From owner-skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Thu Oct 25 07:39:55 2001 Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 17:30:34 -0500 From: skunk-works-digest Reply-To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com To: skunk-works-digest@netwrx1.com Subject: skunk-works-digest V10 #36 skunk-works-digest Wednesday, October 24 2001 Volume 10 : Number 036 Index of this digest by subject: *************************************************** Re: UCAVs Re: UCAVs Re: UCAVs Re: UCAVs Re: UCAVs Re: UCAVs Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis Re: UCAVs text of Stratfor article (UCAVs - Afghan War Will Shape Future U. S. Military Structure) *************************************************** ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 07:47:01 -0700 From: "Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" Subject: Re: UCAVs Someone forgot to tell Sandia this about fifteen years ago... Kurt We're a very long way from having robots firing lethal weapons on anything. For the foreseeable future... ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 16:10:22 +0100 From: "David" Subject: Re: UCAVs From: "Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" > Someone forgot to tell Sandia this about fifteen years ago... > > Kurt > > > We're a very long way from having robots firing lethal weapons on anything. > For the foreseeable future... Your response would have been a good deal more helpful if you'd cited a reference to the project you describe. Are you saying that Sandia Labs had a functioning UCAV flying 15 years ago ? Please let me know the project name and the lead prof and I'll call him. Let me define my terms wrt a robot UCAV: I mean an autonomous flying machine, that is able to process raw data into information - then into real world knowledge and act upon that knowledge to strike a target without reference to a human being. If a vehicle is remotely piloted - it's not autonomous and therefore not a robot in my book. YMMV. D ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 10:12:27 -0500 From: "Allen Thomson" Subject: Re: UCAVs > Someone forgot to tell Sandia this about fifteen years ago... > > Kurt A reference what you're talking about would be helpful. Are you saying that there are autonomous, mobile, lethal robots currently in use by the US military? (Aside from some guided and sensor-fuzed weapons mentioned in earlier messages.) > > We're a very long way from having robots firing lethal weapons on anything. > For the foreseeable future... ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 08:18:39 -0700 From: "Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" Subject: Re: UCAVs Oops. Not quite then. Kurt Let me define my terms wrt a robot UCAV: I mean an autonomous flying machine, that is able to process raw data into information - then into real world knowledge and act upon that knowledge to strike a target without reference to a human being. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 16:43:18 +0100 From: "David" Subject: Re: UCAVs Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" > Oops. Not quite then. > > Kurt > > Let me define my terms wrt a robot UCAV: I mean an autonomous flying > machine, that is able to process raw data into information - then into real > world knowledge and act upon that knowledge > to strike a target without reference to a human being. What was Sandia working on back then? I'm still interested. Best D ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 09:10:53 -0700 From: "Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" Subject: Re: UCAVs UAVs amongst other things. Kurt - --- Ross Technologies Signals Intelligence Division Rosetta Proving Grounds - ----- Original Message ----- From: "David" To: Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 08:43 Subject: Re: UCAVs > Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" > > > Oops. Not quite then. > > > > Kurt > > > > Let me define my terms wrt a robot UCAV: I mean an autonomous flying > > machine, that is able to process raw data into information - then into > real > > world knowledge and act upon that knowledge > > to strike a target without reference to a human being. > > What was Sandia working on back then? I'm still interested. > > Best > D ------------------------------ Date: 24 Oct 2001 09:25:20 -0700 From: gregd@habu2.net Subject: Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis On Wed, 24 October 2001, "David" wrote: > .... Laser and GPS guided munitions have a high level of > electronic sophistication - any of which can go wrong or be programmed > incorrectly - the Chinese embassy debacle for example. I had the opportunity to meet with and talk to the B-2 pilots on the "Chinese embassy" mission. They stated that the bombs hit their programmed target. I tend to believe that since the B-2 mission profile - especially the weapon delivery part - is pretty much a "hands off" affair. While one could assume an error in target programming there was also talk (at the time) that the building in question was the source of certain intelligence operations and therefore was a legitimate target, if not a politically correct one. Greg Fieser ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 17:44:28 +0100 From: "David" Subject: Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis - ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robin Hill" To: Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 4:04 PM Subject: Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis > David (win@dircon.co.uk) wrote: > > >We're a very long way from having robots firing lethal weapons on anything. > >For the foreseeable future, UCAVs will occupy a relatively small niche in > >aerial warfare. SEAD is the most often cited by military planners. If a UCAV > >acquires a radar tracking station AND the man-in-the-loop - confirms that > >target - he'll fire a HARM against it. The man - not the machine makes the > >decision. > > Okay, so how does this work with "fire and forget" type devices? I agree that > at one point in the weapon-firing event, a human pressed a trigger, but with > highly automated devices there's still going to be some decision-making left to > the brains-on-board. When I've mentioned 'decision making' to AI people they usually go quite pale as it's a hugely complex process involving the drawing together of often disparate factors into some form of rationale. So, I'm going to have ask you to define what you mean. If you mean processing general pattern matching algorithms so that a weapon hits the best fit from its pre-programmed profiles that's not decision making - that's running a software programme. >When does, say, the pre-programming of a target for a > cruise missile get beyond the control of the human mission planner and into > the realms of an artificially-intelligent weapon controller. When designers and the customers allow the weapon that level of autonomy. I've mentioned pattern matching software - that's a step in the direction of autonomous strike capability - but it's still programmed by a human. The UCAV cannot conceive what a target of opportunity is any more than it can understand the level of situational awareness that's second nature to a combat pilot. Writing a program that would break down the concept of a target of opportunity into terms that a computer could quickly process and act upon would be an interesting challenge I suspect. >For example, do > we look at the possibility of building devices that can be left on the > battlefield, or loiter in the air above it, waiting for a target of opportunity > to come along (i.e. a "smart" land mine, for example, designed to only attack > when "it" decides that it has detected a legitimate military target)? Again, you're talking about machine decision making. Human beings with infinitely more sophisticated data processing and retrival abilities have major problems making good decisions. The concept of a good decision often depends on your POV - it is not an absolute. > >Why does it matter if the weapon delivery platform is unmanned or the finger > >that presses the fire button is remote from the a/c. > > Arguably, you "press the firing trigger" as soon as you arm an unmanned > device. With a mine, for example, the firing trigger is effectively pressed > at the moment it's buried. The fact that it's victim actually operates it > is beside the point, all that has happened is that there's been an indefinable > delay between the trigger being pressed and the weapon firing. Your original statement was: " We might even get into a spirited debate on the ethics of robots firing lethal weapons at human targets." I fail to see how a land mine fits into even the broadest defn. of robot. Therefore, it has nothing to do with this discussion surely. > I understand that weapons systems like Phalanx can be programmed to monitor > and react to detected threats that fulfil predetermined criteria (speed, > direction of approach, and so on). Is there still a human operator on hand > to press a safety switch or dead-man's handle to abort or confirm a live > fire event? And even if there is, how soon would it be that this kind of > human-in-the-loop delay would prove unacceptable to ensure a prompt response > to an incoming threat? Even if you could accept the human error risks. As the Phalanx is a close-in naval weapons system - a last defence if you like to counter anti-ship missiles and fast moving and/or small objects that have penetrated other systems, it has to be a very fast response system. That's why it has a high degree of autonomy. You don't have time to consider options. It uses FLIR and radar to search, detect, evaluate, track, engage and kill incoming hostiles - so there is an 'audit trail' behind any firing, and the reasons for it can be analysed. It's hardly likely to pose a risk to civilians. I'm afraid I don't see your point. > > I'm drawing a subtle line here between acquiring a target and loosing a weapon > directly against it, and activating a weapon system on the off chance that *it* > can detect a target for itself, without the need for human guidance. Hoping that a weapons system will detect and destroy a valid target on the off chance without reference to very strict parameters and/or human intervention would worry me greatly - especially at the present state of AI. On the other hand: reduction of Sensor to Shooter time is a key area where technology can assist the military to respond in a timely and effective manner. There is > a moratorium on the laying of land mines, because they would fall into the > second category (removing the human operator from the triggering of the weapon > against