webmasters http://www.naw.org/ - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 16:49:30 -0600 (MDT) From: georgek@netwrx1.com (Netwrx Consulting Inc) Subject: test test ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 16:52:25 -0600 (MDT) From: Dave Petersen Subject: test test ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 16:58:23 -0600 (MDT) From: Dave Petersen Subject: test test ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 21:38:43 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: TESTING NEW LIST this is a test ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 21:49:40 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: [none] this is a test #2 George, MR. Tibbs & The Beast Kasica West Allis, WI USA |\_._/| | 6 6 | =( T )= .^`-^-'^. `. ; .' | | | | | ((_((|))_)) ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 21:52:18 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: TEST #3 Test #3 alias and directory created ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 21:54:44 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: [none] CHanged permissions to 777 George, MR. Tibbs & The Beast Kasica West Allis, WI USA |\_._/| | 6 6 | =( T )= .^`-^-'^. `. ; .' | | | | | ((_((|))_)) ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 18:16:12 -0400 (EDT) From: Wei-Jen Su Subject: Re: your mail On Sat, 23 May 1998, George R. Kasica wrote: > > |\_._/| > | 6 6 | > =( T )= > .^`-^-'^. > `. ; .' > | | | | | > ((_((|))_)) > I thought it is a skunk... and not a cat... hehe, Cat Works... Happy Holiday all... And I am waiting for Godzilla to show up in my backyard... May the Force be with you Su Wei-Jen E-mails: wsu02@utopia.poly.edu wjs@webspan.net "What's the purpose of the propeller? To keep the pilot cool. If you don't think so, just stop it and watch him sweat!" ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 22:32:59 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: Test #4 Testing with old address lists removed from Sparknet site George ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 22:44:24 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: test again #5 rights changed ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 22:48:35 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: Test #6 Permissions changed to 776 on Archives George, MR. Tibbs & The Beast Kasica West Allis, WI USA |\_._/| | 6 6 | =( T )= .^`-^-'^. `. ; .' | | | | | ((_((|))_)) ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 23 May 1998 23:46:09 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: Tst with 777 Changed Archives to 777 and below as well George, MR. Tibbs & The Beast Kasica West Allis, WI USA |\_._/| | 6 6 | =( T )= .^`-^-'^. `. ; .' | | | | | ((_((|))_)) ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 24 May 1998 00:16:13 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: testing test #8 with pass file George, MR. Tibbs & The Beast Kasica West Allis, WI USA |\_._/| | 6 6 | =( T )= .^`-^-'^. `. ; .' | | | | | ((_((|))_)) ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 May 1998 00:32:26 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: this is a test all perl paths to /usr/bin/perl ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 May 1998 00:46:43 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: Test message test to generate error. ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 May 1998 11:33:58 -0600 (MDT) From: iServer Support Subject: test1 Michael iServer ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 00:43:39 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: List is now operational again Just a quick note to say that the list and archives are now operational again. Thanks for your patience during the move. ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 00:50:15 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: FINALLY Working 2nd Note: Forgot the perl path name in the archive script. Just a quick note to say that the list and archives are now operational again. Thanks for your patience during the move. ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 00:53:13 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: FINALLY Working #3 2nd Note: Forgot the perl path name in the archive script and the directory. Just a quick note to say that the list and archives are now operational again. Thanks for your patience during the move. ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 00:58:06 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: FINALLY Working #4 2nd Note: Forgot the perl path name in the archive script and the directory. Just a quick note to say that the list and archives are now operational again. Thanks for your patience during the move. ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 11:37:19 +0930 From: Dennis Lapcewich Subject: OZ Nuclear Explosions Database Apologies for being off-topic with this continuing discussion. For those who are interested, the Australian government maintains a public database of all 2,000 nuclear explosions since 1945. For info go to http://www.agso.gov.au/front/products.html and select "Nuclear Explosions." Info on this was found in the Tuesday edition of The Australian (26 May 1998), on page 49 of the computer section. If you do a search under miscellaneous sites, don't be surprised if Colorado, Mississippi and other sites within the continental US (outside of Nevada) show up. A search of the continental US coordinates using http://tiger.census.gov/ verifies the OZ database. BTW - This may sound dumb, but are their restrictions on the use of allied bases, other than the obvious political ones, being used for overflights checking into, say India's latest tests? Australia has just completed the last of a series of airbases along the northern arc capable of supporting any aircraft (commercial, military, etc.) of any size (complete with hardened aircraft bunkers, fast taxi strips and runways in excess of 3km). The bases are unmanned (except for two caretakers each!) and are to be used for rapid deployment of aircraft, troops, etc. The bases are out in the "Back of the Beyond," meaning you can't get there from here unless you fly in and know where to look (It's very easy to hide things here). Dennis ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 11:19:22 -0600 (MDT) From: iServer Support Subject: test Michael iServer ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 11:21:38 -0600 (MDT) From: iServer Support Subject: test2 Michael iServer ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 19:48:31 GMT From: georgek@netwrx1.com (George R. Kasica) Subject: [none] This is a test of the digest feature ===[George R. Kasica]=== +1 414 541 8579 Skunk-Works ListOwner +1 800 816 2568 FAX http://www.netwrx1.com West Allis, WI USA georgek@netwrx1.com Digest Issues at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 28 May 1998 07:34:33 -0400 From: "James P. Stevenson" Subject: [none] - --============_-1315767174==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" 25 May, 1998 Mr. James Hall, Chairman National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 Via Facsimile (202) 314-6018 and Federal Express Re: Request to re-open ValuJet 592 Investigation based on omission of evidence of an electrical