From: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com (skunk-works-digest) To: skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Subject: skunk-works-digest V8 #54 Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Sender: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Errors-To: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk skunk-works-digest Wednesday, April 14 1999 Volume 08 : Number 054 Index of this digest by subject: *************************************************** Re: Two MiG kills by B-52s Re: More F-117 B-52 kills Re: B-52s in Vietnam... Re: More F-117 B-2 Re: B-52s in Vietnam (and their SR-71 support) Re: B-2 Re: More F-117 Re: B-52s in Vietnam (and their SR-71 support) Re: B-2 Re: More F-117 Re: TLC-Mission: FWD: (SW) Two MiG kills by B-52s Re: B-52s in Vietnam (and their SR-71 support) Re: B-2 Re: More F-117 FWD: (TLCB) Linebacker II: A Look Back *************************************************** ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 13 Apr 99 03:57:23 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: Two MiG kills by B-52s On 4/12/99 4:46PM, in message <19990412234855.GIYB15077@oemcomputer>, "Joseph Baugher" wrote: > Can anyone tell me the dates and circumstances of the two > confirmed MiG kills by B-52s over North Vietnam. The serial > numbers of the scoring B-52s would also be nice, so I can add > them to my serial number database. > > Thanks, > Joe Baugher > I can't give the serial numbers, but the two kills were on Dec 18 and 24, both MiG-21s, both by .50 cal from B-52D from tail guns. The crew members credited with the kills were Samuel Turner and Albert Moore, respectively. For what it's worth, the N. Vietnamese claim that one of the B-52s lost on the 27th and one on the 28th were shot down by MiG-21s. Art ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 10:44:51 -0400 From: Brentley Smith Subject: Re: More F-117 patrick wrote: [...] >If you are a conspiracist you will like the theory that "spies" hiding in >the mountains around Aviano time the takeoffs and report back to Yugoslavia >where the flights are timed so they know when to expect them over the >targets. Quite amazing if you consider this was a workable plan conducted >on only the fourth night of attacks and without knowledge of possible >refuelings, which zig zag tracks the plane followed or even which target >could be expected to be hit. I suspect this is a case of a falsely >assigning superhuman powers to your enemy to account for something we >cannot explain. [...] I'm wondering if this is a little less amazing in light of NATO's recent suspicions of a well-placed spy leaking target intel? Sure it's a long shot to get a rag-tag observation/tracking network organized and operational, let alone have it come up with anything tactically useful. On the other hand, don't under-estimate the creativity and resourcefulness of the human mind when backed into a corner. Just because they live in relative squalor under the rule of a tin-cup dictator doesn't mean they can't interpolate disparate bits and scraps of intel like the rest of us. Haven't we learned over and over in previous wars that it's often the low-tech rag-tag enemy that out-smarts our stuck-inside-the-box military planners? At least that's the way it always worked on Battlestar Glactica! Brentley ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 08:43:48 -0700 From: David Lednicer Subject: B-52 kills Joe, take a look at the tally pages that Adrian Camp and I have put together. They are on elevon, listed under Emmanuel Gustin's area. We have tallies of all the US claims, mixed with admitted North Vietnamese losses and North Vietnamese claims, mixed with admitted US losses. The results are interesting... The North Vietnamese admit lossing MiGs to B-52s on dates that none were claimed by B-52s! - ------------------------------------------------------------------- David Lednicer | "Applied Computational Fluid Dynamics" Analytical Methods, Inc. | email: dave@amiwest.com 2133 152nd Ave NE | tel: (425) 643-9090 Redmond, WA 98052 USA | fax: (425) 746-1299 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 12:27:17 -0400 (EDT) From: Kathryn & Andreas Gehrs-Pahl Subject: Re: B-52s in Vietnam... In a previous post I wrote about the LINEBACKER II missions: >Summary: 12 days; 11 missions; 34 targets hit; 729 (or 714) B-52 sorties; >340 from U-Tapao, and 389 from Andersen; The 714 was meant to be 741 (the number scheduled), while 729 is the number executed. Six B-52Gs with older ECM systems (2 cells) were recalled (part of wave 2 on day 3, while I don't know what happened to the other 6 'missing' sorties. Joe, regarding the B-52 'MiG-Killers', their serials are: >B-52 MiG Killers (during the Vietnam war): >========================================== >Date: 12/18/1972 (first LINEBACKER II mission) >Aircraft: B-52D-35-BW, FY-Serial: '56-0676', Model 464-201-7, c/n: 464047 >Unit: 307th SW, based at RTAFB U-Tapao, Thailand >Callsign: BROWN 03 (third aircraft of second cell of first wave) >Crew: SSgt. Samuel