From: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com (skunk-works-digest) To: skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Subject: skunk-works-digest V8 #7 Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Sender: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Errors-To: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk skunk-works-digest Wednesday, January 27 1999 Volume 08 : Number 007 Index of this digest by subject: *************************************************** cc:Mail Link to SMTP Undeliverable Message cc:Mail Link to SMTP Undeliverable Message Re: New ballistic missile defense system Object in F-117 weapons bay Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay RE: Object in F-117 weapons bay Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay RE: Object in F-117 weapons bay Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay This is (Diego Garcia) a (Cobra Ball) test message. Please ignore (B-52 Ops). *************************************************** ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 25 Jan 99 03:03:29 -0500 From: robivey@pmsc.com Subject: cc:Mail Link to SMTP Undeliverable Message - --simple boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ACSII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message is undeliverable. Reason: Unable to access cc:Mail Post office. Please retry later. Original text follows: - --------------------- - --simple boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ACSII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received: from mail.pmsc.com by cc.pmsc.com (ccMail Link to SMTP R8.00.01) ; Mon, 25 Jan 99 03:00:48 -0500 Return-Path: Received: from seawall.pmsc.com (firewall-user@seawall.pmsc.com [170.30.174.10]) by mail.pmsc.com (8.8.5/8.7.1) with ESMTP id IAA21288 for ; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 08:29:35 -0500 Received: by seawall.pmsc.com; id CAA24659; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 02:46:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from netwrx1.com(192.41.8.79) by seawall.pmsc.com via smap (4.1) id xma021049; Mon, 25 Jan 99 02:41:34 -0500 Received: (georgek@localhost) by netwrx1.com (8.8.5) id AAA05861; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 00:50:27 -0700 (MST) Received: from tomcat.sac.verio.net (root@tomcat.sac.verio.net [209.162.64.15]) by netwrx1.com (8.8.5) id AAA05848; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 00:50:20 -0700 (MST) From: betnal@ns.net Received: from pm03-47.sac.verio.net (pm03-47.sac.verio.net [209.162.64.113]) by tomcat.sac.verio.net (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with SMTP id XAA22838 for ; Sun, 24 Jan 1999 23:50:16 -0800 (PST) To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Subject: Re: New ballistic missile defense system Date: Mon, 25 Jan 99 07:49:13 GMT Message-ID: References: <199810190104.TAA05118@netwrx1.com> <3.0.1.32.19990121114644.006f9510@e-z.net> X-Mailer: Quarterdeck Message Center [2.00] Sender: owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com On 1/21/99 11:46AM, in message <3.0.1.32.19990121114644.006f9510@e-z.net>, patrick wrote: > Lets talk ballistic missile defense....... > > No sooner does Bill give the Joint Chiefs 6 billion dollars (no small chunk > of change!) to buy more bullets, petroleum products and pay raises for the > grunts the Pentagon announces it is beginning to create a 12.5 billion > dollar anti-ballistic missile defense system to protect us from.....if you > can believe this, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, various ex Soviet > provinces, etc..... > Most of the "extra" money is actually money that either was already in the budget to cover inflation, or is to be realized through "Management efficiencies". All Bill did was say, "If inflation isn't as much as expected, then instead of freezing this money you may use it for other purposes. If inflation is at or what we expected, or if the 'Management Efficiencies' don't pan out, then you're S.O.L.". Part of the rest of the money is to cover the upcoming military pay raise that he approved but didn't fund. The rest of the "extra" money is earmarked to cover part of the increased expenses of the Bosnia misadventure. > 1. Do we really believe N. Korea is working their butts off to build a 3 > stage rocket with maybe a small nuclear device attached so they can finally > lob one into our backyard? Are they really trying hard, thinking "God, if > we can only launch one device and hit Seattle it would be so cool!!!" > After all surely even they understand the power of retribution we are > capable of unleashing. I just don't see any logic in this threat > whatever. I realize they are building a device but do we understand why > they are doing it? > Try this logic: "We