fire from NTSB Final Report and recently obtained FAA radar data showing NTSB radar track to crash site is false. Dear Chairman Hall, In response to my letter of August 11, 1997 requesting postponement of the August 19, 1997 NTSB so called "Sunshine Hearing" on the ValuJet 592 accident, you arranged for us to meet on August 15th with some of your key staff members to present our findings. Of the many discrepancies in the NTSB factual reports, the most serious one was that the radar track presented by the NTSB was false, incomplete, and led to incorrect conclusions as to the causes and circumstances of the accident. For these and the following reasons, I request a re-opening of the ValuJet 592 investigation. NTSB radar track is false and misleading Mr. Loeb, with one of his radar experts, attempted to rebut our claim that the radar data & track (relevant portions: attachment A & B) presented by the NTSB was false. The expert claimed that radar was not a perfect technology. He stated that on occasions, the NTSB would look at radar data of an accident that showed a flight path apparently inconsistent with what it believed happened. Occasionally, he said, the NTSB had to shape the data to fit the "facts." Mr. Loeb also dismissed our position by claiming that we did not have all of the radar data. He promised to get additional radar data to us, which he did. FAA radar data proves NTSB radar track is false The radar data Mr. Loeb and general counsel Dan Campbell provided gave no new information. Consequently, we filed a Freedom of Information Act request for radar coverage of the same event. The FAA was more forthcoming. Although we still have not received all relevant original radar data, the FAA's data clearly and indisputably now shows that the ValuJet 592 aircraft continued inbound to the airport past the crash site distance of 17 miles (from the airport), past the end of the radar track created by the NTSB, and did not disappear from radar until it reached a point 12 miles from the Miami Airport. (See attachments C& D.) Supporting evidence that the NTSB radar track is false This radar data is consistent with our independent investigation in which the FAA air traffic controller told us that the ValuJet aircraft disappeared from the radar scope at 12 miles. Furthermore, the 12 miles position was confirmed in the radio communications transcripts contained in the NTSB factual reports. On this basis alone, the evidence shows that the NTSB has developed a false radar track. However, we also have other information, much of which we detailed to your staff in our meeting, showing additional flaws in the NTSB's purported radar track and communications with ValuJet 592. Unreported Eye witnesses account of ValuJet flying away from the airport ValuJet 592 was lost off the FAA radar 12 miles from the airport inbound for landing but the crash site is 17 miles from the airport. How did it get there? The answer is contained in the unreported words of two of the witnesses, who told the NTSB investigators that they saw the ValuJet aircraft flying westbound (away from the airport) at a very low altitude (apparently below the radar horizon) and then make a 180 degree right turn and disappear below their visual horizon. Although this testimony was also repeated to my associate, the NTSB failed to record this significant information in the Witness Group Chairman's Factual Report and in the final NTSB report. Ostensible attempt at repression of third eye witness testimony I have expressed to you my concern about another serious omission, specifically the NTSB's failure to interview the Chinese student pilot who was an eye witness to the crash. That negligence was compounded by the NTSB's subsequent claim that no such witness existed. Now that the witness has finally been interviewed by the NTSB we find that his testimony is consistent with that of the other eye witnesses mentioned above. Furthermore, the Chinese pilot's testimony refutes the specious NTSB radar track since he saw the plane flying west to east for about fifteen seconds before the crash. In contradiction, the NTSB's purported radar track of the plane shows it flying south at that time. The conditions of the ValuJet aircraft were ready for an electrical fire Electrical fires often are preceded by indications that the conditions are ripe for such an event. The FAA's service difficulty reports indicated numerous electrical problems on this specific aircraft. The NTSB's records reveal that it was infamous in the ValuJet fleet for continuing electrical problems and was experiencing several electrical problems on the day of the accident. At one point, the flight was delayed in Atlanta while mechanics were trying to find and fix the electrical problems. In spite of these attempts, electrical problems continued while the plane was en route from Atlanta to Miami, which was the flight immediately preceding the accident flight. Indeed, these pre-flight 592 electrical failures appear to have culminated in a series of major electrical failures, which was the initial reason the plane was attempting to return to Miami. This is well documented in the NTSB record. All of this is irrelevant, however, unless there is some evidence of an electrical fire on ValuJet 592. As it turns out, there is such evidence. Unfortunately, the NTSB conclusion from this evidence was negligently derived. NTSB's false and misleading statements regarding electrical fire on ValuJet 592 Throughout your group factual report, your investigators claimed that the wires that were burned showed "little or no evidence of embrittlement." Lack of embrittlement, according Pat Cahill, the FAA's expert on wiring, is indicative of an electrical fire - not a fire from an external source. Yet your final report claims that the wires showed no evidence of an electrical fire. The Final NTSB report (pg.43) states: "The heat damaged wires . . . were consistent with those resulting from an external heat source." Such negligent and seriously misleading interpretations strains the credibility of the NTSB itself and raises the issue of the competency and motives of your investigators. NTSB/FAA oxygen canister fire test ignored the Scientific Method American's pride themselves as practitioners of the Western tradition of applying the scientific method, a self-correcting process of observations, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis, and test. Fundamental to the validity of the scientific method is the use of the double-blind study. However, it was not used to prove the viability of the oxygen canister theory nor was the demonstration set up to maximize the potential for failure, a mandatory element in the intellectual tradition of the scientific method. Instead, the NTSB, using heuristic reasoning, activated the canisters (manually)--itself an assumption without evidence--and proceeded as a given that throwing a box full of oxygen canisters into the cargo hold would activate one or more of them. Another fundamental element of the scientific method is that the experiment can be duplicated and repeated by third parties. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that throwing the canister boxes onto ValuJet 592 would ignite them, then we should be able to duplicate such a test. The NTSB should have demonstrated that the oxygen canisters would ignite by having them thrown into a cargo hold. It failed to do that. Consequently, since the ignition of one or more oxygen canisters is a condition precedent to any speculation that they (1) started the fire or (2) that they exacerbated a fire, everything that followed is moot. We have also obtained test reports and videos from the NTSB/FAA fire tests on the oxygen canisters. Again, an independent forensic laboratory, with extensive experience in fire/arson investigation, has reviewed the data and issued a report highly critical of the tests. This laboratory maintains that this appears to have been an electrical fire, not a fire caused by oxygen canisters. The NTSB provided radar data and ATC transcripts with altered time The NTSB has failed to provide: (1) the actual radar data, (2) the actual radar track, (3) an accurate time clock of the radar data and, (4) the true time on the voice transcripts of the conversation between Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the ValuJet pilot. Consequently, none of the times provided by the NTSB can be used to determine the actual time of the accident. Our investigation so far reveals that the NTSB radar time clock is fast by about 18 seconds at the beginning of the flight and by about 50 seconds at the NTSB's claimed time of the crash (18:13:42). The recently obtained FAA radar data is similarly plagued. NTSB chose the least reliable reference time Given a choice between the extremely accurate atomic clock (WWV) to which the FAA radar data tapes are slaved and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the NTSB chose the latter which, as the record shows, failed twice during the ill fated flight. As your factual reports state: "Times recorded on the CVR transcript were used as the reference time, and FDR and radar clocks were adjusted accordingly." Not only is the CVR suspect, it was made more so because, as your factual reports state: "timing on the tape was established using the known time of several air traffic control transmission recorded on a cassette tape provided by the FAA." Our conclusion that the time is inaccurate follows because the air traffic control (ATC) transmission tape was tampered with. We know this because the same independent audio expert hired on the Aloha Airline accident has confirmed that approximately one minute is missing on the "20 minute" ATC tape. The 19 minute tape was recorded at different speeds and made to fit an inaccurate transcript 20 minutes long (see attachment E). Moreover, a comparison of the CVR times (the NTSB reference time) and the distorted times in the ATC transcripts show that they only differ by a second or so. NTSB attempts at time correlation were debased further by the non sequitur "merry-go-round" in which "the correlation was established through a comparison of the Microphone Keying information recorded by the FDR, Cockpit Voice Recorder and the (ATC). For more details, see Airplane Performance Group factual report." The NTSB ignored evidence of the actual time of the crash An eye witness made a 911 call 20-30 seconds after viewing the crash. The time of the call was recorded on a clock slaved to the same atomic clock used by the FAA's radar. The call was received at 14:15:22. That puts the time of the crash at approximately 14:15:00 local time (18:15:00 UTC). Missing time was adequate for ValuJet to fly from 12 miles back to the crash site Between the NTSB's claimed time of the crash at 18:13:42 (which is fast by about 50 seconds and should be approximately 18:12:50 UTC) and the eyewitness 911 call to the Broward Sheriff's Department within 20-30 seconds of the accident, there is approximately one minute and 17 seconds missing (or about two minutes when adjusted as noted above). Whatever manipulation has been done to the time clocks, the plane had to fly from where it was lost off the radar 12 miles from the airport back to the crash site 17 miles from the airport. There was sufficient time to have flown in the manner described by the unreported testimony of eye witnesses. Integrity of NTSB should be re-established by re-opening the ValuJet 592 investigation Chairman Hall, in light of the foregoing, the integrity of the NTSB must be seriously questioned. I believe you owe it to the relatives and friends of the victims in this tragic accident and to the American public to re-open the ValuJet investigation and have the truth revealed. What other purpose does the NTSB have than to reveal all the facts in an accident and then make recommendations consistent those facts and related findings. I encourage you to do so with dispatch. Meanwhile, I look forward to your early response to this letter and to the September 11, 1997 letter from our Counsel, Mr. Hadley to you concerning "ValuJet Flight 592- Possible Tampering with Evidence/Criminal Conduct" (attachment F). Sincerely, VisionSafe Corporation Bert Werjefelt President ********************************************** James P. Stevenson E-mail Address: jamesstevenson@sprintmail.com Telephone: (301) 254-9000 ********************************************** - --============_-1315767174==_ma============ Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii" 25 May, 1998 Mr. James Hall, Chairman National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 Via Facsimile (202) 314-6018 and Federal Express Re: Request to re-open ValuJet 592 Investigation based on omission of evidence of an electrical fire from NTSB Final Report and recently obtained FAA radar data showing NTSB radar track to crash site is false. Dear Chairman Hall, In response to my letter of August 11, 1997 requesting postponement of the August 19, 1997 NTSB so called "Sunshine Hearing" on the ValuJet 592 accident, you arranged for us to meet on August 15th with some of your key staff members to present our findings. Of the many discrepancies in the NTSB factual reports, the most serious one was that the radar track presented by the NTSB was false, incomplete, and led to incorrect conclusions as to the causes and circumstances of the accident. For these and the following reasons, I request a re-opening of the ValuJet 592 investigation. NTSB radar track is false and misleading Mr. Loeb, with one of his radar experts, attempted to rebut our claim that the radar data & track (relevant portions: attachment A & B) presented by the NTSB was false. The expert claimed that radar was not a perfect technology. He stated that on occasions, the NTSB would look at radar data of an accident that showed a flight path apparently inconsistent with what it believed happened. Occasionally, he said, the NTSB had to shape the data to fit the "facts." Mr. Loeb also dismissed our position by claiming that we did not have all of the radar data. He promised to get additional radar data to us, which he did. FAA radar data proves NTSB radar track is false The radar data Mr. Loeb and general counsel Dan Campbell provided gave no new information. Consequently, we filed a Freedom of Information Act request for radar coverage of the same event. The FAA was more forthcoming. Although we still have not received all relevant original radar data, the FAA's data clearly and indisputably now shows that the ValuJet 592 aircraft continued inbound to the airport past the