O. Turner (tail gunner) >Opponent: MiG-21, shot down with .50 cal. radar-guided tail-guns >Current Status: displayed at Fairchild AFB, WA >Date: 12/24/1972 (seventh LINEBACKER II mission) >Aircraft: B-52D-55-BO, FY-Serial: '55-0083', Model 464-201-7, c/n: 17199 >Unit: 307th SW, based at RTAFB U-Tapao, Thailand >Callsign: RUBY 3 >Crew: A1C Albert E. More (tail gunner) >Opponent: MiG-21, shot down with .50 cal. radar-guided tail-guns >Current Status: displayed at USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, CO - -- Andreas - --- --- Andreas & Kathryn Gehrs-Pahl E-Mail: schnars@ais.org 313 West Court St. #305 or: gpahl@acm.flint.umich.edu Flint, MI 48502-1239 Tel: (810) 238-8469 WWW URL: http://www.ais.org/~schnars/ - --- --- ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 11:13:52 -0700 From: Larry Smith Subject: Re: More F-117 >>patrick wrote: >>[...] >>If you are a conspiracist you will like the theory that "spies" hiding in >>the mountains around Aviano time the takeoffs and report back to Yugoslavia >>where the flights are timed so they know when to expect them over the >>targets. Brentley responded: >I'm wondering if this is a little less amazing in light of NATO's recent >suspicions of a well-placed spy leaking target intel? > >Sure it's a long shot to get a rag-tag observation/tracking network >organized and operational, ... This is not the first time this kind of thing has been done. Former SR-71 pilot Buck Adams told me, at one of the MD-21 parties I attended, that this was done to attempt to shoot down SR-71's over Vietnam. Since it takes time for a SAM to climb to 80,000 ft, the desire is to have them on the way up by the time the SR arrives over target. So it's important to monitor the SR launch from the beginning. This was done by placing spies that could announce SR mission launches from Okinawa. Also, this is another reason why one doesn't go back for another pass, or launch in waves. Or, proceed to a secondary target after hitting one. If they can't lock you (F-117A) or touch you without great difficulty (SR-71A), you can't help them in any way shoot you down. Larry ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 13:40:10 -0700 (PDT) From: Wei-Jen Su Subject: B-2 Anyone know why they are not longer using B-2 for the Kosovo crisis? It is because is too expensibe to operate? If it so, anyone know how much they spend the B-2 operation per mission? Thanks. May the Force be with you Wei-Jen Su E-mail: wsu@cco.caltech.edu - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away." Philip K. Dick ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 99 17:50:03 EDT From: keller@eos.ncsu.edu Subject: Re: B-52s in Vietnam (and their SR-71 support) In response to Andreas' fine and informative summary on B-52 ops in Vietnam, I would ask, can anyone can place a date on the change in tactics after the near-mutiny that Art Hanley discussed last week? - --Paul Keller ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 19:55:47 -0700 From: patrick Subject: Re: B-2 At 01:40 PM 4/13/99 -0700, Wei-Jen wrote: > > Anyone know why they are not longer using B-2 for the Kosovo >crisis? It is because is too expensibe to operate? If it so, anyone >know how much they spend the B-2 operation per mission? Thanks. > > The initial flights were cheaper to operate from a US base. The extra fuel and tankers required were cheaper to fund then moving an entire support squadron to a foreign base. Not sure if they still fly the B-2 or not or why. Maybe Khaddafy will let us place some B-52's and B-2's on TDY at the old Wheelus AFB in Libya!! patrick ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 20:05:18 -0700 From: patrick Subject: Re: More F-117 >>>patrick wrote: >>>If you are a conspiracist you will like the theory that "spies" hiding in >>>the mountains around Aviano time the takeoffs and report back to Yugoslavia >>>where the flights are timed so they know when to expect them over the >>>targets. > >Brentley responded: >>I'm wondering if this is a little less amazing in light of NATO's recent >>suspicions of a well-placed spy leaking target intel? >> >>Sure it's a long shot to get a rag-tag observation/tracking network >>organized and operational, ... > >This is not the first time this kind of thing has been done. Former >SR-71 pilot Buck Adams told me, at one of the MD-21 parties I attended, >that this was done to attempt to shoot down SR-71's over Vietnam. Since >it takes time for a SAM to climb to 80,000 ft, the desire is to have >them on the way up by the time the SR arrives over target. So it's >important to monitor the SR launch from the beginning. This was done >by placing spies that could announce SR mission launches from Okinawa. >~Snip> >Larry =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Larry, I don't see how a single data point at one end of the formula will give you an answer at the other end. Too many unknown variables in between. You aren't using that 5,000 Pentium chipped super computer you guys built are you?? (I bet it would open the pod bay doors!) I can't