are going to move on S. Korea. (or Japan or wherever), in order to defend ourselves from the starvation caused by evil Western Imperialism. Are you willing to sacrifice Seattle in order to interfere with us? We really don't care how many peasants you blow up in any retaliation. Besides, then we'd use our second missile". > 2. We don't have a real good track record in this area. The THAAP testing > going on at White Sands becomes more dismal with each failing test there. > The intercepts are just not happening. I'm sure the SCUD busters stationed > just down the road at Ft. Bliss are looking over their shoulders and > commenting "At least we hit something once in awhile." > I could point out the Polaris missile system had 13 consecutive failures before they got one right. However, this is comparing apples and oranges. We're not talking about tactical missiles but ICBMs. ICBMs move faster than TBMs, true, but they also fly higher (making them easier to spot and shoot, are more predictable in their flight paths and tend to have longer flight times. > 3. What systems do they actually intend on employing.....and whatever it > is they claim the system will be online in 2005. With such a quick > installation can we then assume more money will need to be thrown into the > breach to meet the deadline? The problem is not developing and deploying such a system, but deciding to to so and funding that. This has been anathema since 1993. Keep in mind here that we're not talking about intercepting hundreds of missiles, only tens at most (in a first stage). The Aegis/Standard (upgrade) system shows great promise, but working to hard in this area has been a sure way to get funding cut. Ironically, if we deployed it, we'd be able to defend Tokyo but not Los Angeles :o > > 4. Whatever became of our agreement not to implent an ABM system? We had > developed a Sprint missile system which had to be junked per an agreement > with the Soviets. Of course the Reagan administration was not letting this > impede progress on their Star Wars programs. You mean the agreement we had with a nation that violated it, and no longer exists in any case? That agreement? Your understanding of the Sprint (actually Sprint/Spartan) system is mistaken. It was not dismantled because of any treaty. In fact the ABM treaty specifically authorized it. It was dismantled because Senator Ted Kennedy took it as a personal affront that it was deployed even though he didn't like it. He quietly attached a rider to a bill that specifically forbade the expenditure of any money for operation of the system. He did this a couple of months before the system was to become operational. What the effect of this was that once they finished construction, they were now operational. Since Teddy K. had made it a crime to spend any money on operating the system. AS soon as acceptance tests were complete they had to shut it down. > > 5. And was it not concluded that Star Wars was not going to be efficient > enough to prevent a lethal number of nuclear warheads from successfully > penetrating its barriers? Actually, that wasn't concluded. One goal of SDI was to reduce the number of warheads that made it to detonation. A bigger goal was to introduce a high degree of uncertainty into which warheads would make it. This meant that the adversary would have to build an unaffordable number of missiles to overcome this (which could easily be countered by building more of the far cheaper defenses), or would have to vastly reduce the number of warheads in order to carry decoys and countermeasures to overcome the defenses to the point where you could count on destroying the target you wanted (of course now you have less warheads so that's another uncertainty). As a byproduct, any small attacks by terrorist nations would be easy to deal with. > So somehow now we are able to prevent a handful > of incoming ICBM's so therefore its a rational thing to do? It would probably be considered rational by anyone who happened to be in the target area of those handful of missiles. Remember, this is a vastly easier problem than was faced by SDI. > This may make > sense but I really hope we aren't spending bazillions of dollars for a > system that is inherently flawed while we are all told it works fine. I hope so too. From Tony: >"The panel believes the intelligence community has a strong case that for >sound >technical reasons the United States is unlikely to face an indigenously >developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the third >world before 2010, even taking into account the acquisition of foreign >hardware >and technical assistance, and that case is even stronger than was presented in >the estimate." >Gates report, December 1996 This particular report does not inspire as much confidence as it did