From: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com (skunk-works-digest) To: skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Subject: skunk-works-digest V9 #93 Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com Sender: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Errors-To: owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Precedence: bulk skunk-works-digest Thursday, January 11 2001 Volume 09 : Number 093 Index of this digest by subject: *************************************************** USS Kitty Hawk Incident Report??? Re: skunk-works-digest V9 #92 Re: FWD (TLCB) Re: Stars Wars was a success in a number of ways Re: USS Kitty Hawk Incident FWD (TLCB) Re: Stars Wars was a success in a number of ways A more moderate read of Echelon FWD (PVT) Re: TSR-2 and F-111 Aardvarks *************************************************** ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2001 19:16:46 EST From: SecretJet@aol.com Subject: USS Kitty Hawk Incident Report??? Greetings! We heard this alleged USNavy 'report' was NOT genuine!!! (Good 'fun' though!) Happy New Year, Clear Skies in 2001! - ----------------------------------------- Regards, Bill Turner, 'Admin'. Black-Triangle E-Group HQ. Near London Heathrow, UK. AIM:Secretjet2 ICQ: 29271956 http://members.aol.com/Secretjet/index.html - ----------------------------------------------------------------- No Door is Closed - To an Open Mind! - ----------------------------------------------------------------- Black-Triangle NEW Homepage! Black-Triangle Links ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 05 Jan 2001 20:02:22 -0800 From: Lee Markland Subject: Re: skunk-works-digest V9 #92 At 05:29 PM 1/5/01 -0600, you wrote: > >Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2000 09:52:41 -0600 >From: "Allen Thomson" >Subject: Re: Stars Wars was a success in a number of ways > >> This statement . . . >> >> > I think that the Star Wars efforts did a lot of good-it >> > bankrupted the Russians and we don't have a cold war at present >> >> . . . makes and assertion for which there is no evidence. True, the >Soviets >> crumbled after the Star Wars effort began but that does not prove that the >> Star Wars effort was the cause. > >This is going to be argued for all future time, but just the timing makes it >unlikely that SW drove the USSR to ruin. March 1983 marked the kick-off of >SW, things didn't get rolling for a couple of years, and the Warsaw Pact >collapsed in late 1989, followed by the dissolution of the USSR in late >1991. Not really enough time to do in a robust superpower, especially since >SW never produced anything close to an operational system. (Still hasn't, >for that matter). > >The USSR may have been bankrupted due in some important measure to an arms >race, but it was the arms race that had been going on since 1945. At most, >SW might have pushed them over an edge they were already teetering on, but >it's hard to see how to prove that. The dissolution of the USSR had nothing to do with anything that anyone projects or speculates. For those few people who understand money and subscribe or have received and read such arcana as the Annual Report for the Bank For International Settlements, would have noticed in its 1984 pages, one small paragraph stating in effect that the Soviet Union was a failed economic experiment and must be reorganized. It was shortly after that report was published in 1985 that we started hearing about refuseniks (obviously people with an inside track) and then a massive PR campaign to lift immigration quota's for these "oppressed peoples". Other "insiders" in particular the likes of Dr. Fred Schwartz of the Christian Anti Communist Crusade, started shifting the emphasis of their pamphlets, newletters and programs from "fighting communism" to the "homosexual menace". They obviously knew that the Soviet Union was in demise, and to keep their organization alive, funds and subscriptions flowing in, they had to target a new "devil". BTW, the Bank for International Settlements is the Central Bank of Central Banks, and is the "boss" to whom Alan Greenspan of our Federal Reserve reports (once a month, three days, Sunday thru Tues, they don't work on the Sabbath - Saturday). ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 09 Jan 101 05:51:34 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: FWD (TLCB) Re: Stars Wars was a success in a number of ways Yeah, I know this is an older subject, but I've been away. There's a lot of revisionism going on about this topic, that's spreading into the general consensus here and abroad. We tend to forget how short a time this thing was actually going on. Although REagan made his speech, the program didn't really start swinging until around 1996. We also tend to forget that when it started no-one was exactly sure how to do what we wanted to do, and a lot of basic research was needed just to determine which direction to take. There were definitely some screwball concepts in there, but there always are when tapping the Government largesse seems a possibility. There was also a lot of good science and engineering in there too. SDI (it's easier to type than Star Wars) had a lot of enemies. Not just from those who didn't believe it was possible, but from those who had a vested interest in it not succeeding. The intelligentsia from both ends of the political spectrum didn't want