go to the local airport and watch airliners take off and tell you what town they will land at. And if they can do it then why haven't they repeated this trick by downing a second F-117? patrick ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 99 05:14:45 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: B-52s in Vietnam (and their SR-71 support) On 4/13/99 2:50PM, in message <199904132150.RAA22914@neultra3.ne.ncsu.edu>, keller@eos.ncsu.edu wrote: > In response to Andreas' fine and informative summary on B-52 ops in > Vietnam, I would ask, can anyone can place a date on the change in > tactics after the near-mutiny that Art Hanley discussed last week? > > --Paul Keller > Although no official explanation has ever been given, B-52 tactics were dramatically changed after the Christmas standdown. Art ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 99 05:30:57 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: B-2 On 4/13/99 1:40PM, in message , Wei-Jen Su wrote: > Anyone know why they are not longer using B-2 for the Kosovo > crisis? It is because is too expensibe to operate? If it so, anyone > know how much they spend the B-2 operation per mission? Thanks. > > May the Force be with you > > Wei-Jen Su > E-mail: wsu@cco.caltech.edu > > B-2s have been flying missions out of Whiteman. Bombers are wonderful weapons but they are hideously expensive to operate. However, its doubtful that NATO really cares what they cost. They aren't paying for them, so why should they be concerned? This whole thing is being run kinda nutty. Consider some who are making decisions on what to do. The German foreign Minister is a member of the pacifist Green party. The head of NATO, who opposed his country's membership in NATO. Our Secretary of State, who opposed US involvement in the Gulf War and supported a unilateral US nuclear freeze. Is it any wonder that for the first ten days NATO seemed to be basically trying to run a war without hurting anybody? When they finally hit Belgrade they made sure to hit it at a time when the buildings housing the people they claimed to be trying to stop wouldn't be there (good TV pictures, though). This doesn't seem the best way to do whatever it is we're supposed to be doing... Art ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 99 05:53:18 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: More F-117 On 4/13/99 8:05PM, in message <3.0.1.32.19990413200518.00700208@e-z.net>, patrick wrote: > Larry, I don't see how a single data point at one end of the formula will > give you an answer at the other end. Too many unknown variables in > between. You aren't using that 5,000 Pentium chipped super computer you > guys built are you?? (I bet it would open the pod bay doors!) > > I can't go to the local airport and watch airliners take off and tell you > what town they will land at. > > And if they can do it then why haven't they repeated this trick by downing > a second F-117? > > patrick > Actually people sitting off the end of a runway would be very effective. If you have a rough idea of where the targets could be and you know the off time, you can narrow down your vulnerability window substantially, which allows you to optimize your defensive resources. When an SR pops up, if you aren't primed to shoot you probably aren't going to be able to do much before he's clear. However, it is too hard to keep everything up all the time. Knowing about when the plane is coming helps a lot. ONe of the reasons the RA-5C had the highest loss rate of a/c in N.Vietnam, despite the fact that it was essentially a Mach 2, lower altitude SR-71 is that the N. Viets knew it would be coming soon after a strike so they'd spin everything up, be ready and not have to wait too long. Then they'd salvo damn near everything in range. I was involved in a similar thing in the '80s during RIMPAC exercises. We used to get a lot of "kills" against the strike force. While the regulars would be planning their flights to be deceptive and with decoy feints, we had a lot of reservists on our side. We'd drive over to the "enemy" base as "peaceful and contented natives", with a bag of dimes. When the real "strike" would launch (and it was easy to tell which ones were real, that's what they paid us for, after all), we'd call our guys on the phone and tell them what was launching and when. So, we'd know when the "enemy" was coming and be ready. If you know about when they're gonna get there, your forces can be waiting with bags of gas. They eventually ordered us to stop doing that... Art ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 23:59:31 -0700 From: "Terry W. Colvin" Subject: Re: TLC-Mission: FWD: (SW) Two MiG kills by B-52s Larry, Thanks for the information. It dovetails nicely with Andreas B-52 listing. Terry - ------------------ Larry Hughes wrote: > > At 06:40 PM 4/13/99 -0700, Terry W. Colvin wrote: > >Can anyone tell me the dates and circumstances of the two > >confirmed MiG kills by B-52s over North Vietnam. The serial > >numbers of the scoring B-52s would also be nice, so I can add > >them to my serial number database. > > > No tail #s, heres what I have > > 18 Dec 72, MIG 21, B-52 owned by 307 Strat Wg, Gunner SSgt Samuel Turner > > 24 Dec 72, MIG 21, Also 307th, Gunner A1C Albert Moore > > Larry Hughes > NKP 68 - 69 > TLC Brotherhood http://www.seacoast.com/~jsweet/brotherh/index.html > VFW Memorial Post 10249 > Rustic FAC Assoc. - -- Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean@primenet.com > Home Page: < http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Shadowlands/8832 > Sites: Fortean Times * Northwest Mysteries * Mystic's Cyberpage * U.S. Message Text Formatting (USMTF) Program - ------------ Member: Thailand-Laos-Cambodia Brotherhood (TLCB) Mailing List TLCB Web Site: < http://www.seacoast.com/~jsweet/brotherh/index.html > Southeast Asia (SEA) service: Vietnam - Theater Telecommunications Center/HHC, 1st Aviation Brigade Long Binh, Can Tho, Danang (Jan 71 - Aug 72) Thailand/Laos - Telecommunications Center/U.S. Army Support Thailand (USARSUPTHAI), Camp Samae San (Jan 73 - Aug 73) - Special Security/Strategic Communications - Thailand (STRATCOM - Thailand), Phu Mu (Pig Mountain) Signal Site (Aug 73 - Jan 74) ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 1999 07:34:36 -0400 (EDT) From: Kathryn & Andreas Gehrs-Pahl Subject: Re: B-52s in Vietnam (and their SR-71 support) Paul Keller asked: >In response to Andreas' fine and informative summary on B-52 ops in >Vietnam, I would ask, can anyone can place a date on the change in >tactics after the near-mutiny that Art Hanley discussed last week? Disclaimer: =========== The following is solely based on third hand information -- books, magazines and tv-documentaries. I was not there, have not interviewed anyone who was there, not even looked at the original documents like tasking orders, etc., and I don't claim to have it right. That said, here are my observations: * B-52s flew missions everywhere in theatre: South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, from 1965 to 1973; * B-52s were lost, damaged and even shot down by SAMs, before, during and after LINEBACKER II; * ARC LIGHT missions went on even during LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II, and B-52s flew over North Vietnam before and after LINEBACKER II; * B-52Fs could carry internally either 27 armor-piercing 1000 lb. bombs or 27 M117 750 lb. GP (General Purpose) bombs and 24 M117 750 lb. bombs under the wings (51 in all), and were used from June 1965 to (mid 1967 ?); * B-52Ds (with BIG BELLY modifications) could carry internally either 84 Mk.82 500 lb. or 42 M117 750 lb. bombs and 24 M117 750 lb. bombs under the wings, up to 60,000 lb. of ordnance (108 or 66 in all), and were used from March 1966 until January 1973; * B-52Gs (which had the shorter tail and were more maneuverable, but deemed more difficult to fly) could carry internally either 27 armor-piercing 1000 lb. bombs or 27 M117 750 lb. GP bombs, but none under the wings (27 in all), and were used from early 1972 to January 1973; * B-52s dropped unguided 'dumb' bombs with the help from ground radars (MSQ-77, code named 'COMBAT SKYSPOT') from about 30,000 to 33,000 ft. or as low as 20,000 ft., depending on the targets and missions; * There were B-52Gs with older and newer ECM suits (only about half of the ones at Guam were updated at the time), of which the older ones were considered very vulnerable to SA-2 SAMs; * B-52Ds flew from all bases: 'very long' distance (Andersen AFB, Guam), 'long' distance (Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan) and 'short' distance (U-Tapao AB, Thailand), to their target areas, while B-52Fs and B-52Gs only flew from Guam. This resulted in a heavier tasking of B-52D crews at U-Tapao, which had to fly about every night (at least during LINEBACKER II) while crews from Andersen (both B-52G and B-52D crews) flew only every other night; * Support aircraft assigned to B-52 missions were constantly increased from 39 for the first wave of 48 B-52s on day one, to about 100 for 60 B-52s for the last three nights; * The strict 'no-maneuvering' rule of day one was slightly modified on day two (starting with the second wave) to be more flexible (subject to cell integrity and straight and level flight immediately before dropping the bombs, believed to be necessary for the required accuracy). * B-52Gs were later (after the third night) used much less, and were tasked with less heavily defended targets, but that's a relative term; * Some B-52Gs were even recalled, starting with the second wave on the third night; * The attack patterns, cell spacings, routes, targets, and even times over targets were repeated for the first three days (at least) to a very high degree, and chaff carpets (laid by F-4s, and blown away by the wind), as well as testing of the ECM gear just before the IP (Initial Point, used to aim), made the job for the VN SAM crews much easier than necessary, and at least partially responsible for the high losses on that third night; * On the fifth, sixth, and seventh night, different targets away from Hanoi were