then for a couple of reasons. First, given how long it takes to do things in might indeed take us until 2010 to field something. More importantly, since the Chinese and North Koreans in 1997-98 demonstrated technologies and capabilities that in 1996 were thought to be unachievable by them until 2003-5, the 2010 estimate looks suspiciously like wishful thinking. Don't pick on the intel community too much. Lately, it's become apparent that a good way to end your career is to come up with an assessment that doesn't support the official foregone conclusion. Art - --simple boundary-- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 25 Jan 99 04:51:09 -0500 From: robivey@pmsc.com Subject: cc:Mail Link to SMTP Undeliverable Message - --simple boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ACSII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message is undeliverable. Reason: Unable to access cc:Mail Post office. Please retry later. Original text follows: - --------------------- - --simple boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ACSII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received: from mail.pmsc.com by cc.pmsc.com (ccMail Link to SMTP R8.00.01) ; Mon, 25 Jan 99 04:34:10 -0500 Return-Path: Received: from seawall.pmsc.com (firewall-user@seawall.pmsc.com [170.30.174.10]) by mail.pmsc.com (8.8.5/8.7.1) with ESMTP id KAA00222 for ; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 10:02:57 -0500 Received: by seawall.pmsc.com; id EAA28794; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 04:19:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from netwrx1.com(192.41.8.79) by seawall.pmsc.com via smap (4.1) id xma028687; Mon, 25 Jan 99 04:18:33 -0500 Received: (georgek@localhost) by netwrx1.com (8.8.5) id CAA14687; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 02:31:14 -0700 (MST) Received: from seawall.pmsc.com (firewall-user@seaspray.pmsc.com [198.78.21.66]) by netwrx1.com (8.8.5) id CAA14680; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 02:31:11 -0700 (MST) From: robivey@pmsc.com X-Authentication-Warning: netwrx1.com: Host firewall-user@seaspray.pmsc.com [198.78.21.66] claimed to be seawall.pmsc.com Received: by seawall.pmsc.com; id DAA09242; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 03:46:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from cc.pmsc.com(170.30.70.239) by seawall.pmsc.com via smap (4.1) id xma004819; Mon, 25 Jan 99 03:35:02 -0500 Received: from ccMail by cc.pmsc.com (ccMail Link to SMTP R8.00.01) id AA917252683; Mon, 25 Jan 99 03:49:37 -0500 Message-Id: <9901259172.AA917252683@cc.pmsc.com> X-Mailer: ccMail Link to SMTP R8.00.01 Date: Mon, 25 Jan 99 03:03:29 -0500 To: Subject: cc:Mail Link to SMTP Undeliverable Message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="simple boundary" Sender: owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com - --simple boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ACSII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message is undeliverable. Reason: Unable to access cc:Mail Post office. Please retry later. Original text follows: - --------------------- - --simple boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ACSII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received: from mail.pmsc.com by cc.pmsc.com (ccMail Link to SMTP R8.00.01) ; Mon, 25 Jan 99 03:00:48 -0500 Return-Path: Received: from seawall.pmsc.com (firewall-user@seawall.pmsc.com [170.30.174.10]) by mail.pmsc.com (8.8.5/8.7.1) with ESMTP id IAA21288 for ; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 08:29:35 -0500 Received: by seawall.pmsc.com; id CAA24659; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 02:46:11 -0500 (EST) Received: from netwrx1.com(192.41.8.79) by seawall.pmsc.com via smap (4.1) id xma021049; Mon, 25 Jan 99 02:41:34 -0500 Received: (georgek@localhost) by netwrx1.com (8.8.5) id AAA05861; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 00:50:27 -0700 (MST) Received: from tomcat.sac.verio.net (root@tomcat.sac.verio.net [209.162.64.15]) by netwrx1.com (8.8.5) id AAA05848; Mon, 25 Jan 1999 00:50:20 -0700 (MST) From: betnal@ns.net Received: from pm03-47.sac.verio.net (pm03-47.sac.verio.net [209.162.64.113]) by tomcat.sac.verio.net (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with SMTP id XAA22838 for ; Sun, 24 Jan 1999 23:50:16 -0800 (PST) To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Subject: Re: New ballistic missile defense system Date: Mon, 25 Jan 99 07:49:13 GMT Message-ID: References: <199810190104.TAA05118@netwrx1.com> <3.0.1.32.19990121114644.006f9510@e-z.net> X-Mailer: Quarterdeck Message Center [2.00] Sender: owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com On 1/21/99 11:46AM, in message <3.0.1.32.19990121114644.006f9510@e-z.net>, patrick