crash site distance of 17 miles (from the airport), past the end of the radar track created by the NTSB, and did not disappear from radar until it reached a point 12 miles from the Miami Airport. (See attachments C& D.) Supporting evidence that the NTSB radar track is false This radar data is consistent with our independent investigation in which the FAA air traffic controller told us that the ValuJet aircraft disappeared from the radar scope at 12 miles. Furthermore, the 12 miles position was confirmed in the radio communications transcripts contained in the NTSB factual reports. On this basis alone, the evidence shows that the NTSB has developed a false radar track. However, we also have other information, much of which we detailed to your staff in our meeting, showing additional flaws in the NTSB's purported radar track and communications with ValuJet 592. Unreported Eye witnesses account of ValuJet flying away from the airport ValuJet 592 was lost off the FAA radar 12 miles from the airport inbound for landing but the crash site is 17 miles from the airport. How did it get there? The answer is contained in the unreported words of two of the witnesses, who told the NTSB investigators that they saw the ValuJet aircraft flying westbound (away from the airport) at a very low altitude (apparently below the radar horizon) and then make a 180 degree right turn and disappear below their visual horizon. Although this testimony was also repeated to my associate, the NTSB failed to record this significant information in the Witness Group Chairman's Factual Report and in the final NTSB report. Ostensible attempt at repression of third eye witness testimony I have expressed to you my concern about another serious omission, specifically the NTSB's failure to interview the Chinese student pilot who was an eye witness to the crash. That negligence was compounded by the NTSB's subsequent claim that no such witness existed. Now that the witness has finally been interviewed by the NTSB we find that his testimony is consistent with that of the other eye witnesses mentioned above. Furthermore, the Chinese pilot's testimony refutes the specious NTSB radar track since he saw the plane flying west to east for about fifteen seconds before the crash. In contradiction, the NTSB's purported radar track of the plane shows it flying south at that time. The conditions of the ValuJet aircraft were ready for an electrical fire Electrical fires often are preceded by indications that the conditions are ripe for such an event. The FAA's service difficulty reports indicated numerous electrical problems on this specific aircraft. The NTSB's records reveal that it was infamous in the ValuJet fleet for continuing electrical problems and was experiencing several electrical problems on the day of the accident. At one point, the flight was delayed in Atlanta while mechanics were trying to find and fix the electrical problems. In spite of these attempts, electrical problems continued while the plane was en route from Atlanta to Miami, which was the flight immediately preceding the accident flight. Indeed, these pre-flight 592 electrical failures appear to have culminated in a series of major electrical failures, which was the initial reason the plane was attempting to return to Miami. This is well documented in the NTSB record. All of this is irrelevant, however, unless there is some evidence of an electrical fire on ValuJet 592. As it turns out, there is such evidence. Unfortunately, the NTSB conclusion from this evidence was negligently derived. NTSB's false and misleading statements regarding electrical fire on ValuJet 592 Throughout your group factual report, your investigators claimed that the wires that were burned showed "little or no evidence of embrittlement." Lack of embrittlement, according Pat Cahill, the FAA's expert on wiring, is indicative of an electrical fire - not a fire from an external source. Yet your final report claims that the wires showed no evidence of an electrical fire. The Final NTSB report (pg.43) states: "The heat damaged wires . . . were consistent with those resulting from an external heat source." Such negligent and seriously misleading interpretations strains the credibility of the NTSB itself and raises the issue of the competency and motives of your investigators. NTSB/FAA oxygen canister fire test ignored the Scientific Method American's pride themselves as practitioners of the Western tradition of applying the scientific method, a self-correcting process of observations, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis, and test. Fundamental to the validity of the scientific method is the use of the double-blind study. However, it was not used to prove the viability of the oxygen canister theory nor was the demonstration set up to maximize the potential for failure, a mandatory element in the intellectual tradition of the scientific method. Instead, the NTSB, using heuristic reasoning, activated the canisters (manually)--itself an assumption without evidence--and proceeded as a given that throwing a box full of oxygen canisters into the cargo hold would activate one or more of them. Another fundamental element of the scientific method is that the experiment can be duplicated and repeated by third parties. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that throwing the canister boxes onto ValuJet 592 would ignite them, then we should be able to duplicate such a test. The NTSB should have demonstrated that the oxygen canisters would ignite by having them thrown into a cargo hold. It failed to do that. Consequently, since the ignition of one or more oxygen canisters is a condition precedent to any speculation that they (1) started the fire or (2) that they exacerbated a fire, everything that followed is moot. We have also obtained test reports and videos from the NTSB/FAA fire tests on the oxygen canisters. Again, an independent forensic laboratory, with extensive experience in fire/arson investigation, has reviewed the data and issued a report highly critical of the tests. This laboratory maintains that this appears to have been an electrical fire, not a fire caused by oxygen canisters. The NTSB provided radar data and ATC transcripts with altered time The NTSB has failed to provide: (1) the actual radar data, (2) the actual radar track, (3) an accurate time clock of the radar data and, (4) the true time on the voice transcripts of the conversation between Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the ValuJet pilot. Consequently, none of the times provided by the NTSB can be used to determine the actual time of the accident. Our investigation so far reveals that the NTSB radar time clock is fast by about 18 seconds at the beginning of the flight and by about 50 seconds at the NTSB's claimed time of the crash (18:13:42). The recently obtained FAA radar data is similarly plagued. NTSB chose the least reliable reference time Given a choice between the extremely accurate atomic clock (WWV) to which the FAA radar data tapes are slaved and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the NTSB chose the latter which, as the record shows, failed twice during the ill fated flight. As your factual reports state: "Times recorded on the CVR transcript were used as the reference