attacked, with careful selection of routes, approaches, and strong SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses); * On the eighth mission (after the Christmas pause on 12/25/1972), the spacing and timing was varied and compressed, and just before the IP, tactical maneuvering was used to evade SAMs; * Many SAMs were launched in salvos without radar guidance and with the help of MiG-21s that were shadowing the bombers and relayed precise altitude, speed and heading information to the SAM batteries; * At the end of the campaign, most SAMs were gone and MiGs were apparently not such a big threat to B-52s; * The possibility of a 'mutiny' (or maybe better 'sit down strike') was probably greatest after the third night, but despite the knowledge of the situation and the extreme danger, all crews flew their missions regardless; The following table may illustrate some of the facts, even though the data is very spotty and probably inaccurate in more than one way. The "." dots mean that I have no data for those, but in many cases assume "0", while a "+" plus or "-" minus behind a number means "at least" and "at most" respectively, while a "-" dash by itself means "0" or "None". Day: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 9 10 11 12 12/1972: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Mission: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 9 10 11 =========================================================================== Sorties: 129 93 99 30 30 30 30 | 120 60 60 60 Losses: 3 - 6 2 - - - | 2 2 - - Damaged: . 2 . . - - 1 | . . . . Recalled: . . 6 . . . . | . . . . Support: 39+ . . . 65/70 65/70 65/70 | . 100 100 100 SR-71: - - - - - - - | - 1 - - SAMs: 200 200 200+ 50+ 50- . . | 50+ . . . MiGs: 1(+) - - - - - 1 | - - - - =========================================================================== B-52Ds: 75 ?? 57- 30 30 30 30 | 75 39 45 48 Losses: 1 - 2 2 - - - | 2 2 - - Damaged: . 1 1 . - - - | . . . . Recalled: . . . . . . . | . . . . =========================================================================== B-52Gs: 54 ?? 42+ - - - - | 45 21 15 12 Losses: 2 - 4 - - - - | - - - - Damaged: - 1 - - - - 1 | - - - - Recalled: . . 6 . . . . | . . . . =========================================================================== U-T: 42 42- 42- 30 30 18 30 | 42 30 30 30 Losses: 1 - 1 2 - - - | 2 1 - - =========================================================================== Guam: 87 51+ 57+ - - 12 - | 78 30 30 30 Losses: 2 - 5 - - - - | - 1 - - =========================================================================== - -- Andreas - --- --- Andreas & Kathryn Gehrs-Pahl E-Mail: schnars@ais.org 313 West Court St. #305 or: gpahl@acm.flint.umich.edu Flint, MI 48502-1239 Tel: (810) 238-8469 WWW URL: http://www.ais.org/~schnars/ - --- --- ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 1999 07:38:32 -0400 (EDT) From: Kathryn & Andreas Gehrs-Pahl Subject: Re: B-2 Wei-Jen Su wondered: >Anyone know why they are not longer using B-2 for the Kosovo >crisis? It is because is too expensibe to operate? If it so, anyone >know how much they spend the B-2 operation per mission? Thanks. According to yesterdays news briefings (Pentagon as well as NATO), all of their assets were used that day, including the following: B-1B, B-2A, B-52H, F-15E, F-16CG/CJ, F-117A, and cruise missiles (whether air-launched and/or ship-launched was not specified, though). The Pentagon expects the operation to cost "three to four billion US$" for the military part (ordnance, fuel, etc.), maybe or maybe not including the humanitarian (airlift, etc.) part. I don't think the cost for the B-2As (or their few available JDAMs) will make such a big difference -- as long as they don't loose one of their Spirits, that is. - -- Andreas - --- --- Andreas & Kathryn Gehrs-Pahl E-Mail: schnars@ais.org 313 West Court St. #305 or: gpahl@acm.flint.umich.edu Flint, MI 48502-1239 Tel: (810) 238-8469 WWW URL: http://www.ais.org/~schnars/ - --- --- ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 1999 07:21:31 -0700 From: patrick Subject: Re: More F-117 At 05:53 AM 4/14/99 GMT, you wrote: >On 4/13/99 8:05PM, in message <3.0.1.32.19990413200518.00700208@e-z.net>, patrick > wrote: > >> Larry, I don't see how a single data point at one end of the formula will >> give you an answer at the other end. Too many unknown variables in >> between. You aren't using that 5,000 Pentium chipped super computer you >> guys built are you?? (I bet it would open the pod bay doors!) >> >> I can't go to the local airport and watch airliners take off and tell you >> what town they will land at. >> >> And if they can do it then why haven't they repeated this trick by downing >> a second F-117? >> >> patrick >> >And then Art chimed in > > Actually people sitting off the end of a runway would be very effective. If >you have a rough idea of where the targets could be and you know the off time, you >can narrow down your vulnerability window substantially, which allows you to >optimize your defensive resources. F-117s traditionally leaving on