wrote: > Lets talk ballistic missile defense....... > > No sooner does Bill give the Joint Chiefs 6 billion dollars (no small chunk > of change!) to buy more bullets, petroleum products and pay raises for the > grunts the Pentagon announces it is beginning to create a 12.5 billion > dollar anti-ballistic missile defense system to protect us from.....if you > can believe this, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, various ex Soviet > provinces, etc..... > Most of the "extra" money is actually money that either was already in the budget to cover inflation, or is to be realized through "Management efficiencies". All Bill did was say, "If inflation isn't as much as expected, then instead of freezing this money you may use it for other purposes. If inflation is at or what we expected, or if the 'Management Efficiencies' don't pan out, then you're S.O.L.". Part of the rest of the money is to cover the upcoming military pay raise that he approved but didn't fund. The rest of the "extra" money is earmarked to cover part of the increased expenses of the Bosnia misadventure. > 1. Do we really believe N. Korea is working their butts off to build a 3 > stage rocket with maybe a small nuclear device attached so they can finally > lob one into our backyard? Are they really trying hard, thinking "God, if > we can only launch one device and hit Seattle it would be so cool!!!" > After all surely even they understand the power of retribution we are > capable of unleashing. I just don't see any logic in this threat > whatever. I realize they are building a device but do we understand why > they are doing it? > Try this logic: "We are going to move on S. Korea. (or Japan or wherever), in order to defend ourselves from the starvation caused by evil Western Imperialism. Are you willing to sacrifice Seattle in order to interfere with us? We really don't care how many peasants you blow up in any retaliation. Besides, then we'd use our second missile". > 2. We don't have a real good track record in this area. The THAAP testing > going on at White Sands becomes more dismal with each failing test there. > The intercepts are just not happening. I'm sure the SCUD busters stationed > just down the road at Ft. Bliss are looking over their shoulders and > commenting "At least we hit something once in awhile." > I could point out the Polaris missile system had 13 consecutive failures before they got one right. However, this is comparing apples and oranges. We're not talking about tactical missiles but ICBMs. ICBMs move faster than TBMs, true, but they also fly higher (making them easier to spot and shoot, are more predictable in their flight paths and tend to have longer flight times. > 3. What systems do they actually intend on employing.....and whatever it > is they claim the system will be online in 2005. With such a quick > installation can we then assume more money will need to be thrown into the > breach to meet the deadline? The problem is not developing and deploying such a system, but deciding to to so and funding that. This has been anathema since 1993. Keep in mind here that we're not talking about intercepting hundreds of missiles, only tens at most (in a first stage). The Aegis/Standard (upgrade) system shows great promise, but working to hard in this area has been a sure way to get funding cut. Ironically, if we deployed it, we'd be able to defend Tokyo but not Los Angeles :o > > 4. Whatever became of our agreement not to implent an ABM system? We had > developed a Sprint missile system which had to be junked per an agreement > with the Soviets. Of course the Reagan administration was not letting this > impede progress on their Star Wars programs. You mean the agreement we had with a nation that violated it, and no longer exists in any case? That agreement? Your understanding of the Sprint (actually Sprint/Spartan) system is mistaken. It was not dismantled because of any treaty. In fact the ABM treaty specifically authorized it. It was dismantled because Senator Ted Kennedy took it as a personal affront that it was deployed even though he didn't like it. He quietly attached a rider to a bill that specifically forbade the expenditure of any money for operation of the system. He did this a couple of months before the system was to become operational. What the effect of this was that once they finished construction, they were now operational. Since Teddy K. had made it a crime to spend any money on operating the system. AS soon as acceptance tests were complete they had to shut it down. > > 5. And was it not concluded that Star Wars was not going to be efficient > enough to prevent a lethal number of nuclear warheads from successfully > penetrating its barriers? Actually, that wasn't concluded. One goal of SDI was to reduce the number