a target). How close to this line do modern, or proposed, weapon > systems get? The difference in lying in a hole in the ground waiting for > something to step on it and stooging around with an array of sensors linked > to a control system with set of valid target criteria looking for something > to shoot at is only down to different points on a graph of sophistication. Representing the difference between dumb bombs and LGBs on a graph of sophistication is also simply a question of plotting two points. That doesn't mean that the high cost of the technology involved isn't a huge advance in saving innocent lives. Not perfect by any means, but the level of commitment to reducing civilian casualties is real and demonstrable. > > >The level of automation in warfare is increasing - that's natural - and it > >saves lives. Cruise missiles are like one-way UCAVs and few people have a > >problem with them. Laser and GPS guided munitions have a high level of > >electronic sophistication - any of which can go wrong or be programmed > >incorrectly - the Chinese embassy debacle for example. > > This goes back to the comment about having a target and launching a weapon > directly against it. It's like throwing a very smart, self-propelled stone > at a beer can on a rock. What happens if you make your stone able to > discriminate between the beer can you originally wanted to hit, and a > stack of beer cans hiding behind the rock, that the stone can only see > after you've thrown it? Especially if the wind has blown your intended > target over and the stone has been warned that it is a very valuable stone > and mustn't waste itself by just hitting bare rocks. You might have the best > of all intentions in targeting the original beer can, but if your weapon > system has the ability to adapt unassisted to changing situations, the > entire dynamic of the battlefield, indeed the whole war, changes greatly. > > The "level of automation in warfare is increasing" comment is very > important, especially if you start using learning devices such as neural > nets. How do we know whether or not we're still completely in control of > these devices, especially if we start making them resistant to spoofing? > Could we ever reach a situation where, for example, a control system > starts destroying its own functioning, but damaged, units because they > slow up the undamaged ones? Ontologies, evidential reasoning techniques, probability theory etc. are going to offer more advanced machine learning for sure - and that opens up a whole new vista. But it seems to be a question of deciding that within you neural net, fuzzy logic or whatever you have a super-ordinate construct-like system that will not allow the machine's data processing to do certain things or get so creative that it represents a threat to humans. > And can you trust a robot warrior to know when the struggle is over and > it can stop fighting and sue for peace? (Or at least unload its weapons > and return to its barracks.) A robot will only know the conflict is over when it's told to stop running the attack program and revert to the default benign status. > All this automation lets you distance yourself from the actual business > of harming the enemy. If it gets too comfortable then what's to stop > you treating it all as just a giant game? Oddly enough and FWIW, I find military personnel rarely if ever forget that war a messy and imprecise business. Civilians, because they're removed from the realities of warfare are often far more Gung-Ho. The level of scientific and technological literacy of the general public is so low that they don't seem to understand how difficult it is to only kill the bad guys and leave the good guys standing. As you know, precision ordnance is expensive - some of it wildly so and the US should be commended for the extensive use they've made of it. > > Just a thought. Very interesting points Robin and thanks for them. I hope I've explained my position a little better. Best D ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 12:45:49 -0400 From: John Szalay Subject: Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis At 08:18 AM 10/24/01 -0500, you wrote: >Perhaps some aeroexpert could comment on something that I've wondered >about: > >The armed UCAV in question, the RQ-1 Predator, isn't all that big, and the >Hellfire >missile isn't all that small. >http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/RQ_1_Predator_Unmanned_Aerial.html >http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/graphics/attack/response_12.html > >Hanging a missile on each wing of the Predator doesn't seem to be a trivial >task from either the structure or control viewpoint. Did the original >Predator >design incorporate hardpoints, perhaps for extended-range fuel tanks? >Or was the possibility of weaponizing it always in mind? > >Or is the modification just easier than it looks to me? > http://www.ga.com/news/RQ-1.html "The UAV was equipped with "hard points" by General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems International (GA-ASI), the prime contractor in San Diego, Calif., according to Major Pry. We knew we needed to reinforce the structural, weight-bearing capabilities of Predator, by adding composites to its forward and rear spars, plus some aluminum for attaching the hard points." http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/predator.htm ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 12:31:48 -0500 From: "Allen Thomson" Subject: Re: UCAVs and Stratfor analysis > http://www.ga.com/news/RQ-1.html > "The UAV was equipped with "hard points" by General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems International (GA-ASI), the prime contractor in San Diego, Calif., according to Major Pry. We knew we needed to reinforce the structural, weight-bearing capabilities of Predator, by adding composites to its forward and rear spars, plus some aluminum for attaching the hard points." Thank you. So it appears they did have to beef up the existing airframe. Nice job. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 19:17:05 +0100 From: "David" Subject: Re: UCAVs "Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" > UAVs amongst other things. > > Kurt > From: "David" > > > Mr. K. Rudolph, KD7JYK" > > > > > Oops. Not quite then. > > > > > > Kurt > > > > > > Let me define my terms wrt a robot UCAV: I mean an autonomous flying > > > machine, that is able to process raw data into information - then into > > real > > > world knowledge and act upon that knowledge > > > to strike a target without reference to a human being. > > > > What was Sandia working on back then? I'm still interested. > > > > Best > > D Thanks for clearing that up. It's amazing how far UAVs date back. I seem to recall seeing a photograph of Marilyn Monroe on a production line, building small UAVs in the late 30s / early 40s. I think it may have been at Radioplane. Even before that was the Kettering 'Bug' - a precursor to the cruise missile - goes back to WWI timeframe. Remarkable engineering. Best D ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 15:29:35 -0700 From: Erik Hoel Subject: text of Stratfor article (UCAVs - Afghan War Will Shape Future U. S. Military Structure) Got the thumbs up from George. Erik ___________________________________________________________________ S T R A T F O R THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY http://www.stratfor.com ___________________________________________________________________ 23 October 2001 THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT - FULL TEXT FOR MEMBERS ONLY -> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY FOR MEMBERS ONLY: * Afghan War Will Shape Future U.S. Military Structure http://www.stratfor.com/home/0110232100.htm * Southwest Saudi Arabia: Hotbed of Radical Islam http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/0110232200.htm * Putin's Quest for the West http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0110231940.htm * Argentina: Default's Domino Effect http://www.stratfor.com/latinamerica/commentary/0110232300.htm ___________________________________________________________________ Afghan War Will Shape Future U.S. Military Structure Summary U.S. defense officials have acknowledged that the United States is using armed drones in Afghanistan. This development is important not so much for what it contributes to the war effort there but for what it contributes to the ongoing debate over U.S. defense restructuring. Deployment of unmanned combat air vehicles could signal a major shift in the focus of Air Force planners away from manned tactical aircraft. This is just one of many repercussions the Sept. 11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan could have on the future structure of U.S. forces. Analysis U.S. defense officials have acknowledged that the United States is using armed drones in Afghanistan. This could have a substantial impact on the debate over U.S. defense restructuring. Deployment of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) could signal a major shift in the focus of Air Force planners away from manned tactical aircraft. This will be just one of the many repercussions the Sept. 11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan will have on the future structure of U.S. forces. Bush administration officials have repeatedly said the United States is now waging "a new kind of war." That new war is already revealing weaknesses in force structure, and Defense Department officials are taking their first steps to deal with the new shape of battle. On Oct. 18 unnamed U.S. defense officials told journalists the United States has been using armed variants of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Afghanistan for several months. According to the Washington Post, a few RQ-1 Predator UAVs, designed for reconnaissance, have been fitted with Hellfire air-to-surface anti-tank missiles. The first test-firing of missiles from what is now a Predator UCAV took place in Nevada in February, and the remote-controlled UCAVs have reportedly fired missiles in combat several times in Afghanistan. The United States has increasingly used UAVs in its sub-critical military engagements abroad over the past six years. UAVs are used in areas where the risks to manned operations outweigh the potential benefits of the mission. They were used extensively over Yugoslavia and have seen recent service over Iraq. UAVs are relatively simple, cheap and, most important, unmanned -- rendering their loss in combat less politically and militarily costly. By fitting arms to unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, the military is able to reduce the time