missions take off anywhere from one to six hours after sunset. They zig zag to their targets and can include tanker refuelings. In addition a second target may be located on the return trip home. Add this data into your algorithm! patrick ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Apr 1999 14:37:35 -0700 From: "Terry W. Colvin" Subject: FWD: (TLCB) Linebacker II: A Look Back The cover article of the November 1997 issue of Air Force Magazine (AF Association's monthly magazine) was Linebacker II: A Look Back by William Boyne. I scanned in parts of the article that appeared on pp. 50-57, which provides Mr. Boyne's summary of the main action. I also scanned in the table discussing aircraft losses during Linebacker II. A side note you may find of interest: When I was at SAC headquarters from 1972-1976, I spoke to an Electronic Warfare Officer who had been shot down on one of the B-52s. We was a prisoner for about 90 days as the repatriations were based on first in/first out, phased over about 3 months after the treaty signing. He said that during his whole period of captivity, he had claimed to be a navigator and the NVA never discovered he had been an EWO. He knew of one other crew that had been captured and everyone came home except the EWO. The EWO I spoke to was convinced that if they had ever discovered he was an EWO, he wouldn't have been released. In Omaha at the time, I was working with POW/MIA families. One wife had been married to an EWO, who I believe was flying back-seat in F-4 Wild Weasels (I think we had some of those in the later years.) There was every reason to believe her husband had been captured, based on some comments made to the pilot on the day of his capture. However, her husband was never acknowledged as being a prisoner and never returned. When the apologists argue that there was no reason for the NVA to have held back prisoners, there certainly is an argument for EWOs being kept. In the 60s-70s, on of the USSR's main problems was how to beat the BUFFs and suddenly Hanoi had a handful of men who knew exactly how the BUFFs tried to beat the Communists. I believe some EWOs were kept. When I was working POW/MIA issues while at AFIT in 1970-72, I read an article about a North Vietnamese doctor who had defected in about 1969-1970. He said that within the last year, he had treated French prisoners. That war had ended after the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954! Jimmie H. Butler Nail 12 Feb 67 Jan 68 * * * * * * * * * * * * Excerpts from: Linebacker II: A Look Back, Air Force Magazine, November 1997 It took nearly two hours for 87 B-52s from Guam to taxi, take off, and become airborne on the afternoon of Dec. 18, 1972. They then were joined in the attack by 42 additional B-52s flying out of U Tapao, forming the largest attacking bomber force assembled since World War II. The B-52 targets on the first day were Kep airfield, Hoa Lac airfield, Phuc Yen airfield, Kinh No vehicle repair site, Yen Vien rail yards, Hanoi railroad repair facility, and the main Hanoi radio station. The F-111 force was assigned missions against nine targets. The North Vietnamese leaders had expected a US air attack, but they were shocked by the intensity of the assault on Dec. 18. Reacting swiftly, the forces of the North used their SAMs effectively and quickly began to concentrate their efforts on the post-target turn. SAM Dangers This turn was the point of greatest B-52 vulnerability, for three reasons. First, it was here that the North Vietnamese radar had the greatest chance to "burn through" the B-52 cells' combined electronic countermeasures protection. Second, a banking B-52 presented a greater radar cross section to the defenders. Finally, the turn would reverse the benefits of the wind, transforming a 100-knot tailwind into a head wind that slowed down the enormous aircraft. On Day I of the campaign, the Communist forces fired more than 100 SAMs, often sending them up in four- or six-weapon volleys. Once, the air was filled with more than 40 SAMs. On that day, the US lost three B-52s, two from Andersen and one from U Tapao, as well as one F-111. The losses were lighter than had been expected and were not considered unacceptably high. For the entire 11 bombing days, the BUFF crews up held the Air Force tradition of never being turned back from an assigned mission, pressing on regardless of the ferocity of the enemy attack. On Day 1, SSgt. Samuel Turner, tail gunner on Brown 03, also shot down a MiG-21, the first in B-52 combat history. Tactics were revised slightly on Day 2 of the attack, but routes remained the same. Bomber cell altitudes were lowered to 34,500 and 35,000 feet, the better to place the B-52s more securely within the chaff corridors being laid by the F-4s. Time separation between cells and between Times Over Target (TOTs) was increased to four minutes. Evasive action was authorized on both inbound and outbound routes. The results of the changes seemed to be positive. On Day 2, the North launched some 180 SAMs at the 93 attacking B-52s, but no losses