to even admit the possibility that someone they considered their intellectual inferior might be able to pull off what the y'ed been unable to do in 50 years. Plus, there were still a lot of leftover Carter people and others who were in high positions of power who had committed themselves to the position that the Soviet Union would be around forever and we should "adjust" to this reality. Those that said otherwise found their careers threatened. Finally there were those who wedded to the insane Mutual Assured Destruction lunacy which basically espoused that it was better to burn mothers and children to death than to work on a way to render the threat impotent. Whole careers were dedicated to this anything that threatened that worldview was E-vil. You saw massive disinformation put out that continues to this day, including a widely used but intellectually dishonest method of describing the probability of success of missile intercept. There was also repeated tendencies to overstate the problems in developing a missile defense (difficult though they were), while significantly understanding the very big problems in countering such a defense by an attacker. It's not surprising that there wasn't a lot of hardware put into operation, since we really didn't work on it that long. We were only just refining the direction to go at that point. Lasers were just one of the options being looked at. From '86 through most of '89 SDI got a lot of work done and was working towards a goal of concept selection/technology investigation/development. Of course, in '89 Ronnie went away. Bush Sr. came in, and in many polices was closer to his successor, Billy Jeff, than he was to his predecessor. In addition, if the technology of SDI produced a successful system, Reagan would get credit for it. If it flopped, he [Bush] might get the blame, so he wasn't exactly a champion for the program. This is a good illustration of how much risk a program runs (except the F/A-18) that won't deploy within the tenure of its champion. SDI research started drifting, and being constrained. After Bush lost, the next Administration was openly hostile to missile defense, strategic or tactical, and that was that. There are some ironic differences between what a missile defense had to do against the Soviet Union and a defense today. Against the Soviets, you did not have to stop every warhead (although that would be nice), as long as you got most of them, and could introduce enough uncertainty as to which would get through. The Soviets might figure that one or two out of every ten would get through, and for us that would indeed be horrible. However, for the Soviets, there was no way of telling which ones would be the ones to get through and hit their targets. All of the warheads designated for a particular target might get through, or some or none. There was no way to tell, and the only way to deal with that would be to build more missiles, a Lot more missiles, to bring the probabilities back into line where the attack was worth risking. Remember, the warhead had to hit our base, not come down somewhere else in order for the attack to be worth doing and preventing retaliation. The problem with building enough more missiles is that the defender can negate that certainty by increasing the number of defensive weapons by not that large an amount. That's what the Soviets were so worried about. It would take a lot to build such a system, but once you had, you could counter an action by the attacker much easier than the attacker could counter the defender. SDI wasn't the only thing that brought the Soviets down, but it was a big thing. How do we know? Because back in the early '90s, when we had good relations with Russia and the Ukraine, they told us so. During that period they were being very open with us. Defense against today's threat is different. There won't be as many missiles to defend against, but now you really do need to get every one. If the Soviets were aiming for Long Beach Naval Shipyard and because of SDI they might miss, they wouldn't achieve their objective and they' ed have to deal with that. If, hypothetically, the Chinese decided to poop a missile at LA because we supported Taiwan in a confrontation, they know we know it doesn't matter to them if they actually hit the aim point or miss by 30 miles, they still achieve their goal. So, today, we would have much less to shoot at, but it could come from more directions and it would be more important to get every one. Not an insurmountable problem, but an expensive one. It's also worth noting that many of the things SDI opponents said would be impossible have already been achieved. They made a big point of how complex the code would have to be and how programs with that many lines of code couldn't function. By 1991 telephone switching systems were already using larger and more complex code than what would have been required for SDI. In fact, Win 2K has more lines of code in it than what would have been required for SDI (whether it functions or not I'll leave for another forum). It was said we'd never be able to get the kind of sensor technology needed. The radar technology exists today in packages small enough to be carried by fighters. IR sensors of sufficient resolution and range have been operational for most of the '90s. Our big problem at this point is reliability of the interceptors, and that's engineering not new