From: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com (skunk-works-digest) To: skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Subject: skunk-works-digest V8 #34 Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Sender: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Errors-To: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk skunk-works-digest Friday, April 2 1999 Volume 08 : Number 034 Index of this digest by subject: *************************************************** Re: The stealth excuses begin Re: Advocating stealth Re: The stealth excuses begin FW: STEALTH COMPROMISED BY NOT DESTROYING F-117 WRECKAGE Re: Advocating stealth *************************************************** ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 09:18:46 -0500 From: "James P. Stevenson" Subject: Re: The stealth excuses begin >>>>The article below in one of the beginning trail of excuses for the >>>>F-117's failure to work as advertised. Like every all previous failed >>>>claims, you can expect to see more of this. Usually, it comes in the >>>>form of "we have a software update that will fix that." >>> > >> >>1/ William Perry, =84Defense Department Budget Briefing.=BE (7 Feb. 1994): >>A1, A-10. >> >>He made similar claims with the F-117. > > Really? Why not post them, they're more relevant. > I'll dig them up, eventually. The point, however, is that he is making claims that some have said that no senior official made. >>> 2. When you drive somewhere, do you first change the oil of the car, >>> repaint it, make sure your doors have hermetic seals, and then >>> tighten each and every nut, bolt, and rivet before going anywhere? >>> That's more or less what happens before a stealth aircraft is flown. >>> If there is a scratch in the paint, a loose fitting, or just about >>> any other abnormality, the aircraft's signature will not be optimal. >>> In fact, if the bomb bay or landing gear doors do not close fully, >>> the advantage of stealth is almost certainly lost. Cutbacks in >>> spending for the development of eaier to maintain coatings, etc. and >>> overall cutbacks in the mainatinance of the F-117 fleet reduce their >>> combat effectiveness greatly. >> >>Exactly. So don't sell it to us as fantastic when in fact it has all of >>these issues that keep it from performing as advertised. > > When the "advertisements" you are referring to were made, most of > these problems were not issues because the aircraft were being > maintained much better, because the funds to maintain them were > available. If you believe that there are no funds to maintain the F-117s properly, please provide the evidence. >>You may be right. I am not claiming the recent crash was the result of >>the Serbs. I am saying that stealth has not demonstrated that it worked >>any better than any other aircraft that flew at night above 10,000 feet. > > 1. During the combat conditions of the Gulf War. > 2. According to the GAO. > 3. During a time when it's operational readiness was quite higher. > 4. Neglecting the fact that the French forces in the region were > using more or less the same radar that the Iraqi C3I did, and could > not track the F-117 on repeated occasions- unless the peacetime radar > reflectors were installed. > Etc. 1. correct. 2. The GAO got its information from, among others, the pilots. 3. How do you know? 4. Where is your evidence? > There seem to be a lot of factors you are neglecting in your analysis. What? >>> >>> Basically, you're jumping to far too many conclusions. Wait until the >>> pilot's side of the story is heard before you judge the combat >>> effectiveness of a weapons system in a dynamic threat environemnt by >>> an *accounting report*. >> >>The pilots comments are part of the determination as to what happened, >>but only part. > > And yet, a fairly signifcant part. He was there. None of us, or the > GAO, were :) The GAO did not need to be there if the people they interviewed and the databases they reviewed were accurate. >> >>Unfortunately, the concept of sovereign immunity prevents the citizen >>from suing the government for wasting its money. But if I could, I >>would. The U.S. government just spent over $5 billion on the A-12 for >>which we received nothing. Furthermore, it spent the money illegally >>without the consent of the Congress. >>> > > So write your Congressman, and everyone on the various oversight comittee= s. > And the notion that the A-12 "brought us nothing" is a bit far > fetched. The sensor suite alone advanced the state of the art, and > helped drive down the costs of countless other sensor and information > processing programs in both military and civil sectors. The B-2's > radar carries much of it's lineage from the A-12, as does the F-18E, > J-Stars, etc. You appear to be making assumptions without any foundation. When asked if there were "any . . . A-12 technology, A-12 materials, information . . . from the A-12 program from