time, and FDR and radar clocks were adjusted accordingly." Not only is the CVR suspect, it was made more so because, as your factual reports state: "timing on the tape was established using the known time of several air traffic control transmission recorded on a cassette tape provided by the FAA." Our conclusion that the time is inaccurate follows because the air traffic control (ATC) transmission tape was tampered with. We know this because the same independent audio expert hired on the Aloha Airline accident has confirmed that approximately one minute is missing on the "20 minute" ATC tape. The 19 minute tape was recorded at different speeds and made to fit an inaccurate transcript 20 minutes long (see attachment E). Moreover, a comparison of the CVR times (the NTSB reference time) and the distorted times in the ATC transcripts show that they only differ by a second or so. NTSB attempts at time correlation were debased further by the non sequitur "merry-go-round" in which "the correlation was established through a comparison of the Microphone Keying information recorded by the FDR, Cockpit Voice Recorder and the (ATC). For more details, see Airplane Performance Group factual report." The NTSB ignored evidence of the actual time of the crash An eye witness made a 911 call 20-30 seconds after viewing the crash. The time of the call was recorded on a clock slaved to the same atomic clock used by the FAA's radar. The call was received at 14:15:22. That puts the time of the crash at approximately 14:15:00 local time (18:15:00 UTC). Missing time was adequate for ValuJet to fly from 12 miles back to the crash site Between the NTSB's claimed time of the crash at 18:13:42 (which is fast by about 50 seconds and should be approximately 18:12:50 UTC) and the eyewitness 911 call to the Broward Sheriff's Department within 20-30 seconds of the accident, there is approximately one minute and 17 seconds missing (or about two minutes when adjusted as noted above). Whatever manipulation has been done to the time clocks, the plane had to fly from where it was lost off the radar 12 miles from the airport back to the crash site 17 miles from the airport. There was sufficient time to have flown in the manner described by the unreported testimony of eye witnesses. Integrity of NTSB should be re-established by re-opening the ValuJet 592 investigation Chairman Hall, in light of the foregoing, the integrity of the NTSB must be seriously questioned. I believe you owe it to the relatives and friends of the victims in this tragic accident and to the American public to re-open the ValuJet investigation and have the truth revealed. What other purpose does the NTSB have than to reveal all the facts in an accident and then make recommendations consistent those facts and related findings. I encourage you to do so with dispatch. Meanwhile, I look forward to your early response to this letter and to the September 11, 1997 letter from our Counsel, Mr. Hadley to you concerning "ValuJet Flight 592- Possible Tampering with Evidence/Criminal Conduct" (attachment F). Sincerely, VisionSafe Corporation Bert Werjefelt President ********************************************** James P. Stevenson E-mail Address: jamesstevenson@sprintmail.com Telephone: (301) 254-9000 ********************************************** - --============_-1315767174==_ma============-- ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 28 May 1998 09:30:03 -0400 From: "James P. Stevenson" Subject: Request to NTSB to re-open ValuJet 592 investigation - --============_-1315760278==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" 25 May, 1998 Mr. James Hall, Chairman National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 Via Facsimile (202) 314-6018 and Federal Express Re: Request to re-open ValuJet 592 Investigation based on omission of evidence of an electrical fire from NTSB Final Report and recently obtained FAA radar data showing NTSB radar track to crash site is false. Dear Chairman Hall, In response to my letter of August 11, 1997 requesting postponement of the August 19, 1997 NTSB so called "Sunshine Hearing" on the ValuJet 592 accident, you arranged for us to meet on August 15th with some of your key staff members to present our findings. Of the many discrepancies in the NTSB factual reports, the most serious one was that the radar track presented by the NTSB was false, incomplete, and led to incorrect conclusions as to the causes and circumstances of the accident. For these and the following reasons, I request a re-opening of the ValuJet 592 investigation. NTSB radar track is false and misleading Mr. Loeb, with one of his radar experts, attempted to rebut our claim that the radar data & track (relevant portions: attachment A & B) presented by the NTSB was false. The expert claimed that radar was not a perfect technology. He stated that on occasions, the NTSB would look at radar data of an accident that showed a flight path apparently inconsistent with what it believed happened. Occasionally, he said, the NTSB had to shape the data to fit the "facts." Mr. Loeb also dismissed our position by claiming that we did not have all of the radar data. He promised to get additional radar data to us, which he did. FAA radar data proves NTSB radar track is false The radar data Mr. Loeb and general counsel Dan Campbell provided gave no new information. Consequently, we filed a Freedom of Information Act request for radar coverage of the same event. The FAA was more forthcoming. Although we still have not received all relevant original radar data, the FAA's data clearly and indisputably now shows that the ValuJet 592 aircraft continued inbound to the airport past the crash site distance of 17 miles (from the airport), past the end of the radar track created by the NTSB, and did not disappear from radar until it reached a point 12 miles from the Miami Airport. (See attachments C& D.) Supporting evidence that the NTSB radar track is false This radar data is consistent with our independent investigation in which the FAA air traffic controller told us that the ValuJet aircraft disappeared from the radar scope at 12 miles. Furthermore, the 12 miles position was confirmed in the radio communications transcripts contained in the NTSB factual reports. On this basis alone, the evidence shows that the NTSB has developed a false radar track. However, we also have other information, much of which we detailed to your staff in our meeting, showing additional flaws in the NTSB's purported radar track and communications with ValuJet 592. Unreported Eye witnesses account of ValuJet flying away from the airport ValuJet 592 was lost off the FAA radar 12 miles from the airport inbound for landing but the crash site is 17 miles from the airport. How did it get there? The answer is contained in the unreported words of two of the witnesses, who told the NTSB investigators that they saw the ValuJet aircraft flying westbound (away from the airport) at a very low altitude (apparently below the radar horizon) and then make a 180 degree right turn and disappear below their visual horizon. Although this testimony was also repeated to my associate, the NTSB failed to record this significant information in the Witness Group Chairman's Factual Report and in the final NTSB report. Ostensible attempt