technology anymore. Although it's not at all certain that lasers would have been used, it's worthy of note that it was confidently predicted that lasers of sufficient power would never be able to be lifted off the ground. Well, the ABL is going to be using a laser of the class needed. Sadly, with the end of SDI we lost something else that would have been great for us even if the rest of the program hadn't worked. It was known that a portion of the system would have to be space based, regardless of the form it took. This would require a reliable, simpler and much more economical method of getting to space, preferably reusable. Not dramatic, but workmanlike. SDI was funding valuable work in this area and hardware was starting to be built. In fact, the DC-X was originally funded as one of the concepts to provide the space launch capability that would be needed. When SDI went away, so did a good portion of the funding and in fact it was stigmatized as being part of SDI. Had SDI continued, though, we probably would have had a much better way to get to space in the upcoming years instead of recycling old designs or grandiose flops like X-33/Venture Star... I'm not saying that SDI absolutely the be-all and end-all, but I think that to dismiss it as a failure or that we got nothing from it because it was foolish or impossible doesn't do justice to the concept or to those that worked on it. Would it have been practical? Who knows? We never hung around long enough to find out. (I'll bet there was a lot less eyestrain while I was gone.) Art ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 10 Jan 101 07:50:51 GMT From: betnal@ns.net Subject: Re: USS Kitty Hawk Incident On 1/5/01 7:57AM, in message <98.ed1aa72.27874903@aol.com>, MELUMAN@aol.com wrote: > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > -- > Had to clean up the salty (no pun intended) language, but I can understand > this Hornet driver's frustration. Unfortunately, the e-mail doesn't answer a > couple of salient questions, i.e., did maintenance or parts problems prevent > the Kitty Hawk from keeping F/A-18s on higher alert as they transited the Sea > of Japan? Additionally, if the carrier couldn't launch aircraft sooner, why > didn't some of its escort vessels lock up the Russian jets with their > surface-to-air missile radars, and remind them that we could still blast them > from the sky. Getting locked-up by a SAM radar produces very distinct visual > and audio cues in the cockpit. However, I get the impression that the Kitty > Hawk's AEGIS cruiser didn't do that. All-in-all, a very sad day for the Kitty > Hawk battle group, and the U.S. Navy. > > Alert 30 would not be that rare in this environment, especially since it's our Official position that the Russians are just about our best buddies around. However, according to folks I know who have been on the Kitty Hawk, in the '80s although the readiness state might be Alert 30, you could definitely get at least one fighter in the air in ten minutes, although not everything might be aligned. The basic answer to your question about what happened here is money, lack of support for our forces except when involved in UN fiascoes, shortages of people, parts, fuel and operating hours, both funded and available. In the latter case, so much maintenance has been deferred on F/A-18s and they have been flown so much in spite of it that airframe life is expiring years before expected. This has necessitated plans for a very expensive rebuild to keep them flying for more years. The problem here is that although this rebuild has been announced as the solution for the aircraft running out of time, funding to actually do it has not been requested. This state of affairs is not that rare. Here's another example, also involving the Hawk. When she changed her home prot to Japan a few years back, she replaced the Independence, which was coming home to be scrapped. The Navy could not scrape together enough operational F-14s to fully equip the Kitty Hawk for the deployment. As a result, when the Independence and Kitty Hawk passed each other, some bare tail F-14s that had been deployed on the Independence and normally would be rotated back to the States had to be flown over to the Hawk to equip her. Aside from the obvious implications of this shortage, redeploying those F-14s without normal post-cruise maintenance meant that a lot of their life got used up. It's not that rare for aircraft of one side to fly very close to the other side's warships, but historically flying directly over is a definite no-no. That they did so shows an obvious intent to humiliate and some degree of contempt. Regarding Aegis cruisers, assuming some were around: It's notable that the Russians didn't surprise anyone, we tracked them coming in. It's just that we were unable to do anything about it. Also, while tracking with the search systems is considered kosher, actually locking up with fire control system, and as you say even with Aegis you can tell with that has happened, is considered a very hostile act, much worse than an overflight. In fact, in some cases that might be considered the equivalent of a weapons fire, and could be responded to accordingly. Normals you want fighters along side when aircraft like Flankers and Fencers approach. In an uncertain situation, the Aegis can maintain a track and if necessary lock up and launch fairly quickly, but if the suspect