January of =B988 to January of =B991 that is now being used by the United States. . . " former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology answered, 'No.' (Kaminski Deposition, (Sept. 26, 1995): 158-159.) - -------------------------------------- James P. Stevenson jamesstevenson@sprintmail.com Author, "The Pentagon Paradox : The Development of the F-18 Hornet" Available at Amazon.com at this web site: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1557507759/qid%3D921852978/002-87 71310-1228648 "The $5 Billion Misunderstanding" A history of the Navy's A-12 stealth aircraft. Available Spring of 2000 from The Naval Institute Press Http://www.usni.org ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 09:24:02 -0500 From: "James P. Stevenson" Subject: Re: Advocating stealth > > David wrote: >>>Are you saying that the LO R&D has resulted in a zero net gain wrt to the >>>survivability of a/c ? If so, Air Force Chief of Staff - General Larry Welch >>> . . . would disagree with your take on stealth. > > > Then James S. wrote: >>Larry Welch is an advocate for the Air Force. It was, after all, Larry >>Welch who generated the analysis that said an F-15 with an AIM-82 >>missile could generate an exchange ratio against the MiG-21F of >>955-to-1. > > No, Welch is an advocate for fighters. Lest we not forget he was one of the > main folks instrumental in killing the SR program. > If the Air Force had wanted the SR, Welch would have advocated it. Jim Stevenson ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 09:54:01 -0500 From: "James P. Stevenson" Subject: Re: The stealth excuses begin > Jim S writes: > >>David wrote: >> >>> I can't remember ever being told by anyone in the business or the DoD t= ha=3D >>t >>> LO planes were either invisible to radar/IR or invulnerable. >> >>I don't know if you would consider Secretary of Defense William Perry as >>being in the business, but here is his claim of radar invisibility: > >>"[W]hat gives the F-22 its unique advantage as an air dominance fighter >>of the future is that any aircraft that it comes up against, any air >>defense system that it comes up against it will be essentially invisible >>to. . . . > > To what ? I assume, to radar, but I'd like to see his finished sentence. > I have to say that even in your carefully selected quote he hasn't said > invisible. He's said 'essentially invisible,' which is an important > qualification. If you're essentially anything, you aren't completely > something. I'll attempt to get the complete statement. The word essential means: 1. Constituting or being part of the essence of something; inherent. 2. Basic or indispensable; necessary: essential ingredients. It would be reasonable for a taxpayer to believe that if the secretary of defense says "essentially invisible" that he is offering something close to invisible. The point is, however, that there is no evidence that the F-117 is any more difficult to see that any other aircraft that flew in the Gulf War at night above 10,000 feet. > > WRT the F-22's LO capabilities, maybe Perry knows something we don't - a > fair bet I'd say. The department of defense has used the technique of argumentum intimidatum for years. "We know and you don't--trust us." Well, history is filled with hundreds of examples where the DoD made claims and it turned out differently. Why, with the obvious interest that many on this site have in history, you turn stealth from a neutral claim into a religious event, escapes me. You hear a military or industry person make a claim and you bow down. Why don't you make these people prove what they say? > > As we appear (at least on the issue of LO) to differ, I think > you'd agree that significant aspects of LO survivability and probability = of > intercept are highly classified. The classification is done in part to fund these programs illegally. Another part is done to prevent oversight. >If we knew these details we wouldn't > reveal them here, and without hard data to which scientific methodolgy ca= n > be applied, we can only talk in general terms from information gathered > from open source, non-classified publications. You don't need to know how a telephone works to know you either have or don't have a dial tone. Right now, all we know is that all of the aircraft that flew when and where the F-117 flew survived. We also know that one went down. None of this indicates that stealth is more survivable than non-stealth aircraft. > > That said. if we look at a Department of the Air Force briefing dated Mar= ch > 1990 ' B-2 Survivability Against Air Defense Systems,' we read some very > interesting facts. > > Here are a few carefully chosen extracts of my own from the 13 page paper= . > I think it's a very balanced overview. The headings are mine, just to > quickly identify our areas of discussion/difference: > > 1. [On Invisibility]: > > QUOTE: > "Stealth aircraft are neither invisible or immortal, but pose many > challenges to air defense systems that their survivability is much greate= r > than conventional aircraft." This is a claim without evidence. > > "The B-2 is obviously not invisible. But what is needed for successful ai= r > defense against the B-2 is detection, tracking and kill capabilities at > relatively long operating ranges (e.g. 25 to 100 miles depending on the > style of defense). At such ranges the various signals available from the > B-2 are generally very weak and easily lost." > END QUOTE I see no evidence is this statement, only an assertion without proof. > Comments: Where's the hype here ? It even spells out the fact that LO a/c > are >not< as you suggest being universally 'sold' as invisible and by > implication invulnerable. I call this the understated sell. > > 2. [On Who's Involved with Validating LO Effectiveness]: > > QUOTE: > "Since the early days of the stealth program, the Air Force has conducted= , > and continues to conduct a broad range of investigations of potential air > defense counters to stealthy air vehicles....with the objective of findin= g > an =91Achilles Heel=92 that could provide a means to effectively counter > stealth technologies. A talented cadre of Ph.D. level scientists, > engineers, and analysts [aided by contributions of many additional > talented staff from government, industry, and academia] has been given > direct access to data on various stealth programs and sufficient funding > to conduct major experiments. >>>These researchers have operated > independently of stealth program managers and industrial contractors<<<." > END QUOTE > (My Emphasis added) > > Comments: You suggested that the standard scientific method was thrown > aside in the scramble to put LO 'rubber on the ramp.' Does the involvemen= t > of all these people from different scientific backgrounds imply they're > all part of the cosy LO technological scam ? If so, just how many people > are involved in this illegal conspiracy ? There is no conspiracy, Its about keeping their jobs. I am reminded of a comment about the Ph.D.s working on Star Wars. "It=B9s all very similar to Star Wars," said former Naval Weapons Center director Chuck Bernard. "For years I would have conversations with associates about certain concepts in physics that we would all agree on. But once my associates got hired by Star Wars, their position would change. The laws of physics had not but their position had. In fact, it is very interesting: when I line up those that profess to believe the Star War claims, and those who do not, there is a direct correspondence between those who derive money from Star Wars and those who do not. I could show the same correspondence with stealth." Bernard=B9s observation led to the stealth corollary to the Pentagon Paradox: the advocacy of stealth is proportional to the past, present, or anticipated income or reputation derived therefrom. > > 3. [On Accepting That The B-2 Can Be Detected]: > > QUOTE: > ".....Many radar systems cannot accommodate the very substantial upgrades > to detect the B-2 and their coverage zones are too small to support > successful defense against this bomber. >>Some big, powerful radars do ha= ve > a useful detection capability. In response, the B-2 could employ evasive > routing, fly low to reduce coverage and/or employ stand-off weapons to > attack targets in the vicinity of these radars.<<" > END QUOTE > (My emphasis added) Another claim without proof. > QUOTE: > " Developing an informed and mature view of the survivability of stealthy > aircraft is necessary as we peruse these stealth and counterstealth > activities. For example, during test activities, air defense sensor > components will occasionally detect stealthy air vehicles. And, with > sufficient coverage density and at short range, perhaps even track them." > END QUOTE > > Comments: There is a clear acceptance here that certain radars can > detect and sometimes even track the B-2. That's true. > > Overall, the Air Force seems to have no illusions about LO technology > or its limitations, even if politicians and others are misinformed. Since the Air Force controls all of the information about stealth, the only way anyone could be misinformed would be from Air Force actions. - -------------------------------------- James P. Stevenson jamesstevenson@sprintmail.com Author, "The Pentagon Paradox : The Development of the F-18 Hornet" Available at Amazon.com at this web site: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1557507759/qid%3D921852978/002-87 71310-1228648 "The $5 Billion Misunderstanding" A history of the Navy's A-12 stealth aircraft. Available Spring of 2000 from The Naval Institute Press Http://www.usni.org ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 10:02:36 -0500 From: "James P. Stevenson" Subject: FW: STEALTH COMPROMISED BY NOT DESTROYING F-117 WRECKAGE Defense Daily 2 April 1999 STEALTH COMPROMISED BY NOT DESTROYING F-117 WRECKAGE