occurred. On Day 3, tragedy struck. Only 90 of 99 planned B-52s sorties were effective and six BUFFs were shot down. Two Gs and one D were lost in the first wave and an identical number were downed in the third wave. Three were struck prior to bomb release and three afterward; four went down near Hanoi while two made it out of North Vietnam. None of the lost B-52Gs had been modified to carry the new AN/ALT22 ECM equipment. In the first three days of the campaign, five unmodified Gs and only one modified G had been lost. Of the total of nine B-52s lost to date, five had been hit during their turn off the target. This constituted an unacceptably high seven-percent loss rate. Even so, Gen. John C. Meyer, the commander in chief of SAC, made the tough decision to press on, calling for even heavier strikes on SAM sites and storage areas. His decision proved to be correct, for the enemy had been hurt, too, and now was rapidly expending SAMs. Tactics were altered again, too; cell separation and TOTs were compressed to 90 and 120 seconds, respectively. The altitude separation between cells was increased, and withdrawal routes were changed, enabling some bomber streams to withdraw directly toward the Gulf of Tonkin. Electronic warfare officers received authorization to add an ALT-28 ECM transmitter to their system with the intent of jamming the SAM downlink frequency. On Day 4 of the campaign, attacks were staged by only 30 heavy bombers, all D models from U Tapao. Planning was simplified and a total of 75 tactical aircraft were available for support. Two B-52s were lost to SAMs in an attack on Bac Mai airfield. On each of the next three days - Days 5, 6, and 7 - USAF carried out attacks with packages of 30 B-52s, losing none. The Air Force was making good use of its experience and new tactics (including altitude changes, multiple approach paths, and the selection of new targets outside the Hanoi-Haiphong area) to confuse the North Vietnamese defenders. On Dec. 24, the seventh day of the air campaign, A1C Albert Moore, a gunner on Ruby 03, shot down a MiG. Wrong Signal US bombing forces stood down on Christmas Day in order to give planners a chance to review events so far and give the crews some rest. Politically, the stand-down was like the previous bombing halts, a well intended "signal" that negotiations were in order. Once again the North Vietnamese interpreted the respite as a sign of American weakness, and they spent the day feverishly restocking their SAM sites with missiles. The next day, Day 8, the bombing resumed. All of the previous experience gained was exploited in new tactics. Seventy-eight B-52s in four flights attacked Hanoi simultaneously from four different directions. At the same time, 42 aircraft in three other flights struck Haiphong, North Vietnam's principal harbor and transshipment point for military supplies. The compressed nature of the attack intensified the difficulties of the 114 tactical support aircraft. However, they executed the mission flawlessly. The versatile USAF F-4 Phantom served as the MiGCAP and also dispensed the dense chaff blanket necessary to shield the B-52s from enemy radar. Phantoms and the redoubtable Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs suppressed SAMs in the dangerous Wild Weasel mission. Aging EB-66s were forced by the heavy SAM threat to operate farther than desired from the target area, but they nonetheless provided efficient ECM support. F-111 s and Vought A-7s attacked northern airfields. KC-135 tankers furnished fuel to all types of aircraft, often moving well into a combat area to reach aircraft in trouble. The Air Force Linebacker II team was completed by C-130 search and rescue aircraft, HH-53 Jolly Green Giant helicopters, and EC-121s. The Navy and Marines both supplied F-4 aircraft for the MiGCAP and BARCAP [Barrier Combat Air Patrol], while A-6s attacked designated targets. Even though there was still no centralized control of all air assets, the Navy and the Air Force worked together closely. The attack on Day 8 went off with precision, although two B-52s were lost because of the heavy increase in SAM firings. The United States Air Force had now established a clear ascendancy over the North Vietnamese defenders. Sixty B-52s were dispatched on each of the three remaining nights of the campaign, Days 9, 10, and 11. Two B-52s were shot down on Dec. 27, one going down in North Vietnam and the other making it back to Thailand, where the crew bailed out. Under Siege On the final day of the campaign, Day 11 on Dec. 29, USAF crews - both bomber and support - were at the peak of their form while the enemy was in obvious distress, able to fire only a total of 23 SAMs. Where once they had salvoed six SAMs at a time, they now were reduced to individual snap shots. They were almost out of SAMs, their MiGs were shut down, and their radar and communication links were disrupted. In short, they were at the mercy of the United States. The US had proved decisively that B-52s, supported by tactical air assets, were an effective force, able to