aircraft are close in, the Standard missile may not arrive before the aircraft have launched on their target. If there are fighters alongside, they can strike immediately, Even if an anti-ship missile got off, a Tomcat's first Phoenix would go for the missile and the other would go for the launch aircraft. Oh wait a minute, we're talking F/A-18s here, aren't we? Well, maybe one of the Hornets' tankers could ram the bad guys. Art ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 20:59:35 -0700 From: "Terry W. Colvin" Subject: FWD (TLCB) Re: Stars Wars was a success in a number of ways Forwarded from the Skeptic list... > Although REagan made his speech, the program didn't really start swinging > until around 1996. We also tend to forget that when it started no-one was > exactly sure how to do what we wanted to do, and a lot of basic research was > needed just to determine which direction to take. There were definitely some > screwball concepts in there, but there always are when tapping the Government > largesse seems a possibility. There was also a lot of good science and > engineering in there too. By the measure of working machines to test, it may not have been up and running until 1996, but by another measure, money spent: 1976-1982 ~1 billion/year 1983-1993 $44 billion total 1983 $991 million 1985 1,397.299 million 1986 2,759.222 million 1987 4,802.566 million 1988 5,463.312 million ($4 billion 2nd source) 1994 $2.8 billion 1995 $2.8 billion 1996 $3.3 billion 1997 $3.6 billion 1998 $3.9 billion 1999 $3.6 billion 2000 ? 2001 DoD request $4.7 billion "Overall, the United States has spent more than $100 billion (in current dollars) in the pursuit of missile defense since the mid-1950s (plus $17 billion on the Patriot system, developed separately by the Army as an anti-aircraft system.)" A history of this is at: < http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmdhistory.htm > Additional cost figures from: < http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu38ne/uu38ne0c.htm > < http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/MissileDefenseIllusion.asp?p=8 > The program has changed over the years also. Described in < http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/nd95/nd95.schwartz.html > - ---------- Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars") has evolved through three major phases. The first, from 1983 to 1987, called for an invulnerable shield to protect the entire United States, thus making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The second phase, from 1987 to 1990, envisioned a defense for land-based missiles that called for 2,000 ground- and 4,000 space-based interceptors, at a cost of over $70 billion. The third phase, from 1990 to the present, saw SDI evolve into the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system, a plan to defend against tactical and theater missiles and as many as 200 long-range missiles-at an estimated cost of $40 billion. Each new phase has had less ambitious goals using less ambitious technical means, a trend that has confirmed skeptics' doubts about the feasibility of these systems. From 1984 through 1993, Star Wars cost $38 billion, but produced no workable missile defense. - ---------- After looking at some of these sources, the assertion that the program didn't swing until 1996 isn't accurate. The US has build and tested theater missle defenses since the 1960's without much success. SDI started out aiming for new technologies then fell back on traditional missle interceptors which it started testing in '96. > SDI wasn't the only thing that brought the Soviets down, but it was a big > thing. How do we know? Because back in the early '90s, when we had good > relations with Russia and the Ukraine, they told us so. During that period > they were being very open with us. My understanding is that SDI as an economic policy, designed to drive the Soviet Union bankrupt spending the money to keep up with the US, failed. What I've read is that the Soviet Union didn't take the bait and launch a big SDI program of their own. SDI didn't cause the Soviet Union to fall apart. > It's also worth noting that many of the things SDI opponents said would be > impossible have already been achieved. They made a big point of how complex > the code would have to be and how programs with that many lines of code > couldn't function. By 1991 telephone switching systems were already using > larger and more complex code than what would have been required for SDI. In > fact, Win 2K has more lines of code in it than what would have been required > for SDI (whether it functions or not I'll leave for another forum). It was > said we'd never be able to get the kind of sensor technology needed. The radar > technology exists today in packages small enough to be carried by fighters. IR > sensors of sufficient resolution and range have been operational for most of > the '90s. Our big problem at this point is reliability of the interceptors, > and that's engineering not new technology anymore. Although it's not at all > certain that lasers would have been used, it's worthy of note that it was > confidently predicted that lasers of sufficient power would never be able to be > lifted off the ground. Well, the ABL is going to be using a laser of the class > needed. This seems overly optimistic. -Software: SDI hasn't been designed, let alone implemented, so we