of warheads that made it to detonation. A bigger goal was to introduce a high degree of uncertainty into which warheads would make it. This meant that the adversary would have to build an unaffordable number of missiles to overcome this (which could easily be countered by building more of the far cheaper defenses), or would have to vastly reduce the number of warheads in order to carry decoys and countermeasures to overcome the defenses to the point where you could count on destroying the target you wanted (of course now you have less warheads so that's another uncertainty). As a byproduct, any small attacks by terrorist nations would be easy to deal with. > So somehow now we are able to prevent a handful > of incoming ICBM's so therefore its a rational thing to do? It would probably be considered rational by anyone who happened to be in the target area of those handful of missiles. Remember, this is a vastly easier problem than was faced by SDI. > This may make > sense but I really hope we aren't spending bazillions of dollars for a > system that is inherently flawed while we are all told it works fine. I hope so too. From Tony: >"The panel believes the intelligence community has a strong case that for >sound >technical reasons the United States is unlikely to face an indigenously >developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the third >world before 2010, even taking into account the acquisition of foreign >hardware >and technical assistance, and that case is even stronger than was presented in >the estimate." >Gates report, December 1996 This particular report does not inspire as much confidence as it did then for a couple of reasons. First, given how long it takes to do things in might indeed take us until 2010 to field something. More importantly, since the Chinese and North Koreans in 1997-98 demonstrated technologies and capabilities that in 1996 were thought to be unachievable by them until 2003-5, the 2010 estimate looks suspiciously like wishful thinking. Don't pick on the intel community too much. Lately, it's become apparent that a good way to end your career is to come up with an assessment that doesn't support the official foregone conclusion. Art - --simple boundary-- - --simple boundary-- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1999 14:29:50 -0500 (EST) From: Sam Kaltsidis Subject: Re: New ballistic missile defense system Our representatives in DC need to stop playing politics with national defense. We cannot afford any screw-ups when we have incoming ICBMs. Our politicians need to be reminded that they are not going to get re-elected if all or part of their constituents are blown up by ICBMs or TBMs or terrorists. On Dec. 7th, 1941 we vowed never to allow any nation to do what the Japanese Imperial Navy did to us. Let's try to keep our promise. When we are talking about the lives and safety of over 250 million Americans and our troops worldwide, no price is too high. For the record: I fully support the ABL, ATL (AW&ST Jan 18, 1999 p.18), SDI, THAAD, and all other classified and non-classified missile defense programs. Sam ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 12:20:57 -0700 From: "Allen Thomson" Subject: Object in F-117 weapons bay On p. 56 of the December 1998 issue of Flight Journal, there's a picture of an object hanging from a rail lowered from the weapons bay of a parked F-117. It's black, appears to be ~ 3/4 the length of the bay, has a fairly thick cylindrical midsection with conical tapered sections front and rear. In front, it has another conical step down to a rounded nose cap. It's hard to see what's in back -- no fins, but what might be an attachment fixture is just visible. What is it? A real weapon? A generic shape for loading practice? Something else? ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 14:26:00 EST From: Jasper0007@aol.com Subject: Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay This is probably the Pilots luggage as F117s when not in Combat have pods to carry the pilots gear/stuff inside. hope that helps Richard ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 15:27:59 -0500 From: "Frank Markus" Subject: RE: Object in F-117 weapons bay I wonder how much that luggage cost! - -----Original Message----- From: owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com [mailto:owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com] On Behalf Of Jasper0007@aol.com Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 1999 2:26 PM To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Subject: Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay This is probably the Pilots luggage as F117s when not in Combat have pods to carry the pilots gear/stuff inside. hope that helps Richard ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1999 