between identification and destruction of a target during an air strike. The arming of UAVs mirrors the evolution of manned combat aircraft from simple reconnaissance platforms to ground attack systems. Further evolution into fighter, long-range bomber and electronic warfare systems will undoubtedly follow soon. The arrival of the Predator UCAV on the Afghan battlefield has limited impact. Reportedly only a few of the conversions are available. Moreover they are crude, first-generation UCAVs, with vulnerable communications and control systems and no defensive countermeasures. And UCAVs face the same problems as manned aircraft -- specifically, scarce targets in unforgiving terrain. The significance of the UCAV's deployment lies in what it says about the mindset among senior planners and commanders in the Air Force. The Air Force has been loath to throw its full support to UCAVs because they threaten manned combat aircraft, the bread and butter of the Air Force. Senior officers built their careers on fighter jets and cling to them as the 1930s Navy clung to battleships. UCAVs lack glamour and can be used by anyone. The CIA reportedly controls the Predators in Afghanistan. U.S. Marines have already practiced with man portable UAVs for tactical reconnaissance. If the Air Force is fully behind the deployment of UCAVs in Afghanistan, this indicates Air Force planners are ahead of the curve in recognizing the military shakeup the Afghan war and the ongoing war against radical Islamic militants will generate. Of all the services, the Air Force stands to emerge from Afghanistan on track for the greatest changes. But this in no way will be thanks to its strategic bombing or ground attack record in that country. Quite the contrary, Afghanistan demonstrates the weaknesses of the Air Force's current structure. Landlocked and surrounded by countries to varying degrees politically at odds with the United States, Afghanistan is a difficult target for the Air Force to reach. This necessitated the use of long-range assets based well out of theater, such as the B-1, B-2 and B-52, as well as cruise missiles. The United States had to do substantial political horse-trading to open airspace to U.S. overflights and even more to obtain access to bases near enough to deploy tactical aircraft. The security of those tactical bases and the air space surrounding Afghanistan is in jeopardy daily. And even when all goes well, targets in Afghanistan are few and of limited value. In demonstrating these limitations, the war in Afghanistan shifts attention to new systems and missions already proposed by Pentagon and Air Force planners. The lack of secure bases near Afghanistan bolsters the argument for the proposed intercontinental hypersonic strategic bomber. Increasing the sortie rate from bases far outside the target theater would give the Air Force the "global reach" it has been touting. The same factors that promote the intercontinental bomber will lower the priority of manned fighters. Manned jet fighters are expensive, they require tremendous logistical support and they carry a great deal of political baggage when they go looking for overseas bases. UCAVs, with low acquisition and operating costs, low profile, low risk and the ability to loiter for long periods over the target, are much better suited than jet tactical fighters for a prolonged anti-guerrilla campaign in the Afghan wastes. The Air Force will experience its biggest boost from the Afghan campaign in the area of space operations. Although it can eventually be fitted with defensive countermeasures, the UCAV's greatest inherent weakness is in its link to communications satellites. The Taliban do not have electronic warfare or anti- satellite capabilities, but the same cannot be said for other countries that harbor or assist Islamic militants. The satellites and lines of communication are increasingly vulnerable and in need of defense. This is the case for more than just UCAV command and control. The center of gravity for almost every U.S. system deployed in Afghanistan -- from cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions to Special Forces ground troops -- is the global positioning system (GPS). GPS is a vulnerable system whose architecture was built on the assumption that its ground- and space-based facilities were secure. Space Command, a largely Air Force joint command, will assume much higher priority following the Afghan war. The Army also will experience a post-Afghanistan restructuring. The war against Islamic extremists will not be confined to one engagement, and it will not be confined to Afghanistan. It will be a decade-long campaign spanning the globe. But even though further military action is likely, it probably will not involve major deployments of ground troops. Most of the targets in this war are small units, and national level targets like Iraq are gradually becoming off limits, given the political demands of regional allies. At the same time, there is no other large strategic threat on the horizon -- a perspective that, however shortsighted, will be encouraged by the pressing demands of this war. Earlier this year, China was shaping up as a potential new strategic threat, but even had the Sept. 11 attacks not occurred, the United States was never going to muster and deploy large units of ground troops against China. As long as the war on Islamic extremists is under way, Russia is more likely to maneuver into an allied role rather than challenge the United States in large-scale land combat. Certainly a demand for larger units will remain, to deal with commitments like North Korea and Kosovo. There also will be an increased demand and role for the National Guard in homeland defense. But the overall emphasis in the Army after Afghanistan will be on smaller and more efficient units. Afghanistan and the subsequent engagements of the war on Islamic militants will place tremendous emphasis on Special Forces. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. Special Operations Command has been elevated to report directly, via the secretary of defense, to the president. With higher priority and higher prestige will come higher funding, something the Army will encourage. As these units are deployed with increasing regularity, they will need to grow in number. They are also likely to adopt high-tech force multipliers such as integrated command and control systems, advanced fire control and body armor. Special Forces units currently using 1960s and 1970s vintage helicopters will need better aviation assets for long-range, covert operations. This could give impetus to the development of the V-22 Osprey or to follow-on systems, as the Marine Corps has already suggested. As for Marines, the Afghan campaign and subsequent engagements may offer a role somewhere between the old large Army unit and the new focus on Special Forces. Some scenarios in Afghanistan call for the creation of enclaves inside Afghanistan, from which Special Forces missions could be launched deeper into the country. The United States would not accept foreign control of these beachheads, but the limited numbers of Special Forces could not secure their own bases. Regular Army troops would be inappropriate to the mission. Units more specialized in training and equipment than the regular Army -- but larger in size than Special Forces -- are needed. These units could do what a small unit can't: take and hold ground. The Marines, along with Army units like the 82nd and 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division, could perform this role. Afghanistan will deal a major blow to the Navy in terms of U.S. military priorities. Al Qaeda does not have much of a navy, and its one naval encounter with the United States turned out badly for the USS Cole. The Navy's nuclear arm is sidelined, as boomers are of little use against terrorist cells in Florida. And carrier-based aircraft face the same range problem as Air Force tactical assets, only more so. Navy fighters and attack aircraft don't have the range to strike deep in Afghanistan without refueling over politically volatile countries. The Navy will still have a significant role to play. Maritime threats remain the first strategic priority for the United States, and the Navy will be tasked with keeping other crises in check while the Air Force and Army focus on al Qaeda. However, the Navy will be forced to struggle for funding to deal with long-term threats -- competing with other services' demands for immediate funding to deal with clear and present dangers. The Navy could draw something new from the two valuable roles it played against Afghanistan. Naval vessels served first as mobile cruise missile launch pads. Additionally the USS Kitty Hawk was converted to serve as an offshore base for Special Forces units. These roles could revive two dead projects: the Arsenal Ship, a missile-laden dreadnought, and the Mobile Offshore Base, a cross between an aircraft carrier, oil drilling platform and military depot. Finally, the war on Islamic militants will prompt a reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community and its interactions with the military. In spite of an attempt to create a centralized intelligence system for the United States following World War II, the U.S. intelligence and counter-intelligence communities have become a tangled mass of bureaucracies. Apart from the CIA, there are NSA, NRO, DIA, FBI, the intelligence services of various military branches and so on. There are also a number of military, paramilitary and non- military entities capable of taking action in covert operations. These range from the CIA's Directorate of Operations to the Defense Department's Special Operations Command. Laid end to end, there is endless opportunity for misunderstanding and chaos. Homeland defense is about streamlining security. There will have to be an equivalent streamlining of foreign intelligence collection and military operations. The war in Afghanistan is the first step in a decade-long war, and it is already demonstrating the weaknesses of the U.S. force structure. Prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, the Defense Department was deep in a bottoms-up review. That process will now be accelerated and revised to deal with the new shape of battle, and it will impose some dramatic changes on the U.S. armed services. ___________________________________________________________________ <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< SEND THIS TO A FRIEND! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Did you like this analysis? Then forward it to a friend! Got this from a friend? 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