at repression of third eye witness testimony I have expressed to you my concern about another serious omission, specifically the NTSB's failure to interview the Chinese student pilot who was an eye witness to the crash. That negligence was compounded by the NTSB's subsequent claim that no such witness existed. Now that the witness has finally been interviewed by the NTSB we find that his testimony is consistent with that of the other eye witnesses mentioned above. Furthermore, the Chinese pilot's testimony refutes the specious NTSB radar track since he saw the plane flying west to east for about fifteen seconds before the crash. In contradiction, the NTSB's purported radar track of the plane shows it flying south at that time. The conditions of the ValuJet aircraft were ready for an electrical fire Electrical fires often are preceded by indications that the conditions are ripe for such an event. The FAA's service difficulty reports indicated numerous electrical problems on this specific aircraft. The NTSB's records reveal that it was infamous in the ValuJet fleet for continuing electrical problems and was experiencing several electrical problems on the day of the accident. At one point, the flight was delayed in Atlanta while mechanics were trying to find and fix the electrical problems. In spite of these attempts, electrical problems continued while the plane was en route from Atlanta to Miami, which was the flight immediately preceding the accident flight. Indeed, these pre-flight 592 electrical failures appear to have culminated in a series of major electrical failures, which was the initial reason the plane was attempting to return to Miami. This is well documented in the NTSB record. All of this is irrelevant, however, unless there is some evidence of an electrical fire on ValuJet 592. As it turns out, there is such evidence. Unfortunately, the NTSB conclusion from this evidence was negligently derived. NTSB's false and misleading statements regarding electrical fire on ValuJet 592 Throughout your group factual report, your investigators claimed that the wires that were burned showed "little or no evidence of embrittlement." Lack of embrittlement, according Pat Cahill, the FAA's expert on wiring, is indicative of an electrical fire - not a fire from an external source. Yet your final report claims that the wires showed no evidence of an electrical fire. The Final NTSB report (pg.43) states: "The heat damaged wires . . . were consistent with those resulting from an external heat source." Such negligent and seriously misleading interpretations strains the credibility of the NTSB itself and raises the issue of the competency and motives of your investigators. NTSB/FAA oxygen canister fire test ignored the Scientific Method American's pride themselves as practitioners of the Western tradition of applying the scientific method, a self-correcting process of observations, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis, and test. Fundamental to the validity of the scientific method is the use of the double-blind study. However, it was not used to prove the viability of the oxygen canister theory nor was the demonstration set up to maximize the potential for failure, a mandatory element in the intellectual tradition of the scientific method. Instead, the NTSB, using heuristic reasoning, activated the canisters (manually)--itself an assumption without evidence--and proceeded as a given that throwing a box full of oxygen canisters into the cargo hold would activate one or more of them. Another fundamental element of the scientific method is that the experiment can be duplicated and repeated by third parties. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that throwing the canister boxes onto ValuJet 592 would ignite them, then we should be able to duplicate such a test. The NTSB should have demonstrated that the oxygen canisters would ignite by having them thrown into a cargo hold. It failed to do that. Consequently, since the ignition of one or more oxygen canisters is a condition precedent to any speculation that they (1) started the fire or (2) that they exacerbated a fire, everything that followed is moot. We have also obtained test reports and videos from the NTSB/FAA fire tests on the oxygen canisters. Again, an independent forensic laboratory, with extensive experience in fire/arson investigation, has reviewed the data and issued a report highly critical of the tests. This laboratory maintains that this appears to have been an electrical fire, not a fire caused by oxygen canisters. The NTSB provided radar data and ATC transcripts with altered time The NTSB has failed to provide: (1) the actual radar data, (2) the actual radar track, (3) an accurate time clock of the radar data and, (4) the true time on the voice transcripts of the conversation between Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the ValuJet pilot. Consequently, none of the times provided by the NTSB can be used to determine the actual time of the accident. Our investigation so far reveals that the NTSB radar time clock is fast by about 18 seconds at the beginning of the flight and by about 50 seconds at the NTSB's claimed time of the crash (18:13:42). The recently obtained FAA radar data is similarly plagued. NTSB chose the least reliable reference time Given a choice between the extremely accurate atomic clock (WWV) to which the FAA radar data tapes are slaved and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the NTSB chose the latter which, as the record shows, failed twice during the ill fated flight. As your factual reports state: "Times recorded on the CVR transcript were used as the reference time, and FDR and radar clocks were adjusted accordingly." Not only is the CVR suspect, it was made more so because, as your factual reports state: "timing on the tape was established using the known time of several air traffic control transmission recorded on a cassette tape provided by the FAA." Our conclusion that the time is inaccurate follows because the air traffic control (ATC) transmission tape was tampered with. We know this because the same independent audio expert hired on the Aloha Airline accident has confirmed that approximately one minute is missing on the "20 minute" ATC tape. The 19 minute tape was recorded at different speeds and made to fit an inaccurate transcript 20 minutes long (see attachment E). Moreover, a comparison of the CVR times (the NTSB reference time) and the distorted times in the ATC transcripts show that they only differ by a second or so. NTSB attempts at time correlation were debased further by the non sequitur "merry-go-round" in which "the correlation was established through a comparison of the Microphone Keying information recorded by the FDR, Cockpit Voice Recorder and the (ATC). For more details, see Airplane Performance Group factual report." The NTSB ignored evidence of the actual time of the crash An eye witness made a 911 call 20-30 seconds after viewing the crash. The time of the call was recorded on a clock slaved to the same atomic clock used by the FAA's radar. The call was received at 14:15:22. That puts the time of the crash at approximately 14:15:00 local time (18:15:00 UTC). Missing time was adequate for ValuJet to fly from 12 miles back to the crash site