By Vago Muradian The wreckage of the F-117 stealth fighter that crashed in Yugoslavia on Saturday should have been destroyed by either precision munitions or special operations forces to prevent potential foes from getting hold of parts of the sophisticated aircraft that could lead to the development of stealthy foreign systems, according to military officers and Pentagon officials. "I'm surprised we didn't bomb it, because the standing procedure has always been that when you lose something of real or perceived value--in this case real technology, stealth--you destroy it," retired Air Force Gen. Michael Loh, former commander of the Air Combat Command, told Defense Daily. "I've talked to a lot of people about why we didn't pour PGMs [precision-guided munitions] on it [the wreckage], but I haven't gotten any good answers because once you get the pilot out of there, you blow the thing to smithereens. The two reasons for that are that none of the parts are exploited, and second, you eliminate propaganda value to the enemy, which, as you can see by watching TV, they've made a lot of." For decades, the Air Force has been prepared to destroy the wreckage of sophisticated aircraft to prevent key technologies from falling into hostile hands. The policy dates from the 1960s to ensure that the then-Soviet Union would not benefit from the loss of super-advanced aircraft, including planes such as the SR-71 spyplane. That long-feared eventuality surfaced late Saturday night when a Lockheed Martin [LMT] F-117 crashed during a mission. Yugoslav authorities claim to have tracked and shot down the radar-evading aircraft, a charge the Pentagon has neither confirmed nor denied. The plane's pilot, who has not yet been identified, was rescued by U.S. search and rescue forces in the hours following the crash. Defense sources, however, said the aircraft was downed by an SA-3 missile fired from a mobile launcher. These sources added that the shootdown was tied to a number of factors, including luck, the design of the aircraft in terms of its stealth and performance, as well as careful Yugoslav efforts not to reveal the location of their surface-to-air missile batteries, protecting them from destruction. Despite the downing, F-117s continue to participate in the air campaign over Yugoslavia, a testament, sources said, to the plane's still-potent capabilities. "Certainly if there were large pieces of it that survived--and I did see some pieces on the evening news--and the risk of casualties was small or could have been mitigated, bombing certainly should have been considered," former Pentagon acquisition chief Paul Kaminski, who served as the F-117's first program manager in the late 1970s, told Defense Daily. "The F-117 was first deployed operationally in 1983, so it's been out there for 15 years. However, there are things in that airplane, while they may not be leading technologies today in the United States, are certainly ahead of what some potential adversaries have. It's also important to remember that the airplane is not invisible, but low observable, meaning that if you fly close enough to a defensive system, it's much like flying close to a person because once you get close enough, you can see it. The same holds true for radar." According to sources, military officials considered destroying the wreckage, but the attack was never carried out. Pentagon and Air Force officials declined comment regarding U.S. policy on the loss of sophisticated aircraft and systems, and whether plans to destroy the plane were in place, and if so why they were not carried out. The wreckage was not destroyed because the aircraft could not be located quickly enough to be targeted and attacked before it was crowded by Yugoslav forces, local residents and international media, sources added. Images of the smoldering plane were broadcast worldwide soon after the downing, revealing large pieces of the characteristically angular black jet, emblazoned with the Air Combat Command shield and the tail number 82-806, eradicating any doubt that the aircraft was anything but an F-117. With the 50,000-pound aircraft lying broken in Yugoslavia, but more intact than had been hoped by the Pentagon, senior officials have been forced to ponder the implications of the loss. Many are concerned that the crash has stripped away the aura of invincibility that has come to typify the F-117 in combat operations, a reputation earned during the Persian Gulf War when the planes seemed to penetrate with impunity the heavily-defended airspace over Baghdad. In fact, Yugoslav officials in anticipation of a long-awaited NATO attack, recently visited Iraq to receive briefings on the capabilities and limitations of allied aircraft. The worst-case fear is that Yugoslav officials will parse out portions of the downed plane to such potential foes as Russia, China, Iraq and North Korea. A greater understanding of the plane's secrets could hamper the