don't know how big the programs would be. More pointed arguments against it were that it would be difficult to test the complete system (necessary to eliminate bugs), and that the software would be easy to sabotage by introducing hard to test for bugs. -Sensors: Much prgress has been made in the last 17 years, true. But wasn't there a recent flap about how decoys were, in principal, undistinguishable in the situation tested? The current state of the tech is hard to assess. I don't know of a SDI sensor system which has been put together and passed tests. -ABL laser: The ABL is a plane-baed system which may, as is said, be light enough to fit on a satelite (3000 lbs). It is still being developed, and as far as I know, hasn't been tested (begin testing in 2002-3, best as I can tell). Apparently it can not be put in space as it's components are not durable--some need to be replaced after firing. Also this: "Critics cite a study, to be released shortly by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), a watchdog agency, that reportedly raises serious doubts about the viability of the ABL. It reportedly found little hope that a system that can mold laser beams to compensate for atmospheric disturbances will ever be developed." from < http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:www.csmonitor.com/durable/1997/10/20/ us/us.1.html+ABL+SDI+test+problem&hl=en > Jim Lund - -- Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean1@frontiernet.net > Alternate: < terry_colvin@hotmail.com > Home Page: < http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Stargate/8958/index.html > Sites: Fortean Times * Northwest Mysteries * Mystic's Cyberpage * TLCB * U.S. Message Text Formatting (USMTF) Program - ------------ Member: Thailand-Laos-Cambodia Brotherhood (TLCB) Mailing List TLCB Web Site: < http://www.tlc-brotherhood.org >[Allies, CIA/NSA, and Vietnam veterans welcome] Southeast Asia (SEA) service: Vietnam - Theater Telecommunications Center/HHC, 1st Aviation Brigade (Jan 71 - Aug 72) Thailand/Laos - Telecommunications Center/U.S. Army Support Thailand (USARSUPTHAI), Camp Samae San (Jan 73 - Aug 73) - Special Security/Strategic Communications - Thailand (STRATCOM - Thailand), Phu Mu (Pig Mountain) Signal Site (Aug 73 - Jan 74) ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 22:23:26 -0700 From: "Terry W. Colvin" Subject: A more moderate read of Echelon "Echelon" is real, but it isn't the all-absorbing big-ear that some people think, nor is it being used for the wrong reasons. - - Bulletin of Nuclear Scientists - < http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00richelson.html > - -- Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean1@frontiernet.net > Alternate: < terry_colvin@hotmail.com > Home Page: < http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Stargate/8958/index.html > Sites: Fortean Times * Northwest Mysteries * Mystic's Cyberpage * TLCB * U.S. Message Text Formatting (USMTF) Program - ------------ Member: Thailand-Laos-Cambodia Brotherhood (TLCB) Mailing List TLCB Web Site: < http://www.tlc-brotherhood.org >[Allies, CIA/NSA, and Vietnam veterans welcome] Southeast Asia (SEA) service: Vietnam - Theater Telecommunications Center/HHC, 1st Aviation Brigade (Jan 71 - Aug 72) Thailand/Laos - Telecommunications Center/U.S. Army Support Thailand (USARSUPTHAI), Camp Samae San (Jan 73 - Aug 73) - Special Security/Strategic Communications - Thailand (STRATCOM - Thailand), Phu Mu (Pig Mountain) Signal Site (Aug 73 - Jan 74) ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 22:54:00 -0700 From: "Terry W. Colvin" Subject: FWD (PVT) Re: TSR-2 and F-111 Aardvarks I'll have to have a delve into my collection of aircraft books for details. From memory: The TSR-2 (Tactical Strike Reconnaissance) aircraft was a BAC (British Aircraft Corporation, became British Aerospace when it merged with Hawker-Siddeley Aircraft, now part of BAE SYSTEMS) project in the late 1950's/early 1960's. The TSR-2 was an extremely ambitious project, intending to replace the V-force (Victor, Vulcan and Valiant aircraft), which formed the United Kingdom's tactical and strike air force after the Second World War. At the time the TSR-2 was being developed, the basic requirement for manned aircraft was being questioned inside the British government. Strategic nuclear missiles were expected to take a future war to the enemy, while local defence would be fulfilled with missile batteries equipped with such weapons as the Bloodhound surface to air missile. Pilots were going to be the dinosaurs of modern warfare, and the need for a major (and very expensive) project to design and build a new manned aircraft was difficult to justify. The TSR-2 was intended to carry nuclear bombs or stand-off short range nuclear missiles. The Buccaneer was a similar nuclear bomber for the Royal Navy that was designed to fly at extremely low altitudes to fly under an enemy's radar, then use a ballistic release (called the "toss bomb" manoeuvre) to lob its weapon with a high degree of accuracy at a target and yet be able to get away before it was caught in the weapon's concussion zone. Early Buccaneers (and the TSR-2 prototypes) were painted anti-flash white in anticipation of their role as nuclear bombers. In the event the weapon for the Buccaneer was never developed. The rotating weapon bay was designed specifically to carry a nuclear weapon (referred