Between the NTSB's claimed time of the crash at 18:13:42 (which is fast by about 50 seconds and should be approximately 18:12:50 UTC) and the eyewitness 911 call to the Broward Sheriff's Department within 20-30 seconds of the accident, there is approximately one minute and 17 seconds missing (or about two minutes when adjusted as noted above). Whatever manipulation has been done to the time clocks, the plane had to fly from where it was lost off the radar 12 miles from the airport back to the crash site 17 miles from the airport. There was sufficient time to have flown in the manner described by the unreported testimony of eye witnesses. Integrity of NTSB should be re-established by re-opening the ValuJet 592 investigation Chairman Hall, in light of the foregoing, the integrity of the NTSB must be seriously questioned. I believe you owe it to the relatives and friends of the victims in this tragic accident and to the American public to re-open the ValuJet investigation and have the truth revealed. What other purpose does the NTSB have than to reveal all the facts in an accident and then make recommendations consistent those facts and related findings. I encourage you to do so with dispatch. Meanwhile, I look forward to your early response to this letter and to the September 11, 1997 letter from our Counsel, Mr. Hadley to you concerning "ValuJet Flight 592- Possible Tampering with Evidence/Criminal Conduct" (attachment F). Sincerely, VisionSafe Corporation Bert Werjefelt President ********************************************** James P. Stevenson E-mail Address: jamesstevenson@sprintmail.com Telephone: (301) 254-9000 ********************************************** - --============_-1315760278==_ma============ Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii" 25 May, 1998 Mr. James Hall, Chairman National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 Via Facsimile (202) 314-6018 and Federal Express Re: Request to re-open ValuJet 592 Investigation based on omission of evidence of an electrical fire from NTSB Final Report and recently obtained FAA radar data showing NTSB radar track to crash site is false. Dear Chairman Hall, In response to my letter of August 11, 1997 requesting postponement of the August 19, 1997 NTSB so called "Sunshine Hearing" on the ValuJet 592 accident, you arranged for us to meet on August 15th with some of your key staff members to present our findings. Of the many discrepancies in the NTSB factual reports, the most serious one was that the radar track presented by the NTSB was false, incomplete, and led to incorrect conclusions as to the causes and circumstances of the accident. For these and the following reasons, I request a re-opening of the ValuJet 592 investigation. NTSB radar track is false and misleading Mr. Loeb, with one of his radar experts, attempted to rebut our claim that the radar data & track (relevant portions: attachment A & B) presented by the NTSB was false. The expert claimed that radar was not a perfect technology. He stated that on occasions, the NTSB would look at radar data of an accident that showed a flight path apparently inconsistent with what it believed happened. Occasionally, he said, the NTSB had to shape the data to fit the "facts." Mr. Loeb also dismissed our position by claiming that we did not have all of the radar data. He promised to get additional radar data to us, which he did. FAA radar data proves NTSB radar track is false The radar data Mr. Loeb and general counsel Dan Campbell provided gave no new information. Consequently, we filed a Freedom of Information Act request for radar coverage of the same event. The FAA was more forthcoming. Although we still have not received all relevant original radar data, the FAA's data clearly and indisputably now shows that the ValuJet 592 aircraft continued inbound to the airport past the crash site distance of 17 miles (from the airport), past the end of the radar track created by the NTSB, and did not disappear from radar until it reached a point 12 miles from the Miami Airport. (See attachments C& D.) Supporting evidence that the NTSB radar track is false This radar data is consistent with our independent investigation in which the FAA air traffic controller told us that the ValuJet aircraft disappeared from the radar scope at 12 miles. Furthermore, the 12 miles position was confirmed in the radio communications transcripts contained in the NTSB factual reports. On this basis alone, the evidence shows that the NTSB has developed a false radar track. However, we also have other information, much of which we detailed to your staff in our meeting, showing additional flaws in the NTSB's purported radar track and communications with ValuJet 592. Unreported Eye witnesses account of ValuJet flying away from the airport ValuJet 592 was lost off the FAA radar 12 miles from the airport inbound for landing but the crash site is 17 miles from the airport. How did it get there? The answer is contained in the unreported words of two of the witnesses, who told the NTSB investigators that they saw the ValuJet aircraft flying westbound (away from the airport) at a very low altitude (apparently below the radar horizon) and then make a 180 degree right turn and disappear below their visual horizon. Although this testimony was also repeated to my associate, the NTSB failed to record this significant information in the Witness Group Chairman's Factual Report and in the final NTSB report. Ostensible attempt at repression of third eye witness testimony I have expressed to you my concern about another serious omission, specifically the NTSB's failure to interview the Chinese student pilot who was an eye witness to the crash. That negligence was compounded by the NTSB's subsequent claim that no such witness existed. Now that the witness has finally been interviewed by the NTSB we find that his testimony is consistent with that of the other eye witnesses mentioned above. Furthermore, the Chinese pilot's testimony refutes the specious NTSB radar track since he saw the plane flying west to east for about fifteen seconds before the crash. In contradiction, the NTSB's purported radar track of the plane shows it flying south at that time. The conditions of the ValuJet aircraft were ready for an electrical fire Electrical fires often are preceded by indications that the conditions are ripe for such an event. The FAA's service difficulty reports indicated numerous electrical problems on this specific aircraft. The NTSB's records reveal that it was infamous in the ValuJet fleet for continuing electrical problems and was experiencing several electrical problems on the day of the accident. At one point, the flight was delayed in Atlanta while mechanics were trying to find and fix the electrical problems. In spite of these attempts, electrical problems continued while the plane was en route from Atlanta to Miami, which was the flight immediately preceding the accident flight. Indeed, these pre-flight 592 electrical failures appear to have culminated in a series of major electrical failures, which was the initial reason the plane was attempting to return to Miami. This is well documented in the NTSB record. All of this is irrelevant, however, unless there is some evidence of an electrical fire on ValuJet 592. As it turns