meet and defeat the enemy. In the miserable prisons in which they were held, American prisoners of war experienced an unimaginable elation at seeing their brutal captors frightened and suddenly polite. The result of Linebacker II was exactly what had been predicted by those who had advocated full application of airpower against North Vietnam: a military victory. The badly shaken North Vietnamese accepted that the war was at a stalemate, returned to the negotiating table in Paris, and signed the Paris Peace Accords on Jan. 27, 1973. Within 60 days of the signing, 591 American POWs were released and back in the United States. In Linebacker II, SAC's B-52s had flown 729 sorties out of a total of 741 planned sorties and dropped 15,000 tons of bombs, North Vietnamese forces had fired about 1,240 SAMs. The Air Force lost 15 B-52 bombers, which amounted to a loss rate of less than two percent. Of 92 B-52 crew members involved in the losses, 26 were recovered, 25 came up missing in action, 33 became prisoners of war, and eight were either killed in action or later died of wounds. In addition, the US lost two F-111As, three F-4s, two A-7s, two A-6s, one EB-66, one HH-53, and one RA-5C. As soon as Hanoi signaled it wished to resume peace negotiations, Linebacker II raids immediately ceased. Some in the Air Force argued that this was a mistake; if the United States continued the attacks, they maintained, North Vietnam would have to accept a military defeat. Instead, they secured at the peace table a political victory that they would in due course translate into a full-scale military conquest of South Vietnam. Not long after the end of Linebacker II and the formal return of he US prisoners of war, United States forces at last formally disengaged from the war in Southeast Asia. There then followed what Henry Kissinger described as a "decent interval" of about two years, after which Hanoi, knowing that it no longer faced any realistic threat of another Linebacker II, invaded South Vietnam across a broad front. The Communist forces entered Saigon on April 30, 1975, and unified the two Vietnams under Hanoi's totalitarian control. To Air Force observers, the events of 1975 pointed up a classic case of what might have been." To them, full application of airpower in a Linebacker II-type campaign in 1965, a decade earlier, would have achieved military victory, prevented the long and costly US involvement in Southeast Asia, saved South Vietnam as a nation, and allowed the US to escape the calamitous effects that the Vietnamese war has afflicted on America ever since. 0 Walter J, Boyne, former director of the National Air and Space Museum in Washington is a retired Air Force colonel and author. He has written more than 400 articles about aviation topics and 28 books, the most recent of which is Beyond the Wild Blue~ A History of the United States Air Force, 1947-1997. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, "Hap, " appeared in the September 1997 issue. Date Type Call Sign Target (Mission) Cause Dec. 18 F-111A Snug 40 Hanoi Radio unk. Dec. 18 B-52G Charcoal 01 Yen Vien complex SA-2 Dec. 18 B-52G Peach 02 Yen Vien complex SA-2 Dec. 18 B-52D Rose 01 Hanoi Radio SA-2 Dec. 20 B-52D Quilt 03 Yen Vien complex SA-2 Dec. 20 B-52G Brass 02 Yen Vien complex SA-2 Dec. 20 B-52G Orange 03 Yen Vien complex SA-2 Dec. 20 B-52D Straw 02 Gia Lam rail yard SA-2 Dec. 20 B-52G Olive 01 Kinh No complex SA-2 Dec. 20 B-52G Tan 03 Kinh No complex SA-2 Dec. 21 B-52D Scarlet 03 Bac Mai airfield SA-2 Dec. 21 B-52D Blue 01 Bac Mai airfield SA-2 Dec. 22 F-111A Jackle 33 Hanoi port facility unk. Dec. 23 EB-66C Hunt 02 (non-combat) engine out Dec. 26 B-52D Ebony 02 Giap Nhi rail yard SA-2 Dec. 26 B-52D Ash 01 Kinh No complex SA-2 Dec. 27 F-4E DeSoto 03 (strike escort) MiG-21 Dec. 27 F-4E Vega 02 (MiGCAP) MiG-21 Dec. 27 HH-53 Jolly Green (rescue) small arms Dec. 27 B-52D Ash 02 SAM site SA-2 Dec. 27 B-52D Cobalt 02 Truang Quan rail yard SA-2 Source. Pacific Air Forces - -- Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean@primenet.com > Home Page: < http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Shadowlands/8832 > Sites: Fortean Times * Northwest Mysteries * Mystic's Cyberpage * U.S. Message Text Formatting (USMTF) Program - ------------ Member: Thailand-Laos-Cambodia Brotherhood (TLCB) Mailing List TLCB Web Site: < http://www.seacoast.com/~jsweet/brotherh/index.html > Southeast Asia (SEA) service: Vietnam - Theater Telecommunications Center/HHC, 1st Aviation Brigade Long Binh, Can Tho, Danang (Jan 71 - Aug 72) Thailand/Laos - Telecommunications Center/U.S. Army Support Thailand (USARSUPTHAI), Camp Samae San (Jan 73 - Aug 73) - Special Security/Strategic Communications - Thailand (STRATCOM - Thailand), Phu Mu (Pig Mountain) Signal Site (Aug 73 - Jan 74) ------------------------------ End of skunk-works-digest V8 #54 ******************************** To subscribe to skunk-works-digest, send the command: subscribe in the body of a message to "majordomo@netwrx1.com". 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