to as the "TML" (Target Marker Lanyard) or "TMB" (Target Marker Bomb)), under a project called "Blue Danube". The ballistic missile programme ("Blue Steel") was also cancelled at about the same time, partly justified by the failure of a European space collaboration project between the UK, Germany and France (The Blue Steel component of he launch vehicle worked every time. Components from other contributor nations - notably France - were less than successful.) TSR-2 was a very complex aircraft which had a number of revolutionary design features. It had a sophisticated autopilot and engine control system. It also had a number of teething problems which, like every other high-tech project caused delays and cost overruns. Attention was focussed on, of all things, the undercarriage. The main landing gear had two large wheels in tandem to bear the not inconsiderable weight of the aircraft. The retraction mechanism required the undercarriage bogie to rotate before it could be stowed in the undercarriage bay. This complicated linkage was prone to jamming, and great efforts were made to improve its reliability. Reginald "Bee" Beaumont, its test pilot, had concerns about the reliability of the mechanism. he insisted that it perform at least five cycles on the ground without jamming before he would retract the undercarrige in flight. It turned out that his concerns were justified. On one test flight the undercarriage was retracted. When the gear was lowered in preparatio for the landing, the wheel bogie on one side failed to rotate, such that instead of both wheels being level, one wheel was high and the other low. Beaumont tried the usual trick of applying positive and negative 'g' to shake the machanism loose, but it remained jammed. The option remained to eject, but that would have destroyed the prototype aircraft. Beaumont elected to make an attempt at landing the aircraft, risking the jammed gear tipping it over. In the event, as the wheel touched the ground, the bogie unjammed and deployed properly, allowng the aircraft to land without further incident. Unfortunately, this was latched upon by the government as yet another piece of evidence as to the failure of TSR-2. The project was abruptly cancelled - so abruptly that another prototype was on its maiden flight preflight checks when the order to cease work arrived. The pilot was ordered to shut down the engines and abandon the flight. The aircraft never even flew, even though it was seconds away from its first flight. The existing airframes were ordered to be destroyed, the jigs and tools cut up and notes and drawings shredded. Within weeks all trace of the project were to be expunged. A couple of non-flying prototypes still exist in museums in the UK, saved by BAC employees who refused to allow them to be destroyed. It was a shameful example of how the British government treated its aviation industries after the war, basically stating that it was incapable of matching the design claims of its American rivals. Ironically, the F-111, ordered to replace the TSR-2, cost more and had a poorer performance than the TSR-2. Even the MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft), which became the Tornado, has still not achieved the capabilities of the TSR-2 nearly forty years later. I'll see if I can dig up more details. In the meantime, here are a few pictures: Hope this helps, Robin. - ------ fortean1@frontiernet.net on 10/01/2001 22:35:03 *** WARNING *** This mail has originated outside your organization, either from an external partner or the Global Internet. Keep this in mind if you answer this message. Robert Chambers suggested I contact you for more details on the TSR-2 program. I quote in part his e-mail: >The poor record of the Aardvarks is an old story where the bureaucrats >push aside the cautions of the engineers and other technicians. Shades >of the O-ring! "It upsets those of us who are big TSR-2 fans that the UK govt of the time ditched the programme because of delays and overspends, convinced by the US govt that the F-111 would be on time and on budget, and ended up being even more expensive than the TSR-2 would have been. For more details, contact Robin Hill (robin.hill@baesystems.com) who has a more detailed knowledge of these things. Rob" - -- Terry W. Colvin, Sierra Vista, Arizona (USA) < fortean1@frontiernet.net > Alternate: < terry_colvin@hotmail.com > Home Page: < http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Stargate/8958/index.html > Sites: Fortean Times * Northwest Mysteries * Mystic's Cyberpage * TLCB * U.S. Message Text Formatting (USMTF) Program - ------------ Member: Thailand-Laos-Cambodia Brotherhood (TLCB) Mailing List TLCB Web Site: < http://www.tlc-brotherhood.org >[Allies, CIA/NSA, and Vietnam veterans welcome] Southeast Asia (SEA) service: Vietnam - Theater Telecommunications Center/HHC, 1st Aviation Brigade (Jan 71 - Aug 72) Thailand/Laos - Telecommunications Center/U.S. Army Support Thailand (USARSUPTHAI), Camp Samae San (Jan 73 - Aug 73) - Special Security/Strategic Communications - Thailand (STRATCOM - Thailand), Phu Mu (Pig Mountain) Signal Site (Aug 73 - Jan 74) ------------------------------ End of skunk-works-digest V9 #93 ******************************** To subscribe to skunk-works-digest, send the command: subscribe in the body of a message to "majordomo@netwrx1.com". 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