employment of current aircraft such as the F-117 and the Northrop Grumman [NOC] B-2. Some possibility exists, sources said, that the F-117's secrets also could undermine new stealthy systems-- such as the F-22 fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile--weapons the Pentagon hopes will preserve U.S. military superiority well into the future. Kaminski said he does not share this worst-case fear, a view also endorsed by former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mike Dugan. "This in no way destroys the aura or the leverage of the technology, because the F-117 can still perform its mission very well," Kaminski said. "My concern isn't that exploitation of F-117 materials would undermine the effectiveness of the F-117 or more advanced stealth systems, but it could give others a leg up on the technology deployed in the F-117 in the 1980s that in turn could help them develop their own stealth systems." The trouble is, some officials and analysts are convinced that chunks of the wreckage are already en route to potential enemies. "The concern isn't only that someone will copy it, but also allow them to tweak existing systems to satisfy a growing need to protect yourself from stealthy systems," one defense official told Defense Daily. While the Pentagon will not address the circumstances of the crash, spokesmen are seeking to minimize the impact of the loss. They noted the pilot was recovered safely, and that the plane--developed in the 1970s to penetrate the most sophisticated of Soviet air defenses--contained outmoded technologies that are widely available to industrialized nations. They have also said the aircraft was destroyed in the crash and subsequent fire, leaving behind little if anything of value. "The aircraft was heavily damaged and was burning for several hours and we feel it is very unlikely that any classified materials and equipment would have survived impact that can be exploited," a Pentagon spokesman told Defense Daily. "Besides, this was the first-generation of stealth, and the technology used on other stealth platforms is more advanced and would not have been revealed by this aircraft." But Kaminski added that contrary to popular belief, the F-117 is not a first-generation stealth aircraft, but a second-generation version. First-generation stealth systems were early cruise missiles and the Have Blue, the tiny plane that proved the feasibility to a manned stealth aircraft that served as the foundation of the F-117. Fourth-generation stealth systems include the B-2 and the F-22 fighter. An example of a third-generation system is the Tacit Blue technology demonstrator that confirmed that material stealth could be achieved using curved shapes, rather than the F-117's facets. The F-117 entered service in 1983 as the world's first operational stealth aircraft, and remained in the shadows until it was unveiled in the late 1980s. No sooner had work on the F-117 started, that development of the B-2 began, this time seeking to dramatically advance stealth by adopting even more sophisticated shapes, materials and systems. While military and defense sources conceded the aircraft is aging, they stressed it contains potent technologies that ensure it is far stealthier than all but a handful of newer aircraft all of which place a premium on stealth capabilities, both active and passive. "We hoped it would burn hotly and fiercely and completely enough that some remediation would be affected," one source told Defense Daily. "Unfortunately that was not the case and, despite its age, there remains some very, very classified information on that airplane. On the other hand, you can't place an aircraft like that in combat and not be prepared to lose it and accept the consequences of its loss." Those consequences--particularly in helping future foes adjust their defensive systems enough to effectively render at least the F-117 unusable--could have been avoided in an attack, according to proponents of a strike on the plane. "The fact is that there's a lot of airplane still over there, including advanced composites, mission and flight computers, sensors and a whole lot of other stuff that people would literally kill to get their hands on," the defense official said. "It should have been destroyed and the fact that is wasn't makes me so mad I want to spit." Other retired officers, including Dugan, are less concerned regarding the fate of the wreckage. "We are about to enter 2000 and the development on this plane took place in the 1970s; so think of it as the Wright Flyer of stealth," Dugan said. "If we were to build an airplane today it would be a fundamentally different design and layout. It was great when it came out, and has held up well, but it's passe now, so if someone wants to copy and backward engineer this technology they are going to take on a lot more work for a lot less gain than they think." He also said he was unwilling to second-guess