00:59:10 -0800 From: patrick Subject: Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay At 02:26 PM 1/26/99 EST, you wrote: >This is probably the Pilots luggage as F117s when not in Combat have pods to >carry the pilots gear/stuff inside. > Good call Richard. I recall it is an old empty bomb casing of some sort that has a new nose cone and tail cone with an access door installed on the side. It literally is used to haul personal gear for overnight trips to airshows and such. This is a common item on several planes, not just to the F-117. patrick ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 15:47:09 -0500 From: "Waller, Jay" Subject: RE: Object in F-117 weapons bay I talked to an A-10 pilot once and he said that their luggage pods were converted from empty containers that were at one time intended for Napalm bombs. I have no idea if that is true, but the one he had on his Warthog sure resembled a Napalm bomb, except it was painted gloss black and had a door on it. This kind of struck me as odd when I heard it so I thought I'd mention it. > -----Original Message----- > From: Frank Markus [SMTP:fmarkus@pipeline.com] > Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 1999 3:28 PM > To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com > Subject: RE: Object in F-117 weapons bay > > I wonder how much that luggage cost! > > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com [mailto:owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com] > On Behalf Of Jasper0007@aol.com > Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 1999 2:26 PM > To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com > Subject: Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay > > This is probably the Pilots luggage as F117s when not in Combat have pods to > carry the pilots gear/stuff inside. > > hope that helps > > Richard ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 19:27:49 EST From: INFORMATION RESTRICTED Subject: Re: Object in F-117 weapons bay I have seen "personal effects" containg devices loaded in the bay which match your description, it may be one of these. Kurt Amateur Radio Stations KC7VDG/KK7RC Monitor Station Registry KCA6ABB Based In Nevada, United States Of America In use: Kenwood: TM-251A/E, TS-570d, Yaesu: FT-8100R, FT-2500M, FT50rd, Realistic: DX-394, Icom: IC-706MKII, Uniden: BC-200xlt, BC-760xlt, Whistler: CO403DC scanning video reciever 55-806 MHz On Tue, 26 Jan 1999 12:20:57 -0700 "Allen Thomson" writes: >On p. 56 of the December 1998 issue of Flight Journal, there's a >picture of >an object hanging from a rail lowered from the weapons bay of a parked >F-117. It's black, appears to be ~ 3/4 the length of the bay, has a >fairly >thick cylindrical midsection with conical tapered sections front and >rear. >In front, it has another conical step down to a rounded nose cap. >It's hard >to see what's in back -- no fins, but what might be an attachment >fixture is >just visible. > >What is it? A real weapon? A generic shape for loading practice? >Something else? > > > > > ___________________________________________________________________ You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail. Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com/getjuno.html or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866] ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1999 04:33:12 -0800 From: patrick Subject: This is (Diego Garcia) a (Cobra Ball) test message. Please ignore (B-52 Ops). 990131. B-52, KC-10 crews create unique training at Navy island base by Staff Sgt. Dale Yates 2nd Air Expeditionary Group Public Affairs NAVAL SUPPORT FACILITY DIEGO GARCIA, British Indian Ocean Territory (AFPN) -- The B-52 and KC-10 air crews of the 2nd Air Expeditionary Group, vital during Desert Fox, are creating unique training opportunities to prepare for future challenges. The group is comprised primarily of units from Barksdale Air Force Base, La.; Minot AFB, N.D.; and Travis AFB, Calif., deployed here since November. "After Desert Fox there was a lot of turmoil moving folks in and out of the (area). We are coming to the end of that confusing phase. The operations are getting smoothed out fairly well," said Lt. Col. Doug Hayner, 2nd Air Expeditionary Group commander. Now the group's operations are focused on training to keep the aircrews ready to meet any challenge. "We have transitioned more to a training methodology, and we are trying to fly local training missions a couple of times a week to keep (the crews) current," said Lt. Col. Mark Murry, commander of the 2nd AEG's air refueling force. Being in the middle of the Indian Ocean has forced the crews to be little more creative to continue proficiency training. "We've built a low-level route through some islands north of here, and