out, there is such evidence. Unfortunately, the NTSB conclusion from this evidence was negligently derived. NTSB's false and misleading statements regarding electrical fire on ValuJet 592 Throughout your group factual report, your investigators claimed that the wires that were burned showed "little or no evidence of embrittlement." Lack of embrittlement, according Pat Cahill, the FAA's expert on wiring, is indicative of an electrical fire - not a fire from an external source. Yet your final report claims that the wires showed no evidence of an electrical fire. The Final NTSB report (pg.43) states: "The heat damaged wires . . . were consistent with those resulting from an external heat source." Such negligent and seriously misleading interpretations strains the credibility of the NTSB itself and raises the issue of the competency and motives of your investigators. NTSB/FAA oxygen canister fire test ignored the Scientific Method American's pride themselves as practitioners of the Western tradition of applying the scientific method, a self-correcting process of observations, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis, and test. Fundamental to the validity of the scientific method is the use of the double-blind study. However, it was not used to prove the viability of the oxygen canister theory nor was the demonstration set up to maximize the potential for failure, a mandatory element in the intellectual tradition of the scientific method. Instead, the NTSB, using heuristic reasoning, activated the canisters (manually)--itself an assumption without evidence--and proceeded as a given that throwing a box full of oxygen canisters into the cargo hold would activate one or more of them. Another fundamental element of the scientific method is that the experiment can be duplicated and repeated by third parties. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that throwing the canister boxes onto ValuJet 592 would ignite them, then we should be able to duplicate such a test. The NTSB should have demonstrated that the oxygen canisters would ignite by having them thrown into a cargo hold. It failed to do that. Consequently, since the ignition of one or more oxygen canisters is a condition precedent to any speculation that they (1) started the fire or (2) that they exacerbated a fire, everything that followed is moot. We have also obtained test reports and videos from the NTSB/FAA fire tests on the oxygen canisters. Again, an independent forensic laboratory, with extensive experience in fire/arson investigation, has reviewed the data and issued a report highly critical of the tests. This laboratory maintains that this appears to have been an electrical fire, not a fire caused by oxygen canisters. The NTSB provided radar data and ATC transcripts with altered time The NTSB has failed to provide: (1) the actual radar data, (2) the actual radar track, (3) an accurate time clock of the radar data and, (4) the true time on the voice transcripts of the conversation between Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the ValuJet pilot. Consequently, none of the times provided by the NTSB can be used to determine the actual time of the accident. Our investigation so far reveals that the NTSB radar time clock is fast by about 18 seconds at the beginning of the flight and by about 50 seconds at the NTSB's claimed time of the crash (18:13:42). The recently obtained FAA radar data is similarly plagued. NTSB chose the least reliable reference time Given a choice between the extremely accurate atomic clock (WWV) to which the FAA radar data tapes are slaved and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the NTSB chose the latter which, as the record shows, failed twice during the ill fated flight. As your factual reports state: "Times recorded on the CVR transcript were used as the reference time, and FDR and radar clocks were adjusted accordingly." Not only is the CVR suspect, it was made more so because, as your factual reports state: "timing on the tape was established using the known time of several air traffic control transmission recorded on a cassette tape provided by the FAA." Our conclusion that the time is inaccurate follows because the air traffic control (ATC) transmission tape was tampered with. We know this because the same independent audio expert hired on the Aloha Airline accident has confirmed that approximately one minute is missing on the "20 minute" ATC tape. The 19 minute tape was recorded at different speeds and made to fit an inaccurate transcript 20 minutes long (see attachment E). Moreover, a comparison of the CVR times (the NTSB reference time) and the distorted times in the ATC transcripts show that they only differ by a second or so. NTSB attempts at time correlation were debased further by the non sequitur "merry-go-round" in which "the correlation was established through a comparison of the Microphone Keying information recorded by the FDR, Cockpit Voice Recorder and the (ATC). For more details, see Airplane Performance Group factual report." The NTSB ignored evidence of the actual time of the crash An eye witness made a 911 call 20-30 seconds after viewing the crash. The time of the call was recorded on a clock slaved to the same atomic clock used by the FAA's radar. The call was received at 14:15:22. That puts the time of the crash at approximately 14:15:00 local time (18:15:00 UTC). Missing time was adequate for ValuJet to fly from 12 miles back to the crash site Between the NTSB's claimed time of the crash at 18:13:42 (which is fast by about 50 seconds and should be approximately 18:12:50 UTC) and the eyewitness 911 call to the Broward Sheriff's Department within 20-30 seconds of the accident, there is approximately one minute and 17 seconds missing (or about two minutes when adjusted as noted above). Whatever manipulation has been done to the time clocks, the plane had to fly from where it was lost off the radar 12 miles from the airport back to the crash site 17 miles from the airport. There was sufficient time to have flown in the manner described by the unreported testimony of eye witnesses. Integrity of NTSB should be re-established by re-opening the ValuJet 592 investigation Chairman Hall, in light of the foregoing, the integrity of the NTSB must be seriously questioned. I believe you owe it to the relatives and friends of the victims in this tragic accident and to the American public to re-open the ValuJet investigation and have the truth revealed. What other purpose does the NTSB have than to reveal all the facts in an accident and then make recommendations consistent those facts and related findings. I encourage you to do so with dispatch. Meanwhile, I look forward to your early response to this letter and to the September 11, 1997 letter from our Counsel, Mr. Hadley to you concerning "ValuJet Flight 592- Possible Tampering with Evidence/Criminal Conduct" (attachment F). Sincerely, VisionSafe Corporation Bert Werjefelt President ********************************************** James P. Stevenson E-mail Address: jamesstevenson@sprintmail.com Telephone: (301) 254-9000 ********************************************** - --============_-1315760278==_ma============-- ------------------------------ End of skunk-works-digest V7 #30 *******************************