the operational priorities of air campaign leaders, adding that had destroying the plane been a priority, all that would have been left was a giant crater. The defense official added, however, that the assertion that foes will not benefit handsomely from the F-117 is preposterous. He pointed out that the plane is still so secret that after one crashed during an airshow near Baltimore last year the Air Force thoroughly sanitized the area of wreckage--including carting away truck-loads of dirt--to ensure that the plane's secrets were preserved and its toxic materials would not jeopardize public health. "That effort was to keep stealth away from American citizens much less a group of people who despise the United States, are at war with us and looking to our enemies for support. Think of the trading value of this stuff," the official said. "I think we're going to feel the impact of this thing for a long time, a long time." At the moment, the B-2, like the F-117, continues flying missions over Yugoslavia. But some are concerned that even the B-2, despite its considerable stealth advantage over the F-117 also could be vulnerable. Because although the giant bomber is extremely stealthy, it is not as stealthy as the Air Force wants it to be. Which is why a panel of experts in March 1998 headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Larry Welch concluded that the Air Force's top bomber priority would be to invest steadily to resolve outstanding stealth issues with the B-2. But the service appears to have disregarded Welch's finding in its Bomber Roadmap, released last month, which postponed the much-needed stealth upgrades until 2015. As for the F-117, the plane's initial design may have contributed to its downing. Because the F-117 was tailored to penetrate cutting-edge Soviet air defenses, it may be particularly vulnerable to the target acquisition radar of the three-decade-old SA-3s in Yugoslav service that operate on low frequency waves. The waves appear to have the ability to detect stealthy aircraft at the right angles, particularly from the sides. As an early version of stealth, the F-117 counters radar waves through a combination of tactics to position the plane properly against suspected radar sites and materials that both absorb and channel radar energy out the sides of the plane. The plane's visibility is smallest when approaching radars head-on, sources said. On Saturday, however, it appears that as the F-117 approached its target it was detected by an SA-3 as the plane as it passed in front of the radar. Making matters worse, the plane apparently became briefly more visible, sources said, when it opened its bomb-bay doors to drop its weapons on its target. It was soon after that three SA-3s streaked skyward in launches apparently recorded by allied surveillance aircraft operating nearby. The pilot tried to maneuver to avoid the missiles, but the F-117 was not able to evade the weapons. Although the missiles did not lock onto the aircraft for a direct hit, at least one detonated nearby after its onboard radar detected its close proximity to the plane. The blast was severe enough, according to sources, to disable the aircraft, forcing the pilot to eject. The aircraft, which because of its ungainly shape tends to spin once its flight computers fail, hit the ground relatively flat, "pancaking" sources said, explaining why it was not completely destroyed, leaving enough of the plane intact that portions could be recovered. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 02 Apr 99 15:20:25 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: Advocating stealth On 4/2/99 6:24AM, in message <199904021423.GAA22277@harrier.prod.itd.earthlink.net>, "James P. Stevenson" wrote: > > No, Welch is an advocate for fighters. Lest we not forget he was one of the > > main folks instrumental in killing the SR program. > > > If the Air Force had wanted the SR, Welch would have advocated it. > > Jim Stevenson > Got to disagree, Jim. SAC didn't want it because it didn't drop bombs, but there was a large faction in USAF that did want it. However, the man who probably would have been next Chief of Staff, and believed in the program, was killed in a tragic Sabreliner accident. Welch, who was a known opponent, moved into the realignment in the sudden power vacuum. He brought similar thinking people with him and over a couple of years people who were familiar with or advocated the program were eased aside for "right thinking" individuals. Once it was clear which way the wind was blowing, support dried up in the interest of career enhancement. Think of the same thing in reverse in the Navy for the F/A-18E/F. Art ------------------------------ End of skunk-works-digest V8 #34 ******************************** To subscribe to skunk-works-digest, send the command: subscribe in the body of a message to "majordomo@netwrx1.com". 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