we've built high bomb runs over the island (Diego Garcia)," said Capt. Ed Bellem, B-52 aircraft commander. "We can pretty much do just about everything we normally do on training sorties back at home. We even managed to get some (electronic warfare training) when the Navy (destroyers) rolled through." Those destroyers, USS Hopper, USS Fletcher and USS Paul Hamilton, moored at Diego Garcia Jan. 11. While the ships where here, Bellem was able to coordinate an electrical-emissions war game for the B-52s during the destroyers' departure. "Normally we just train off of simulators and bomb sites. In this case, we were working with a natural warship that we've never played with before," said 1st Lt. John Edwards, B-52 electronic warfare officer. "(A destroyer) is an electronic warfare platform that employs surface-to-air missile threats, anti-aircraft artillery threats and electronic warfare. So, this is actually like a real adversary, vs. a training van out in a desert. "(We) rarely get the opportunity to work with the Navy, and especially out here, we don't get electronic warfare," Edwards continued. "So, when we got that mission, we (filled) the plane with three electronic warfare officers to get training." The 2nd AEG's tanker crews also received a break from flying training sorties with the B-52s by also offering support to RC-135 Cobra Ball reconnaissance operations here. "They were going to bring some tankers from Kadena (Air Base, Japan)," Murry said. Instead, "We stepped up to volunteer and are supporting them." To keep the deployed KC-10 crews current, the unit is planning to start teaching the crews in a new tactics-training program. "It is a new KC-10 training program for employing the weapons system a little bit differently in (threat) environments," said Capt. Brian Smith, KC-10 aircraft commander. Overall, the aircrews have found flying over British Indian Ocean Territory easier for their training, because "For 300 miles around the island, you pretty much have the airspace," Bellem said. "You can go where you please as opposed to being under radar control," added Smith. "It is easier to train out here than it is at home." Not everything is easy at Diego Garcia, however. According to Hayner, being separated from the accustomed Air Force support structure can be difficult, but he added that 13th Air Force and the Pacific Air Forces' crisis action team have helped tremendously. "They have managed to move trucks for us that we needed because we are also supporting several other Air Force functions, and 13th and PACAF have been key to making those things happen," Hayner said. The organizations have also provided a B-52 jack system for repairing a landing gear. The island also has its challenges as the 2nd AEG continues to blend with existing operations. "Even though we are a contingency operation and take priority, there is still construction and some bio-waste disposal projects that have to continue to function otherwise the island would deteriorate," said Hayner. "We kind of mix in with those series of other projects using the same housing, using the same facilities and trying to coexist." In the end, the meshing units have formed a cohesive team. "When we first got to the island, the 2nd AEG was a conglomeration of eight different units forced to work together," Hayner said. "We still have quite of few of those agencies that are not part of the 2nd Bomb Wing (the Barksdale unit that is lead for the 2nd AEG deployment). "You can see a sense of teamwork with the whole system functioning that I find refreshing. We've stepped up to every challenge we've had thrown at us," Hayner said. "We are part of a team that comes out and gets the job done," Murry added. ------------------------------ End of skunk-works-digest V8 #7 ******************************* To subscribe to skunk-works-digest, send the command: subscribe in the body of a message to "majordomo@netwrx1.com". If you want to subscribe something other than the account the mail is coming from, such as a local redistribution list, then append that address to the "subscribe" command; for example, to subscribe "local-skunk-works": subscribe local-skunk-works@your.domain.net To unsubscribe, send mail to the same address, with the command: unsubscribe in the body. Administrative requests, problems, and other non-list mail can be sent to georgek@netwrx1.com. A non-digest (direct mail) version of this list is also available; to subscribe to that instead, replace all instances of "skunk-works-digest" in the commands above with "skunk-works". Back issues are available for viewing by a www interface located at: http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works If you have any questions or problems please contact me at: georgek@netwrx1.com Thanks, George R. Kasica Listowner